University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
Spring 2010

The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct: A
Randomized Low-Intensity Probation Experiment
Charlotte E. Gill
University of Pennsylvania, cegill00@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Criminology Commons

Recommended Citation
Gill, Charlotte E., "The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct: A Randomized Low-Intensity
Probation Experiment" (2010). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 121.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/121

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/121
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

The Effects of Sanction Intensity on Criminal Conduct: A Randomized LowIntensity Probation Experiment
Abstract
Probation is a well-established part of our criminal justice toolkit, but we know surprisingly little about the
circumstances under which it is effective. Attempts to increase supervision intensity for crime- and costsaving purposes have yielded mixed results at best. This dissertation examines the theory and scientific
evidence on the effectiveness of probation, and the impact of changing the intensity of probation
sanctions on recidivism.
First, we conduct a rigorous search and synthesis of the existing literature on intensive probation
programs. We utilize meta-analysis to identify the circumstances under which such programs might be
effective. We find no evidence that probationers in these programs fare better than their counterparts
under traditional supervision. We call for further research into supervision approaches that emphasize
behavioral management over contact frequency and caseload size. Second, we employ a range of
statistical procedures to examine the viability of saving resources by reducing supervision for low-risk
offenders. In a randomized controlled trial comparing low-intensity probation to traditional practice, we
find no evidence that reducing supervision increases recidivism. We find that low-risk probationers are
heterogeneous in their characteristics but homogeneous in their propensity to reoffend. They appear to
respond well regardless of the intensity of the sanction. Finally, we use epidemiological methods to
evaluate the low-risk prediction model used in the experiment. We find that the model successfully
identifies offenders who are unlikely to commit serious offenses, and is therefore a useful tool for
diverting probationers to low-intensity supervision. In turn, low-intensity supervision is not associated with
changes in offending severity. Chapters 2 and 3 both conclude that low-intensity supervision is a safe
strategy that works very well for a probation agency’s lowest-level offenders.
This dissertation contributes to knowledge by changing perceptions of the characteristics of offenders
and resource allocation in criminal justice supervision. We find that ‘more’ does not always mean ‘better,’
and there is no need to distribute expensive services equally. In a given probation population, the majority
of offenders will respond well no matter how little supervision they receive, so it makes sense to focus
our attention on the minority that will not.
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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF SANCTION INTENSITY ON CRIMINAL CONDUCT:
A RANDOMIZED LOW-INTENSITY PROBATION EXPERIMENT

Charlotte Elizabeth Gill

John MacDonald

Probation is a well-established part of our criminal justice toolkit, but we know
surprisingly little about the circumstances under which it is effective.

Attempts to

increase supervision intensity for crime- and cost-saving purposes have yielded mixed
results at best. This dissertation examines the theory and scientific evidence on the
effectiveness of probation, and the impact of changing the intensity of probation
sanctions on recidivism.
First, we conduct a rigorous search and synthesis of the existing literature on
intensive probation programs. We utilize meta-analysis to identify the circumstances
under which such programs might be effective. We find no evidence that probationers in
these programs fare better than their counterparts under traditional supervision. We call
for further research into supervision approaches that emphasize behavioral management
over contact frequency and caseload size. Second, we employ a range of statistical
procedures to examine the viability of saving resources by reducing supervision for lowrisk offenders. In a randomized controlled trial comparing low-intensity probation to
v

traditional practice, we find no evidence that reducing supervision increases recidivism.
We find that low-risk probationers are heterogeneous in their characteristics but
homogeneous in their propensity to reoffend. They appear to respond well regardless of
the intensity of the sanction. Finally, we use epidemiological methods to evaluate the
low-risk prediction model used in the experiment. We find that the model successfully
identifies offenders who are unlikely to commit serious offenses, and is therefore a useful
tool for diverting probationers to low-intensity supervision.

In turn, low-intensity

supervision is not associated with changes in offending severity. Chapters 2 and 3 both
conclude that low-intensity supervision is a safe strategy that works very well for a
probation agency’s lowest-level offenders.
This dissertation contributes to knowledge by changing perceptions of the
characteristics of offenders and resource allocation in criminal justice supervision. We
find that ‘more’ does not always mean ‘better,’ and there is no need to distribute
expensive services equally. In a given probation population, the majority of offenders
will respond well no matter how little supervision they receive, so it makes sense to focus
our attention on the minority that will not.
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PREFACE
This dissertation presents an examination of the impact of changing the intensity
of the probation sanction on the recidivism of adjudicated probation clients. Historically,
research on probation supervision has revolved around the assumption that more
intensive (increased) supervision is the best way to ensure public safety and prevent
crime, while saving money relative to incarceration. However, that assumption was not,
for the most part, evidence-based. Rigorous research has shown that intensive probation
programs yield mixed results at best, and may be even less effective for the least serious
offenders. This dissertation addresses two broad questions: What scientific evidence is
there for the effectiveness of probation supervision? Does variation in its intensity affect
crime outcomes?

The following three chapters represent three stand-alone papers

looking at different aspects of these questions: a review of the existing evidence; a
randomized controlled trial of low-intensity supervision; and a method for predicting
low-risk offenders suitable for minimal supervision.
Chapter 1 reports the results of a rigorous search and synthesis of the existing
literature on intensive supervision probation (ISP). Although ISP is one of the most
thoroughly tested criminal justice interventions, the evaluations have never been
identified and synthesized in a methodologically rigorous way. We examine forty-seven
experimental and quasi-experimental studies conducted over the last fifty years using
meta-analytic techniques to investigate whether and under what circumstances ISP might
be effective. We find no evidence that the mostly high-risk probationers on ISP fare any
better than their counterparts who receive traditional supervision. Increased supervision
xi

intensity makes no difference to recidivism, and tends to increase the rate of technical
violations (which can lead to returns to jail and further criminalization) due to the
increased surveillance inherent in the process. However, we find several more recent
studies that show more promising reductions in recidivism. These programs tend to focus
more closely on the content of supervision, which remains a largely neglected aspect of
probation, rather than contact frequency and caseload size.

We conclude that the

assumption that “more is better” does not necessarily hold true, and that it is more
important to ask what probation officers are expected to achieve during supervision.
Chapters 2 and 3 build on the findings from an experiment conducted with the
Philadelphia Adult Probation and Parole Department (APPD), in which the agency
restructured supervision activities along risk-based lines. Sixty per cent of APPD’s
caseload was filtered into reduced-intensity supervision based on a statistical prediction
that they were at low risk of serious recidivism. The removal of resources from some
probationers has met with criticism, despite the longer-term goal of the project: to free up
staff to work more closely with the dangerous offenders who increase the public’s fear of
crime. The goal of these chapters is to provide a rigorous evaluation of low-intensity
supervision and the suitability of the prediction model, to ensure first that no serious
offenders inadvertently receive too little supervision, and second that reduced supervision
in itself is not criminogenic.

While Chapter 1 shows no evidence that increased

supervision prevents serious offenders from committing crimes, it remains important to
show that reduced supervision does not lead to unfavorable outcomes. The policy cannot
work as a resource-saving strategy if agencies view it as too politically risky.

xii

From a theoretical standpoint, Chapters 2 and 3 also provide an insight into the
nature of low-risk offenders and the types of crime they commit. Understandably, a great
deal of attention is paid in the criminological literature to unpacking the characteristics of
more serious offenders, but in developing low-intensity supervision the Philadelphia
APPD hypothesized that the majority of its caseload could be classified as low risk. If it
is true that the majority of offenders pose little risk of serious recidivism, it is important
to learn how they compare to the minority who pose a greater threat.
In Chapter 2 we utilize a range of statistical procedures to break down the main
results of the low-intensity supervision experiment, in order to ensure that there are no
circumstances under which reduced supervision increases recidivism.

We find no

evidence that this was the case. We use instrumental variables techniques to model the
characteristics of low-risk offenders and their relationship to take-up and outcomes of
low-intensity probation. We find that low-risk offenders represent a much broader range
of society than the traditional ‘young male’ offender. However, they have an extremely
low propensity to reoffend and appear to perform well regardless of the degree of
supervision they receive. Thus, we conclude that it is not necessary to treat all offenders
equally when it comes to probation supervision. Standards can be relaxed for most
offenders to allow probation officers to spend more time with higher-risk clients, working
to identify and address their needs. For such a model to work in practice, a good
prediction model is needed to identify who can safely be diverted to the low-intensity
unit.
Chapter 3 examines whether the prediction model used in the low-intensity
supervision experiment, which classifies offenders as low and non-low risk based on their
xiii

risk of committing just the most serious crimes, is an effective tool for the type of risk
management strategy employed by Philadelphia APPD.

Using methods from the

epidemiology field, we assess the sensitivity of the model to the patterns of offending
severity exhibited in a sample of probationers. We find that low-risk offenders have a
very low propensity for serious offending, while those receiving a non-low risk
prediction are much more likely to engage in these offense types. The model appears to
successfully recognize this over several different definitions of severity. Furthermore,
there is no change in offending severity when supervision is reduced for predicted lowrisk offenders. We find further evidence of the homogeneity in this sample’s propensity
to reoffend regardless of supervision intensity.

Predicted low-risk offenders with a

history of serious offending respond just the same to reduced supervision as they do to
regular supervision. For those without a serious offending history, reduced supervision is
even associated with reductions in recidivism compared to the status quo. Thus, we
conclude that low-intensity supervision is a safe and effective strategy that works
particularly well for a probation agency’s lowest-level offenders.

xiv

CHAPTER 1. Is ‘More’ Really ‘Better’? The Impact of Intensive
Probation Supervision on Recidivism.

Introduction
Probation is one of the most frequently-used criminal sanctions in the United
States (American Correctional Association, 2006). At the end of 2008, nearly 5.1 million
adults were on probation alone – 84 per cent of all adults under community supervision.
In all, one in forty-five U.S. adults is on probation or parole.1 Although growth slowed
slightly in 2008, the population under community supervision has been steadily rising for
some time, increasing by more than half a million between 2000 and 2008 (Glaze &
Bonczar, 2009).
Despite the extent of its use, probation has suffered from image problems,
particularly a public perception that it is a ‘soft’ approach to crime for often serious
offenders who are highly likely to recidivate.2 Subsequently, many probation agencies
have struggled to access sufficient funding (Petersilia, 1997). This highlights a clear
need for probation agencies to identify supervision practices that are effective at reducing
recidivism, and at the same time represent an efficient use of scarce resources. Taxman
(2002) notes that considerable research has been dedicated to programming and services
that are often provided in conjunction with or on referral from probation, such as
cognitive-behavioral therapy, drug courts, and skill-building programs (see also
MacKenzie, 2006a; 2006b). Yet comparatively little attention has been paid to the
1

impact of probation supervision itself on crime: the number of cases a probation officer
handles, the frequency of contact between officer and client, and the nature of the
interaction. Supervision is perhaps considered an uninteresting part of the probation
process, “in the background of other programming” and therefore “inconsequential to
effectiveness” (Taxman, 2002, p. 179).
On the contrary, supervision is a crucial aspect of probation not only because it is
the bedrock of programming, but also because in a chronically under-funded enterprise it
may constitute the only interaction between client and agency. In this regard it may
directly impact the client’s future criminal behavior.

If a probation officer with a

caseload of 150 clients has inadequate time to spend with each one, s/he may find it
impossible to build an accurate picture of individuals’ needs in order to target
programming most effectively. Supervision levels vary widely, from weekly or twiceweekly meetings for high-risk or delinquent probationers, to telephone reporting for those
near the end of their sentences. In some busy agencies ‘supervision’ may constitute
nothing more than a mail-in contact detail confirmation card (Petersilia & Turner, 1993,
p. 285). It is not always clear whether supervision intensity is related to the client’s needs
or risk, or whether it is simply determined by operational capabilities.
In this paper, we conduct a systematic search for literature on probation
supervision intensity and synthesize the results using meta-analytic techniques to present
the most current knowledge about the effect of changing intensity on probationers’
subsequent criminal conduct. We find that the amount of supervision in itself does not
appear to be associated with recidivism outcomes. More supervision may in fact increase

2

probation violation rates because offenders are at greater risk of detection. The literature
on intensive probation also sheds very little light on the nature of effective practices.

Background
Intensive supervision probation (ISP) is one aspect of probation that has received
considerable research attention. ISP programs usually consist of small caseloads and
enhanced reporting requirements. However, interest in the practice has evolved from a
need to find punitive alternatives to imprisonment rather than a general desire to
understand more about supervision practices. As a result, there has been very little
articulation of the theoretical basis for its hypothesized effectiveness beyond the
assumption that ‘more is better.’ Indeed, Bennett (1988) described ISP as “a practice in
search of a theory.”
Skeem and Manchak (2008) propose that probation supervision may follow one
of three broad guiding philosophies: control/surveillance, treatment, or a hybrid of both.
ISP programs developed over the last fifty years have fallen into all three of these
categories, but the ‘classic’ model has been a surveillance strategy designed to keep track
of serious offenders who would otherwise be incarcerated. As such, ISP appears rooted
in traditional theories of formal social control and deterrence. Offenders are offered the
opportunity to remain in the community on the understanding that they are being
constantly monitored, and the consequence of failure is the loss of liberty. Several
qualitative studies have noted that most offenders express a preference for incarceration
over intermediate sanctions like ISP (e.g., Crouch, 1993; Petersilia & Deschenes, 1994),
3

which perhaps suggests that ISP is a more unpleasant prospect than prison for adjudicated
offenders and could therefore have a strong deterrent effect against future offending.
MacKenzie and Brame (2001) suggested an alternative mechanism by which social
controls operate through ISP. They proposed that increased supervision intensity could
lead to increased involvement in conventional and therapeutic activities, and found some
support for that hypothesis through empirical testing. Overall, ISP studies have usually
focused on the field testing of programs and avoided any explication of the theoretical
foundations of probation supervision.
Clear and Hardyman (1990) describe two waves of interest in ISP research: the
first in the 1960s, and another in the mid-1980s. More recently, a third wave of research
has refined the application of increased supervision intensity, considering its relationship
with carefully matched programming and treatment. The earliest set of field studies of
what may be characterized as ISP programs focused on the impact of reducing probation
officers’ caseload sizes, and followed the ‘treatment’ philosophy.

At the time, the

rehabilitative ideal prevailed in corrections, and it was believed that smaller caseloads
allowed probation officers more time to help their clients (Petersilia & Turner, 1990).
However, these initiatives appeared to make little impact on recidivism, and even
increased probation failures and technical violations.

Clear and Hardyman (1990)

suggest that one important reason for the lack of effectiveness of these initiatives was a
lack of insight into how probation supervision activity could best serve the treatment
goal. Probation officers simply did not know how to use the additional time made
available to them.

4

The collapse of the rehabilitative ideal and the subsequent ‘nothing works’
paradigm of the 1970s, along with a sharp rise in crime, led to an exponential increase in
prison growth (and the cost of corrections) that has persisted ever since (e.g., Ruth &
Reitz, 2003). The probation population was also growing at a similar pace, and probation
officer caseloads were becoming too large to allow them to serve the increasing number
of serious and high-need offenders being granted probation or parole (Petersilia &
Turner, 1993). By the 1980s there was renewed interest in ISP as part of a battery of
‘intermediate sanctions’ that sought to alleviate prison overcrowding and save money,
while maintaining the appearance of being tough on offenders who would otherwise have
been incarcerated. The focus was on surveillance and control of the offender through
small caseloads, frequent contacts, increased drug testing, and mandatory employment.
The new ISP was rooted in the classical theory of deterrence through swift, certain
punishment, effected by close supervision (Petersilia & Turner, 1990).
Georgia was the first state in the U.S.A. to implement this new generation of ISP
program. Participants had very low recidivism rates, maintained employment, and paid
probation fees that helped offset the cost of supervision.

The Georgia model was

subsequently adopted elsewhere in the United States, with mixed results. The Bureau of
Justice Assistance (BJA) responded to the interest in and uncertainty about the Georgia
model by funding a large, multi-site randomized controlled trial in the mid-1980s, which
was evaluated by the RAND Corporation. Twelve of the fourteen experiments compared
ISP to routine supervision, while two compared ISP to incarceration. By and large, the
results of the evaluations were disappointing, again showing little impact on new crimes
and an increase in technical violations compared to usual practice.
5

Furthermore, a

program intended to reduce the strain on the prison system actually resulted in more
incarcerations, as increased surveillance and drug testing raised the likelihood of
probation failure (Petersilia & Turner, 1993).
The inability of ISP to demonstrate potential as a crime prevention program under
the scrutiny of a rigorous research design largely killed off interest in the
surveillance/control model of probation supervision by the 1990s. ISP was listed in the
influential University of Maryland report to the United States Congress, Preventing
Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising, as a program that did not work
(Sherman et al., 1997; MacKenzie, 2006b). However, the ‘what works’ movement also
led to an increased focus on the factors that influence successful programming. Andrews,
Bonta, and Hoge (1990) introduced what are now commonly described as the ‘principles
of effective intervention’ (PEI), which posit that programs should be designed to be
responsive to offenders’ specific risk and need levels (the risk-need-responsivity, or
RNR, model: see also Taxman & Thanner, 2006).

The risk principle in particular

suggests that more intensive supervision and treatment should be targeted at higher-risk
offenders, an idea that is strongly supported by empirical research (see Lowenkamp,
Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006, for a summary). The PEI suggest that ISP might be more
effective if, through increased contact and control, the probation officer were able to
establish offenders’ risk and need levels and direct them into appropriate treatment.
Treatment provision was not a priority of the BJA/RAND-evaluated programs,
and few participants received such services (Latessa et al., 1998). However, results from
some of the study sites indicated that intensive supervision combined with treatment
might have a positive effect on crime, which led the evaluators to call for more research
6

into such interaction effects (Petersilia, Turner, & Deschenes, 1992a; Petersilia & Turner,
1993). Several more recent studies also suggest that ISP programs that adhere to the PEI
and offer a balance of treatment and surveillance (the ‘hybrid’ philosophy) show promise
in improving offender outcomes (e.g., Latessa et al., 1998; Paparozzi & Gendreau, 2005).
A recent meta-analysis of a wide range of correctional interventions also supports the
contention that modern treatment-focused ISPs are more effective at reducing recidivism
than surveillance-based programs (Aos, Miller, & Drake, 2006). MacKenzie (2006b), in
a detailed update to the University of Maryland report, lists intensive supervision with a
treatment component as a ‘promising’ strategy in corrections, which means that further
rigorous research is needed but several studies have produced encouraging results.
Uncertainty about the effectiveness of ISP indicates a clear need for work to
unpack the complex relationships between surveillance and treatment, probation officer
and client. Taxman (2008a) notes that efforts are now under way to effect organizational
change in probation departments that will allow for greater rapport-building between
officers and offenders, which is intended to lead to behavioral change. She is currently
leading experimental research into “proactive” and “seamless” criminal justice
supervision and treatment programs that embody these new directions and have so far
shown substantial reductions in recidivism for participants (Taxman, 2008b). A recent
randomized controlled trial in Hawaii indicated that intensive probation programs rooted
in the classical deterrence tradition may be effective when a consistent, incentive-based
structure is implemented. The Hawaii HOPE program combined increased drug testing
with swift, certain adjudication and shock incarceration for violations. A novel aspect of
the program was the handling of violations. Non-compliant offenders continued their
7

supervision with probation officers trained in therapeutic techniques, and repeat violators
were directed to treatment services as well as being punished (Hawken & Kleiman,
2009).
Taken together, the research on ISP to date suggests a complex dynamic that goes
beyond earlier assertions that the programs do not work. Furthermore, even less is
known about the converse of ISP: increasing caseloads and reducing contacts (‘lowintensity’ supervision). The PEI would suggest that ISP be reserved for the highest-risk
offenders, with reduced surveillance and services for those at the lowest end of the riskneed spectrum. There is some speculation that increased caseloads can lead to harmful
reductions in supervision, putting society at risk from offenders whose probation officers
have too many clients to ensure that each one is not a threat to public safety (e.g.,Worrall
et al., 2004;3 Lemert, 1993). However, Glaser (1983) speculated that reduced frequency
of contact would not adversely affect low-risk or low-need clients. This suggestion is
supported empirically, notably by a recent randomized experiment (Barnes et al.,
forthcoming; also Johnson, Austin, & Davies, 2003; Wilson, Naro, & Austin, 2007).
Additionally, several studies have indicated that more intensive supervision can have
unfavorable effects on the recidivism of low-risk offenders (Erwin, 1986; Hanley, 2006;
Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006). We still have much to learn about probation
and parole supervision, and the circumstances under which its use is effective in reducing
crime.

8

The Present Study
The overall aim of the present study is to undertake a comprehensive review and
synthesis of the most rigorous research available on the effects of probation supervision
intensity on recidivism. The focus of the review is programs that include among their
primary features a change in the ratio of probationers to probation officers (caseload
size), frequency of contact between officers and clients, or other ‘frontline’ supervisory
behavior, such as drug testing.

The effects of these changes are tested against a

counterfactual of ‘supervision as usual’ – offenders who remained part of standard
probation caseloads.

The primary outcome measure is recidivism, as measured by

arrests, charges, or convictions. We also examine the impact of probation intensity on
technical violations.
As we have seen, there is conflicting evidence about the effectiveness of
increasing the intensity of probation supervision.

It may depend on the specific

philosophies and components of the programs and how they interact with supervision
levels. The risk and need levels, and other characteristics, of offenders who participated
in ISP research studies may also impact the relative effectiveness of the programs. We
systematically code the characteristics of each program and sample to examine which, if
any, of these characteristics moderate the overall effect of the change in intensity.
The specific research questions we address in this systematic review are:
1. How does the degree of probation supervision intensity affect probationers’
subsequent offending and technical violations?
2. To what extent does program philosophy (treatment, surveillance, or hybrid)
influence the success or failure of changes in supervision intensity?
9

3. To what extent do the risk/need levels of program participants affect their response
(in terms of reoffending and violations) to changes in supervision intensity?
4. Which other program components or offender characteristics moderate the overall
effect of supervision intensity on crime?

Systematic Review Methodology
Criteria for inclusion and exclusion of studies in the review
Types of Interventions
Eligible studies will test the effect of a change in intensity of probation
supervision on subsequent crime. A change in intensity could be brought about by
increasing or decreasing the ratio of clients to probation officers (changing caseload size);
increasing or decreasing the frequency of contact between clients and their officers; or
increasing or decreasing the frequency of other forms of supervisory control effected by
probation officers, such as drug testing.4 Studies in which the primary purpose of the
research design is to estimate the impact of these specific measures on recidivism and/or
technical violations are considered. Most studies have tested increases in intensity rather
than decreases, but changes in both directions are eligible for inclusion in the review.
We impose a number of restrictions on program type in order to preserve
comparability between what we already know will be a highly diverse set of studies.
Some programs have examined the provision of supervision as part of a ‘team’ approach;
for example, multi-agency collaboration between probation officers, police officers, and
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treatment providers. Evaluations of these programs are eligible as long as the probation
officer is the primary supervisor. This limitation allows us to maintain a degree of
equivalence between treatment providers and settings, and between treatment and control
group conditions. For example, we included a study in which probation officers provided
increased supervision by frequently visiting clients’ homes accompanied by a police
officer (Piquero, 2003). However, we excluded a study in which the only difference in
supervision intensity between the treatment and control groups was that treatment group
probationers were assigned police officers who made unannounced visits during their
regular patrol shifts to monitor probation compliance (Giblin, 2002).
We also restrict our analysis to the study of adjudicated offenders sentenced to
probation or granted parole. Probation services may also be provided at the pretrial stage,
or as part of diversion strategies for first-time juvenile arrestees or ‘pre-delinquent’
adolescents. We hypothesize that there may be substantial differences in the offending
propensities of participants in these programs compared to adjudicated offenders,
particularly because offenders at the pretrial stage are not guaranteed to receive any
conviction or sentence. There is also no straightforward comparison condition to pretrial
probation in the same way that ‘supervision as usual’ simply involves more or less of the
same intervention.

Types of studies
We attempt to maximize internal validity in our selection of studies by limiting
the sample to studies meeting at least a ‘high’ Level 4 on the Maryland Scientific
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Methods Scale (SMS: Farrington et al., 2006). The SMS is a 5-point methodological
rating scale, on which 1 indicates the least reliable research design (a one-group study
with only post-intervention outcomes), and 5 represents the most rigorous design
(random assignment of multiple units to treatment and comparison groups). Level 3
designs (non-comparable treatment and control units) are generally accepted as the
‘minimum interpretable’ research design (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Level 4 studies are
quasi-experimental designs including multiple treatment and comparison units, pre- and
post-program measures of offending behavior, and controls for potential bias from
confounding factors through matching of treatment and comparison subjects or
multivariate statistical controls. We limit our analysis only to those studies that utilize
strong quasi-experimental designs involving at least subject-level matching, or
randomized controlled trials (RCTs). We justify these strict inclusion criteria on the basis
of a priori knowledge of a large body of the highest-quality research on ISP. The
BJA/RAND studies alone were the largest randomized experiment in corrections
undertaken in the United States at the time (Petersilia & Turner, 1993, p. 292). Thus, we
expect to find sufficient numbers of experimental and quasi-experimental studies meeting
our other eligibility criteria to permit a meta-analysis to be conducted.
The control condition must be regular probation or parole supervision
(‘supervision as usual’). This may vary widely between studies in terms of number and
type of contacts, caseload size, and so on, as long as the control group participants are
exposed to the regular practices of the probation agency. The specific components of the
control group are coded. In some evaluations, ISP programs based on the ‘Georgia
model’ were compared to the agency’s existing intensive supervision program, rather
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than ‘routine’ probation (e.g., Ventura County, California: Petersilia & Turner, 1990).
We consider these studies for inclusion as long as there are differences between the
existing and experimental ISPs that meet the requirements set out in the previous section.
Evaluations in which ISP is compared to incarceration or a different program (e.g., a boot
camp) are excluded. The aim of this review is to investigate the impact of changing
probation/parole supervision intensity, so our baseline for assessing such change must be
probation/parole supervision of a different intensity than that received by the treatment
group.

Types of Participants
We include both juvenile and adult probationers in the review. Since probation
agencies supervise a broad range of offenders, most studies will include mixed caseloads
of male and female offenders with different risk and need levels and varying offending
histories. However, we expect that most participants will be the moderate to high-risk
male offenders usually targeted in high-intensity probation programs.

Some

experimental ISPs were directed at specific offending problems (e.g., focusing on druginvolved offenders), while others accept a range of offender types. Many probation and
parole agencies do not have different policies for the supervision of probationers as
compared to parolees, so studies may include mixed caseloads. Specific details about all
these variations are coded.
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Types of Outcomes
Eligible studies measure recidivism in terms of new arrests and/or convictions.
Technical violations of probation, such as absconding or failing a drug test, are also
included as a separate outcome measure. While technical violations do not inevitably
result in a recorded arrest or charge for a new offense, they represent a failure to comply
with probation conditions that could be affected by the intensity of supervision.
The use of technical violations as an outcome measure comes with the caveat that
increased supervision intensity could increase the likelihood of a violation being detected
through increased surveillance, rather than simply a failure to comply. This caveat
applies to new criminal cases too, but to a lesser extent. New crimes are more likely to
be detected by the police than by probation officers, so future arrests are less likely to be
affected by the offender’s probation status. This also makes arrest a preferable outcome
measure to charges or convictions that come further along the criminal justice process
and may be more affected by disclosure of prior sentences. Of course, police officers in
smaller beat areas probably know the repeat offenders too and will adjust their discretion
to arrest accordingly. All recidivism measures suffer from inherent limitations.
Offending measured by self-report is not excluded, but most ISP studies use
official records. This is a limitation of our research: it is well-known that official records
can underestimate the prevalence of reoffending, and there may be confounding between
the treatment and response that could be partly overcome by using self-reports.
However, these data were simply not available to the extent needed to conduct a
meaningful analysis.
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Search strategy for identification of relevant studies
We used several strategies to conduct a comprehensive search for literature on
probation intensity. Our main source of information was the Internet. References were
found through keyword searches of online abstract databases and the websites of research
organizations and government agencies (see Appendix A for lists of keywords and the
databases and websites searched). Specialist search engines like Google Scholar also
provide a rich source of ‘grey literature.’5 We also consulted lists of references from
existing reviews of probation supervision and intensity, and of randomized trials in
general (Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Phipps et al., 1999; Taxman, 2002; Weisburd,
Sherman, & Petrosino, 1990), and book and microfilm collections at the University of
Pennsylvania library. We supplemented the online searches with hand searches of key
journals in the field.6 Every effort was made to locate unpublished material where
possible. Most agencies now make reports available online for review or download,
meaning we were able to obtain most of our references very quickly. However, many of
the older reports that have not been digitally archived are harder to access.

The

University of Pennsylvania’s Inter-Library Loan service proved useful in locating some
of these studies. Electronic references were downloaded to Zotero, a web-based program
that captures, stores, and manages references.7 Eligibility of studies was assessed by
reading titles and abstracts, and obtaining the full text of documents that appeared to be
relevant.
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Description of methods used in primary research
We located a wide range of evaluations testing a change in probation intensity.
However, the BJA/RAND experiments from the 1980s (Petersilia & Turner, 1993)
represent the ‘classic’ ISP model, and serve as a convenient illustration of a typical study
design. The BJA/RAND studies were a fourteen-site randomized controlled trial of
largely surveillance/control-oriented ISP programs. Two of the study sites compared ISP
to incarceration (so were not eligible for inclusion in this review), while the remaining
twelve contrasted ISP with supervision as usual (SAU) or existing intensive supervision
models. Enhancements of both probation and parole supervision were tested. The exact
nature of the program depended on the study site – each jurisdiction selected components
of the Georgia ISP model for inclusion as it saw fit. Key common features of all the
evaluations included smaller caseloads of around 25-30 offenders per officer (usually
compared to 100 or more in SAU), increased frequency of contact (usually at least once a
week at first, gradually decreasing in phases), drug testing, and mandated employment.
Participants in the ISP evaluations had to be adults. Their risk levels varied, but
they were generally more serious offenders. Petersilia and Turner (1993) state: “People
placed on enhancement ISPs [as opposed to prison diversion or early release] are
generally deemed too serious to be supervised on routine caseloads” (p. 292). However,
persons convicted of homicide, robbery, or sex crimes were excluded as a matter of
policy from the experiment. Participants were primarily males in their late twenties to
early thirties, with extensive criminal records. A substantial proportion of participants
were drug dependent. The study sites set their own eligibility criteria for participants
beyond these initial requirements. Participants were randomly assigned to treatment and
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control conditions by RAND researchers.

The study sites implemented the

randomization sequence.
Data collection occurred in several waves. A baseline assessment of demographic
characteristics and criminal history was conducted shortly after assignment. Supervision
details and services received were recorded at six and twelve months; and recidivism
(proportion with new technical violations, arrests, convictions, and incarcerations) was
recorded at twelve months. Data on drug testing were collected monthly. Cost data and
calendars for assessing time at risk were also collected. Each site obtained its own data,
and procedures were checked for validity by RAND staff. Recidivism data came from
official records rather than self-reports.

Criteria for determination of independent findings
Many ISP studies report data on multiple outcome measures, which cannot be
considered independent treatment effects for the purposes of quantitative meta-analysis
because they are taken from the same sample of participants. In this review we do not
attempt to pool outcome measures. As described above, the different outcome measures
can be affected in different ways by the offenders’ probation status. We initially take the
more conservative approach of handling different types of outcome measure separately.
However, we combine arrests and convictions in some analyses. In these cases, arrest
outcomes take precedence over convictions so that multiple outcomes from the same
study are not used. We prioritize arrest because a successful conviction is dependent on
many external factors and may not represent the most accurate picture of the offender’s
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actual behavior.

We analyze technical violations separately because of the strong

likelihood that they will be related to the treatment condition due to the increased
surveillance inherent in ISP programs.
In the event that samples or outcomes are broken down by subgroups (e.g., new
arrests are reported for the full sample and then broken out into drug, property, and
violent crime arrests), we use the data for the full sample or outcome only. Where
enough studies provide results broken down by the same types of subgroups, we analyze
those outcomes separately. Some studies report only felony or misdemeanor arrests or
convictions, but do not combine the two. In these cases we prioritize felony offenses,
given that ISP is generally used with more serious offenders.
A related threat to the independence of findings is the measurement of follow-up
outcomes for the same sample at multiple time periods. In such cases, the longest followup period is preferred. However, in some studies we obtained, sample sizes decreased
significantly over time as cases were lost to follow-up. In those cases we selected the
follow-up period with the closest number of cases to the original sample size to minimize
bias from attrition.
Where multiple reports are based on the same dataset or sample, we combine
results where possible, counting the sample as one study. The study containing the
longest follow-up period and/or the most detail is considered the primary study, and other
reports are used to supplement the data from the primary study where necessary. We
checked each coded document carefully to ensure that re-analyses of the same datasets
were not inadvertently included with primary evaluation data from the same research
project. We do include several studies conducted in the same jurisdiction (usually no
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smaller than the county level) where the dates of the study periods indicate that there is
little risk of project or participant overlap.

Where multiple treatment groups are

compared to a single control group (e.g., Haapanen & Britton, 2002), we select one
treatment group only to maintain independence of control group samples. The treatment
group is selected at random to avoid bias in the overall effect size.

Details of study coding categories
A systematic review can be thought of as a survey in which the respondents are
studies rather than people.

Each retrieved report is ‘interviewed’ using a survey

instrument (coding protocol) to obtain information relevant to our analysis. The coding
protocol developed for this study is reproduced in Appendix B. It is designed to capture
the hierarchical nature of evaluation data: a single study may report separate effect sizes
for multiple outcome constructs for multiple samples in multiple treatment-comparison
contrasts or study sites (‘modules’). We recorded a range of methodological details about
each study to assist in decision-making about eligibility and study quality. A host of
items capturing information about program, setting, and participant characteristics served
as both determinants of eligibility and potential moderator variables. We did not expect
all these factors to influence outcomes and did not test each one to minimize the risk of
finding results that were statistically significant merely by chance. However, we also
aimed to be as inclusive as possible so that potentially relevant information was not
missed.
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Treatment of qualitative research
Qualitative research studies are not included in the systematic review results, but
relevant qualitative data are used to inform the background, framing, and analysis of our
questions. The broad definition of our search terms allows qualitative studies to be
systematically identified in the literature searches.

Analytic Strategy
Meta-analytic procedures are used to quantitatively combine effect size data from
the eligible studies where appropriate (i.e., where two or more studies were available that
measured a common outcome, such as arrests, and contained sufficient information to
calculate an effect size).

Effect sizes for each outcome measure in the studies are

encoded according to procedures outlined in Lipsey and Wilson’s (2001) guide to metaanalysis. The type of effect size chosen depends on the form of the original outcome
measure. Most evaluations of ISP include dichotomized measures of the prevalence of
recidivism or technical violations (e.g., the proportion of offenders arrested/not arrested).
This type of data is suitable for calculating odds ratios (OR). The odds ratio compares
two groups on the relative odds8 of an event (e.g., arrest) occurring (see Appendix C).
The odds ratio is centered at 1, so OR=1 indicates no difference between the treatment
and control groups on the outcome measure. In our analyses, OR > 1 indicates a result
that favors the control group (i.e. recidivism increases following assignment to intensive
probation), and OR < 1 indicates a result that favors the treatment group (assignment to
intensive probation is associated with reduced recidivism). The events of interest here
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(arrests, convictions, violations, etc.) are unfavorable and the intention of the change in
supervision intensity is to reduce their prevalence. Thus, a smaller effect size implies
fewer events, which is the goal of the programs being tested.9
The synthesis of effect sizes in a meta-analysis also requires the calculation of a
weight for each effect size. Without the inclusion of the weight, each study’s effect size
is assumed to contribute equally to the overall (mean) effect size. This is unjustified
because smaller studies have greater sampling error and should not contribute as much to
the mean outcome as larger, relatively more reliable studies. Lipsey and Wilson (2001, p.
36) suggest that the optimal study weight is based on the inverse of the squared standard
error of the effect size (called the ‘inverse variance weight’). Formulas for calculating
the standard error and inverse variance weight for the OR are presented in Appendix C.
Computations of effect sizes and inverse variance weights, and calculation of the
mean effect sizes and corresponding confidence intervals and statistical tests, are
performed using specialized meta-analysis macros written for STATA software (Wilson,
2002). We use RevMan software (Cochrane Collaboration, 2008) to construct forest
plots for the graphical representation of meta-analysis results. The forest plot shows the
weighted mean effect size and associated 95 per cent confidence interval for each study.
A square represents the point estimate of the effect size, the size of the square represents
the study weight, and the lines on either side of the square are the confidence intervals.
The mean effect size across all studies is displayed as a diamond, whose far left and right
points represent the lower and upper bounds of that estimate’s confidence interval. The
plot is centered around 1, the point at which no difference is observed between treatment
and control groups. Point estimates to the left of center represent outcomes favoring the
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treatment group, and those to the right favor the control group. When the confidence
intervals do not touch or cross the center line, the point estimate is statistically
significant.
We assume a random effects model, rather than fixed effects, for all analyses (see
Appendix C for details). Fixed effects models in meta-analysis assume that the only
random error in the distribution of effect sizes arises from within-study sampling error.
We do not consider this to be theoretically justified in our analysis because of the
considerable between-study differences (heterogeneity: see below) in program
characteristics, settings, and populations. Further, because we know we have not been
able to capture all the available research on intensive probation programs, we can
consider our set of studies a sub-sample of a larger ‘population’ of studies, with its own
sampling error. Both of these factors justify the use of the random effects model (Lipsey
& Wilson, 2001, pp. 117-120).10
Meta-analytic methods are also used to investigate whether the overall mean
effect size is moderated by other factors. We are interested in the potential impact of
certain program and offender characteristics on the variation in effect sizes across studies.
Because all our moderator variables are categorical and we have a small set of a priori
hypotheses about potential moderators, such as risk/need level and supervision
philosophy, we use the meta-analytic analog to the analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test
whether these factors might account for any variability in the observed effect sizes from
each study (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, pp. 120-122). We assess each categorical variable
separately using this strategy. Even though we include a substantial number of studies in
this meta-analysis, cell frequencies became very small when they were broken out by
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research design, outcomes, and different levels of each moderator variable. Therefore,
we focus only on bivariate comparisons on each moderator, and do not attempt to model
outcomes any further. This is a limitation of our moderator analysis: the results we
present do not control for the presence of any additional moderators.
The analog to the ANOVA is based on the Q-statistic calculated as part of the
main random effects model. Q is the weighted sum-of-squares of each effect size around
the grand mean. It represents the extent to which differences between the effect sizes are
statistically related to differences in moderators (a statistically significant Q-statistic
indicates evidence of between-study heterogeneity). We use the random effects analog to
the ANOVA (also called a ‘mixed effects’ model), which assumes there is still
unmeasured variability after moderators are modeled. We justify this on the basis of our
limited set of moderators, which are unlikely to explain all the variability between
studies.11 The relevant formulas are presented in Appendix C. These analyses are also
performed using the STATA macros.
Due to the greater risk of bias in non-randomized studies, experimental and quasiexperimental results are treated separately in all analyses. Randomized experiments that
indicate large baseline differences between participants on characteristics likely to be
related to outcomes (such as prior offending history), or which experienced substantial
attrition of participants or other implementation problems are analyzed with the quasiexperiments. The concern with such experiments is that the attrition may be caused by
reasons related to the treatment and/or outcome; for example, higher-risk offenders may
be more likely to abscond from probation and be subsequently lost to follow-up, thus
offending outcomes for the remaining lower-risk offenders are biased.
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Discussion of Results
Systematic search results
We present detailed search results in Appendices A and D. Appendix A includes
a flowchart describing how the number of database ‘hits’ obtained through the systematic
search translated into the 47 studies included in the final analysis. Our search terms
initially produced 30,591 hits. Recall that we deliberately left the search terms broad to
pick up background information as well as evaluations, so this number by no means
reflects the total number of studies available. It also includes a substantial number of
duplicate hits both across and within databases. We identified 528 references to potential
evaluations of changes in probation intensity, of which 410 were put forward for more
detailed title and abstract screening.
We identified 239 references requiring full coding, and obtained 81 per cent
(n=194) of these. Most of the studies we could not obtain were the tests of caseload size
variation conducted by local government agencies (mostly the state of California) in the
1950s and 1960s. We do not feel that our results are greatly biased by these missing
studies, because literature reviews of ISP have indicated that they found similar results to
the research of the 1980s and early 1990s – ISP had no effect on recidivism and increased
technical violations.
Of the 194 reports we coded in full, 21 were eligible for inclusion in the metaanalysis, 102 were evaluations that did not meet our eligibility criteria (this number
reflects some multiple reports of the same study), and the remainder were either relevant
background literature or additional reports of eligible studies that were used as
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supplements to the primary report. We list the supplemental reports and ineligible studies
(with reasons for exclusion) in Appendix D.12 Most of the excluded studies tested
changes in probation intensity, but had no comparison group or unmatched controls. A
few involved high-quality research designs but the comparison groups did not include
regular probationers (in most of these cases ISP was compared to incarceration). Many
of the 21 eligible reports contained data for multiple study sites that could be treated as
separate evaluations for the purposes of the review. For example, Petersilia and Turner
(1990) reported on ISP experiments in three California counties. Thus, our final sample
contains 47 independent evaluations of probation intensity variation.

Description of eligible studies
Of the 47 evaluations we include in our review, 38 were randomized trials and 9
were either matched-pairs designs or RCTs that reported high attrition. The unusually
large number of RCTs for a systematic review of a criminal justice system intervention
reflects the interest in obtaining rigorous data on the effectiveness of intermediate
sanctions (largely funded by the U.S. government) as crime and the incarceration rate
rose between the 1970s and 1990s.

All the evaluations tested increased probation

intensity.13 We present specific details about each eligible study in Appendix D, and
summarize their characteristics in Table 1.1. Studies are listed in Appendix D first by
research design (RCTs then quasi-experiments), then by the report date.
Table 1.1 shows that almost all of the studies were conducted in the United States
(N = 42). Five experimental studies were conducted in the United Kingdom, all of which
25

were evaluated in the same report (Folkard, Smith, & Smith, 1976). More than half of
the studies were reported in government or technical reports rather than traditional
academic sources. Almost all the studies were conducted in the 1990s or earlier.14
Almost all the ISP studies were enhanced probation or parole initiatives rather
than prison diversion programs. Reduced caseloads were the primary component of the
test of increased intensity, although most studies also involved increased contact as a
natural consequence of the smaller caseload, even if there was no set protocol for contact
frequency. In a few cases increased drug testing was the only difference in supervision
intensity between the treatment and control groups (e.g., Haapanen & Britton, 2002;
Hawken & Kleiman, 2009).

Following Skeem and Manchak’s (2008) model, we

assessed the prevailing supervision philosophy as control/surveillance in approximately
40 per cent of studies, treatment in 16 per cent of studies, and hybrid in 45 per cent.
Comparison groups in the eligible studies almost always experienced routine
probation supervision. A handful of programs compared ISP to existing, less restrictive
ISPs. “Routine probation” covered a myriad of conditions that were often not reported in
great detail, but as much information as possible about what it comprised is recorded in
the ‘Comparison’ column of the table in Appendix D.

It usually involved larger

caseloads, less frequent contacts, and fewer services. Most evaluations targeted general
offender caseloads comprised mostly of probationers rather than parolees.
Because ISP is a general supervision strategy that can be implemented across the
board in probation agencies, we found lots of variation in participant characteristics
across studies. For example, we do not analyze the racial composition of participants
because this was highly dependent on the characteristics of the general population in the
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agency’s jurisdiction. Table 1.1 shows some limited participant characteristics that could
be generalized across studies. We found a mix of studies evaluating programs for either
juvenile probationers, or youth (18 and over) and adults. Study samples comprised
mostly male offenders. Only two studies examined ISP versus SAU in exclusively
female caseloads.15 Most samples comprised high or mostly high risk offenders (as
assessed by classification instruments or offending history), reflecting the fact that ISP
has usually been used as a means of community supervision for more serious offenders
who might otherwise have gone to prison.

Needs assessments were not frequently

discussed so we do not present these results, but where needs assessments were carried
out most ISP offenders were classified as high need for services, often based on drug and
alcohol dependencies.

Overall mean effects of probation supervision intensity on recidivism
Table 1.2 shows the results of the main analysis examining how probation
supervision intensity is related to subsequent offending and technical violations. Each
row of the table, along with the estimated effect sizes for each included study, is visually
represented in separate forest plots (Figures 1.1 to 1.7). Across the 47 studies, we
obtained a total of 213 different outcome measures. The present study makes use of
those that measure the prevalence of arrests, drug arrests, convictions, and technical
violations.16
The results reported in Table 1.2 are consistent with what we already know about
intensive supervision. None of the mean effect sizes is statistically significant, and the
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direction of effects is as we would expect given prior research. In the RCTs, assignment
to intensive supervision made no difference to the prevalence of rearrest or reconviction
(mean OR for arrests = .93; p ≤ .72; mean OR for convictions = .98, p ≤ .80). We also
see no significant effect of ISP in the quasi-experiments, although note that the raw effect
sizes (especially for convictions) show moderate reductions in recidivism associated with
ISP and the small number of studies in these categories reduce the likelihood of a finding
being statistically significant (mean OR for arrests = .83, p ≤ .10; mean OR for
convictions = .60, p ≤ .10). The forest plot for conviction outcomes (Figure 1.4) suggests
that there is a lot of uncertainty in this model: the confidence interval around the mean
effect size is clearly very large.
Our analyses also indicate an increase in technical violations associated with ISP.
Across the RCTs, intensive supervision was associated with a 54 per cent increase in the
odds of a technical violation (mean OR = 1.54, p ≤ .06). A smaller, non-significant
increase of 29 per cent was observed across the quasi-experiments (mean OR = 1.29, p ≤
.22) but is again based on a much smaller subset of studies. Finally, we found no effect
of ISP for the subset of studies reporting drug related effects (mean OR = 1.14, p ≤ .10).
The mean effect sizes should be interpreted with caution given the very small number of
events in some of the studies (see Figure 1.7).
Table 1.2 indicates substantial heterogeneity across studies in four of our seven
analyses, as evidenced by the highly significant Q statistics (RCT arrests: Q = 61.55, p <
.001; RCT technical violations: Q = 120.11, p < .001; quasi-experiment technical
violations: Q = 18.91, p ≤ .004; quasi-experiment convictions: Q = 22.74, p < .001). This
indicates that there is more variability between studies than we would expect from the
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sampling error within each study alone. This suggests that other unique characteristics of
each study, such as program and offender characteristics and study setting (all of which
could also be confounded with each other), might explain the heterogeneity. Thus, the
overall effects of ISP on recidivism compared to SAU may be moderated by some of
these explanatory variables.

Moderator analyses
We focus only on arrests/convictions and technical violations for the experimental
sample in these analyses.

We only have a maximum of 9 quasi-experiments, so

frequently have insufficient observations in each category of the moderator variables to
conduct a meaningful analysis. We justify combining arrests and convictions for the
recidivism analysis because it substantially increases our sample size (seventeen RCTs
reported only conviction outcomes) and our main effects analysis showed that there was
no difference in the effects of ISP on either arrests or convictions. Furthermore, we did
not observe significant heterogeneity across conviction outcomes, so we have no reason
to believe that the effect of ISP on convictions could be moderated by other factors that
are not related to arrest outcomes. The overall mean effect size and Q-statistic for the
combined RCT arrest/conviction studies were very similar to those for RCT arrests.17
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To what extent does program philosophy influence the effect of changes in supervision
intensity on recidivism?
Table 1.3 indicates no effect of program philosophy on recidivism (arrests and
convictions) in the 38 RCTs included in the study, based on the meta-analytic analog to
the ANOVA (QB = 1.73, p ≤ .421). Most of the studies were of surveillance/treatment
hybrid programs (N = 17). In these programs, the odds of failure in the treatment group
were marginally smaller than in the treatment group, but no real effect is observed (mean
OR = .93, p ≤ .525). Similar results were observed in the 15 surveillance-based programs
(mean OR = .92, p ≤ .475). Interestingly, offenders in treatment-based programs did
have 20 per cent greater odds of recidivism than their counterparts in regular probation,
but the effect size is not statistically significant, and its reliability is questionable because
it is only based on 6 studies, 5 of which were conducted by the same evaluators (mean
OR = 1.20, p ≤ .314). Unfortunately, we were unable to build a good picture of the
moderating effect of supervision philosophy on ISP and technical violations because
none of the studies reporting technical violation outcomes followed a treatment-based
model (Table 1.4). As we would expect, technical violations were higher in both controlbased (N = 13) and hybrid (N = 3) programs. For both program types the odds of a
technical violation was about fifty per cent greater in the treatment groups than the
control groups (mean OR for control-based: 1.55, p ≤ .091; mean OR for hybrid: 1.46, p
≤ .481). However, the statistical difference between these estimates is negligible (QB =
.01, p ≤ .923) .
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To what extent do the risk/need levels of program participants affect their response to
changes in supervision intensity?
Based on the principles of effective intervention (PEI), we speculated that
supervision may be more effective if more intensive programs are targeted at the highest
risk/need offenders, and vice versa. There are several impediments to assessing this
question in great detail. First, we could not examine whether low-intensity probation is
effective for low-risk probationers across a range of studies. Second, very few studies
included needs assessments, and those that did lacked detail. Thus, we decided not to use
the need variable in our analysis. Finally, many of the studies discussed the PEI or
evaluated programs that had made an attempt to target higher-risk offenders, so we do not
have much variation in our data.

We are only able to examine whether programs

including either all or a majority of high-risk offenders were more or less likely to
prevent reoffending than those including offenders of any risk level or not utilizing a risk
assessment. A further caveat related to this final point is that programs that did not
formally assess participants for risk may still have had inclusion criteria that targeted
more serious offenders.
The results in Table 1.3 may lend some support to this caveat. There is no
difference between programs that targeted higher-risk offenders and those that accepted
any offender type (QB < .01, p ≤ .981), and neither risk category is associated with
recidivism outcomes. The odds ratio for studies involving higher risk offenders was .96
(N = 11, p ≤ .798), and for all risk levels .97 (N = 27, p ≤ .735). For technical violations,
there is also very little variation in the odds of failure by risk level (QB = .04, p ≤ .836;
high risk: N = 10, OR = 1.59, p ≤ .092; mixed risk: N = 6, OR = 1.45, p ≤ .292).
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Which other components of programs or offender characteristics moderate the overall
effect of supervision intensity on crime?
We examined a range of other potential moderators of the effect of supervision
intensity on recidivism and technical violations, the results of which are listed in Tables
1.3 and 1.4 respectively. As before, our analyses are somewhat limited by the reduced
cell frequencies when studies are broken out by each level of the moderator variables.
We group our outcomes into three main categories: study characteristics, program
characteristics, and sample characteristics.

The varied program characteristics are

particularly important because of the range of different activities that constitutes ISP in
each study.
Among selected study characteristics (Table 1.3), we found that only the type of
publication was significantly associated with ISP recidivism outcomes (QB = 11.86, p ≤
.003). Of course, the publication type does not directly influence the outcome of a study,
but these results are important because they show that our other results are not affected
by publication bias (for example, non-publication of unfavorable or null-effect results).
In government reports, ISP did not have any effect on recidivism on average (N = 13, OR
= 1.01, p ≤ .949), but among the other unpublished papers we found, the odds of
recidivism were significantly reduced by ISP programs (N = 9, OR = .70, p ≤ .002), while
in academic articles there was a marginally significant increase (N = 16, OR = 1.20, p ≤
.085). If we had only examined the published literature we might have deduced that ISP
does not work, and while these results are not exactly promising they do not lend
themselves to such a drastic conclusion. We could not reliably assess different study
settings because almost all of the studies were conducted in the U.S., and the five that
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were not were all conducted in the U.K. at the same time by the same evaluators, and
reported in the same paper.
We see similar results for technical violations, although the smaller number of
studies in this category affected the analyses we could run (Table 1.4). We combined
government and other unpublished reports to compare them with published academic
articles. Although the between-group difference was non-significant (QB = 2.31, p ≤
.129), there was a large, statistically significant increase in technical violations for ISP
participants in published studies, compared to a slight increase in unpublished studies
(published: N = 8, OR = 2.08, p ≤ .007; unpublished: N = 8, OR = 1.19, p ≤ .472). We
only had technical violation data for studies conducted in the 1980s and 1990s, and
although studies from both decades had increased violations among ISP participants, the
increase was larger and significant in the 1980s (N = 11, OR = 1.81, p ≤ .023; 1990s: N =
4, OR = 1.22, p ≤ .631). The between-group difference is non-significant (QB = .63, p ≤
.429).

Although the number of studies in the 1990s is very small, limiting the

conclusions we can draw from these results, it may be the case that 1980s studies showed
more technical violations because control/surveillance was the prevailing supervision
philosophy in that era.
We examined the moderating effects of a limited set of sample characteristics on
ISP outcomes. We found no effect of age on the relationship between supervision
intensity and recidivism (QB = .07, p ≤ .794; juveniles: N = 16, mean OR = .97, p ≤ .778;
youth and adults: N = 20, OR = .93, p ≤ .465). We could not assess the effects of age on
technical violations because too few studies reported this outcome for juveniles. We also
found no effect for gender on either recidivism or violations (recidivism: QB = 1.59, p ≤
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.450; technical violations: QB < .01, p ≤ .987). The odds of recidivism were 50 per cent
greater among ISP participants in the all-female studies, but this was based on only two
studies and was non-significant (mean OR = 1.50, p ≤ .299).
The additional program characteristics we examined were program type
(enhanced probation/parole or prison diversion); the population (probationers, parolees,
or both) and offense types (any offenses, or a specialized caseload such as drugs) targeted
by the program, and some more specific effects of changes in intensity. Again, small cell
frequencies limit our ability to draw any firm conclusions from these analyses. We found
that the odds of recidivism were lower in prison diversion programs than probation
enhancement programs (there were no technical violation data for prison diversion
programs), but with only two studies aiming to divert offenders from prison it is not
possible to say that this reduction was due to intensive supervision. Not all of the studies
we included accounted for time at risk in their reporting of outcomes, so it is possible that
prison diversion programs appear more successful because participants had a higher
likelihood of being reincarcerated and thus incapacitated (QB = 1.44, p ≤ .231;
enhancement: N = 36, OR = .99, p ≤ .952; diversion: N = 2, OR = .69, p ≤ .207). Few
substantial differences were observed between target populations and offense types
either, beyond what might be expected given the nature of the categories. The odds of
recidivism and violations were slightly higher among parolees compared to probationers
and mixed caseloads, and among specialized caseloads compared to mixed offense types.
Parolees may be more likely to reoffend than offenders who were sentenced to probation;
and offenders who have been singled out for offense-specific caseloads (e.g., specialized
supervision for drug offenders) have already been designated as posing a greater risk of
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failing on a certain type of crime. Since many of the specialized caseloads were drugsfocused, offenders may have been monitored more closely for substance abuse and
violated for failing drug tests. This could explain the significant difference in technical
violations between specialized and general caseloads (QB = 3.95, p ≤ .047; specialized: N
= 6, OR = 2.44, p ≤ .002; general: N = 10, OR = 1.19, p ≤ .430).
The final set of moderator variables we examined relate to the type and ‘dosage’
of supervision intensity, which are a key part of our inquiry. We attempted to examine
how the programs we studied attempted to increase intensity, and whether it is possible to
draw any conclusions about what magnitude of increased intensity is necessary to really
affect outcomes. Too few studies reported enough information to assess the second
question, so we examine this separately using only the studies that did report target
caseload sizes and numbers of contacts and drug tests.
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show the moderator analyses for the effects of intensity type on
recidivism and technical violations respectively. On recidivism, we see little effect of
any of the three main types of intensity increases (reduced caseloads, increased contacts,
and mandatory drug tests), either within treatment groups or compared to controls. For
technical violations, the raw effect sizes are considerably different between studies
reporting and not reporting specific increases in intensity, but not in the direction
expected. Studies that did not report reduced caseloads or increased contact reported
higher odds of violations in the treatment groups. For increased drug testing, we also see
significantly higher odds of violations in the treatment groups where drug tests were not a
component of the program. These results may need no further explanation than the fact
that there are very few studies involved, so they may be highly skewed. In both analyses,
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it should be noted that those programs not reporting a particular type of increase (e.g.,
caseload size) will still have increased intensity in other ways. Furthermore, studies
assessing reduced caseloads will most likely also have involved more contacts simply
because the probation officers had more time with their clients, even if increased contacts
were not a stated component of the program. Thus, we cannot say much about the effects
of specific changes in intensity with these results.
We examined whether studies reporting increases in one or more components of
intensity reported actual or planned ratios (e.g., planned caseload size in the treatment
group compared to average caseloads on regular probation). Due to the amount of
variability and the fact that planned amounts of supervision did not always translate into
practice, we simply dichotomized dosage variables according to whether or not the
dosage was changed by more or less than 100 per cent in the treatment group compared
to the control group. Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show the results of this investigation for
recidivism and technical violations respectively. ‘High’ dosage programs are those in
which the number of contacts or drug tests was more than 100 per cent greater than
control group standards. We were unable to include caseload size in the analysis because
only one study reported a planned caseload difference of less than 100 per cent.
Table 1.5 shows that neither high nor low dosages of contacts or drug tests
appeared to greatly affect recidivism compared to regular probation. The results are
similar for technical violations (Table 1.6). While we observe some large effects for drug
test dosage and violations, the number of studies is very small. The finding for contact
frequency and technical violations is unsurprising: the odds of failure for probationers in
high contact ISPs compared to controls were higher than for those in low contact ISPs
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compared to controls; however, there is no statistical difference between these groups (QB
= .04, p ≤ .835; high: N = 11, OR = 1.67, p ≤ .06; low: N = 4, OR = 1.49, p ≤ .407).

Conclusion
The aim of this study was to systematically review and synthesize the most
rigorous available evidence on the effects of changing probation intensity on
probationers’ criminal conduct. We identified and coded 239 potential evaluations of
increased intensity (intensive supervision probation or ISP), and assessed a total of 47
individual treatment-comparison contrasts – 38 randomized trials and 9 quasiexperiments – as eligible for inclusion in a meta-analysis.
Despite our comprehensive approach to identifying a body of research spanning
over fifty years, we were unable to find any evidence to contradict prior reports that
suggest ISP ‘does not work’ (e.g., Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Sherman et al., 1997;
MacKenzie, 2006b). Although in general the experience of ISP does not appear to
substantially increase reoffending among participants, they do not appear to fare any
better than their counterparts on regular probation for the extra supervision they receive.
In addition, and again consistent with the prior research, we found that ISP was
associated with an overall increase in technical violations across the studies we reviewed.
In our examination of potential moderator variables, we found no policy-relevant
program features that indicated any circumstances under which ISP may be more
successful. Our only significant finding that is not affected by small cell frequencies or
substantial statistical uncertainty is that ISP appears more successful in programs written
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up in unpublished reports than those in academic articles. This only enables us to say
that our findings account for potential publication bias.
We do not believe that our results should be taken as conclusive evidence that
intensive probation supervision is a failed intervention. There is clearly a great deal of
variation in the types of programs studied that we could not capture with our limited set
of moderator variables. While the common components we were able to identify do not
appear to have any great effect on recidivism, there are many more that we could not
compare. Although we were able to include more rigorous studies in our meta-analysis
than many other systematic reviews in the social sciences, there are so many variations
on the ISP theme that many more studies including the same components would be
needed to draw any meaningful conclusions.
sensitive to implementation issues.

ISP effects may also be particularly

All experimental programs may suffer from

inadequate or problematic implementation in the field, but ISP may be especially
susceptible because it involves changing the practices of an extant agency. Even research
funding (which may be limited compared with the general operating costs of a probation
agency) might not be sufficient to enable officers to reach caseload or contact targets, or
know what to do when they get there. Indeed, some studies we reviewed did include the
actual as well as intended caseload sizes and contact frequencies. They usually showed
that caseloads were generally slightly larger and contacts less frequent in reality than the
numbers called for in the evaluation design, although it should be added that the planned
ratios of intensity between the treatment and control groups were often similar because
agencies also found it difficult to meet the contact and caseload size standards they set for
regular probation.
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Several reviews have indicated that some ISP programs, particularly those
involving a treatment component, show more favorable results (e.g., Aos, Miller, &
Drake, 2006; MacKenzie, 2006b). Our own analysis did not support this finding, but the
individual point estimates in our forest graphs clearly show that some ISP programs were
very successful. This suggests that further exploration of programs and designs may be
needed to fully understand the potential benefits of ISP.
Two recent successful ISP studies, the Maryland Proactive Community
Supervision program (Taxman, Yancey, & Bilanin, 2006), and Hawaii’s HOPE (Hawken
& Kleiman, 2009), appear very different on the surface, but share certain elements that
might be the key to understanding the ‘optimal’ approach to intensive supervision. The
Maryland program focuses on service brokerage and individual case planning by the
probation officers: in the broad philosophical scheme, it is more treatment-based,
although it includes surveillance and enforcement components too.

In contrast, the

Hawaii program is much more enforcement- and deterrence-focused. Probationers are
notified daily whether or not they have been selected for random drug testing, and failed
drug tests are met with swiftly delivered sanctions: a brief period of imprisonment
(usually a weekend), the duration of which increases in response to further violations.
However, multiple violators are also directed to residential drug treatment. Underlying
both programs is a behavioral management model, which is articulated in the Maryland
program and implicit in Hawaii’s approach. The principles of behavioral management
include incentive/sanction schemes; a focus on criminogenic factors that leads to tailored,
rather than mandated, treatment and services; and offender accountability through
behavioral contracts.

In Hawaii, for example, offenders who were sent to jail for
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violations first went before a judge who reminded them of their responsibilities on
probation in a manner that reinforced the desire of the whole criminal justice system to
see offenders succeed rather than fail. Criminal justice programming that emphasizes a
combination of treatment and accountability, and incentive/sanction-based models, has
shown promise in other settings, such as drug courts (Marlowe, 2003; MacKenzie,
2006b).

Given the extent to which ISP programs have been directed toward drug-

involved offenders, it may be particularly informative to draw comparisons with drug
offending research. Gendreau, Goggin, and Fulton (2001) also lend more support to the
general contention that such a balanced approach to offender supervision, emphasizing
relationship-building, incentives, and adherence to the PEI, is effective.
One striking element of both programs just discussed is the lack of any emphasis
of specific alterations to program intensity. Whereas prior experiments have searched for
optimal caseload sizes or mandated certain numbers of contacts or drug tests, these more
recent studies seem to focus on the content of supervision and responses to violations.
This is in contrast to the surveillance-based programs in which (at their most extreme),
probation officers “go out in the field actively looking for violations” (Pearson, 1988).
This begs the larger question: what do probation officers actually do when required to
supervise offenders more closely? The present study has not brought us much closer to
answering that question than when Clear and Hardyman (1990) considered it twenty
years ago. A reduction in caseload size is not automatically accompanied by a guarantee
that officers will actually be able to spend more time with their clients. Fewer cases do
not necessarily equate to more intensive treatment of probationers. Indeed, for all the
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research we uncovered on ISP, there is little qualitative inquiry into the nature of the
probation officer-client interactions.
Bonta et al. (2008) are among the few researchers who attempted to get inside
what they call the “black box” of supervision. They discovered that the officers they
studied spent “too much” time on enforcement rather than service delivery; did not
account for the PEI or criminogenic need in their supervision strategies; and were not
equipped with the necessary tools to effect behavioral change. The elements Bonta et al.
found lacking seem to match the characteristics we suggest may be the key to successful
ISP programs. Enforcement may well be easier, if not less time-consuming, than the
service-oriented elements of supervision: identifying non-compliance may be more clearcut than identifying individualized needs and tailoring case plans accordingly.
We therefore call for more research into probation supervision in general, ideally
combining quantitative and qualitative methods, to uncover exactly what characteristics
and processes influence successful outcomes. This review has shown that ‘more’ does
not equal ‘better’ – in most cases intensive probation does not improve recidivism, and
may even increase technical violations.

However, we cannot yet conclusively say

whether more of the ‘right stuff’ is better, and to do that we first need a much greater
understanding of what the ‘right stuff’ is.

Notes
1

In the subsequent narrative we do not differentiate between probation and parole. ‘Probation’ is used as
shorthand for both unless otherwise stated. In many agencies there is little difference in supervision
practices for both probation and parole clients.
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2

One U.S. estimate indicates that over 40 per cent of probationers and more than half of parolees do not
complete their supervision terms successfully, and that parole violators account for nearly 35 per cent of
admissions to state prisons (Solomon et al., 2008).
3

Worrall et al. conducted a cross-sectional study that indicated an increase in property crime rates across
the state of California as that state’s average probation caseloads increased.
4

There are multiple ways in which supervision can be intensified, particularly in the light of advances in
information technology. Electronic monitoring, satellite tracking (GPS), and voice verification systems are
popular methods for ‘passively’ managing offender caseloads. Because such a wide range of automated
systems are available, some of which have been the focus of systematic reviews in their own right (e.g.,
Renzema & Mayo-Wilson, 2005, on electronic monitoring), we do not include evaluations that focus solely
on passive monitoring technology. However, many intensive supervision programs use technology as part
of a range of surveillance measures implemented alongside direct contact with probation officers, and these
studies will be considered if the monitoring technology is not the only difference in intensity between
treatment and comparison cases.
5

Grey literature refers to studies that are not commercially published or available through traditional
sources, such as technical reports and dissertations. Failure to allow for the identification of grey literature
in systematic searches can lead to publication bias, which occurs when the published or otherwise readily
available literature is not representative of all studies. This is a real possibility: for example, some authors
and journal editors may be more inclined to submit or accept statistically significant findings, whereas
studies that show no discernible effect may be written up for funding agencies but never published in peerreviewed academic journals (Rothstein & Hopewell, 2009).
6

Important journals include: British Journal of Criminology; Crime & Delinquency; Crime & Justice;
Criminology; Criminology & Public Policy; Federal Probation; Journal of Criminal Justice; Journal of
Experimental Criminology; Journal of Offender Rehabilitation; Journal of Quantitative Criminology;
Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency; Justice Quarterly; Probation Journal.
7

http://www.zotero.org.

8

The odds of the event occurring are given by p/(1-p) (the probability of the event occurring divided by the
probability of the event not occurring).
9

Note that although we present our results as odds ratios, analyses are actually performed on the natural
log of the OR, which is centered around 0 rather than 1 and has a standard error that is easier to calculate
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, p. 54).
10

Current thinking in meta-analytic methods states that the random effects model should always be used.
Previously, fixed effects models were considered acceptable when the Q-statistic from the main effects
analysis was non-significant, indicating homogeneity between effect sizes. However, the assumptions of
the random effects model are probably more defensible for many criminological applications. The random
effects model also converges on the fixed effects as the distribution becomes homogeneous (see Appendix
C) (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, p. 120; David B. Wilson, personal communication, December 2009). Most of
our analyses displayed substantial heterogeneity. We obtained both fixed and random effects estimates for
the mean effect sizes and did not observe much difference between the two. The random effects estimates
were generally more conservative (results not shown).
11

The mixed effects analog to the ANOVA has a lower risk of Type I error than the fixed effects, which
assumes that differences are systematic and thus does not perform well when the distribution is very
heterogeneous. We employ a method of moments estimator of the random effects variance component.
We also use this estimator for the main effects model (Appendix C; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, pp. 124-5;
Wilson, 2010, pp. 195-8). This is the least biased estimator available in the current version of the STATA
macro, but it is less efficient than the alternative maximum likelihood approach. However, it is well-suited
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to most applications, including sets of studies with relatively small sample sizes (Wilson, 2010, p. 196).
We did not observe substantial differences in the results of our ANOVA tests depending on whether
method of moments or maximum likelihood estimators were used (results not shown).
12

Note that the excluded studies listed in Appendix D are only those that were coded in full and found to
be ineligible. Many studies gave sufficient information about the research design or nature of the
comparison group in their titles and abstracts and as such did not make it past the initial screening stage.
13

We know of two studies on decreased probation intensity (one RCT and one rigorous quasi-experiment)
that have not yet been published. We do not include them in the review because they are not comparable to
the other evaluations, and are based on the same sample so cannot be compared to each other (Barnes et al.,
forthcoming; Berk et al., forthcoming).
14

Although we identify individual studies according to the date of the report, the “research timeframe”
measure in Table 1.1 reflects the actual year in which the research was conducted. If a study spanned two
decades it is classified according to the year in which the study period began.
15

One was a program specifically designed for women (Guydish et al., 2008), and the other was an
evaluation in which results were reported separately for male and female offenders in one of the study sites
(Folkard, Smith, & Smith, 1976). Data on gender composition were missing in 12 of the 47 studies, but we
expect that they also reflect mixed, mostly male caseloads typical in any probation agency.
16

Effect sizes excluded from this analysis were either continuous measures with insufficient data reported
to calculate an effect size, or based on specific offense types that were either not available in enough
studies, or were not theoretically relevant. For example, we saw no basis for reporting outcomes for
property offenses separately from all offense types as we had no reason to believe that ISP would affect
property offenses differently. Drug offense measures were the exception. Because many of the ISP
programs we examined were targeted specifically at drug-involved offenders or included increased drug
testing among the control measures employed, we examined this outcome separately. Eleven randomized
trials reported separate data for arrests for drug-related crimes. Twenty-eight studies (21 RCTs and 7 quasi
experiments) reported arrest data for any offense type; 23 studies reported technical violations (16/7), and
32 studies reported convictions (27/5).
17

OR = .97 (p ≤ .645). Q = 72.80 (p < .001).
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Tables
Table 1.1: Characteristics of Included Studies
Proportion of studies with characteristic
RCTs
Quasi-Experiments
Total
(N=38)
(N=9)
(N=47)
Study Characteristics
Type of publication
Academic publication
Government/technical report
Other unpublished
Research timeframe
1970s and earlier
1980s
1990s
2000s
Study conducted in USA
Program Characteristics
Program type
Enhanced probation/parole
Prison diversion
Program involves caseload size
reduction
Program involves contact
frequency increase
Program involves drug test
requirement increase
Supervision philosophy
Control/surveillance
Treatment
Hybrid
Control group received regular
supervision
Target population
All probationers
All parolees
Mixed
Target offending typea
Any offenses
Specialized caseloads

42.1
34.2
23.7

44.4
44.4
11.1

42.6
36.2
21.3

15.8
34.2
47.4
2.6
86.8

0.0
11.1
77.8
11.1
100.0

12.8
29.8
53.2
4.3
89.4

94.7
5.3

88.9
11.1

93.6
6.4

89.5

88.9

89.4

55.3

44.4

53.2

29.0

11.1

25.5

39.5
15.8
44.7

11.1
11.1
77.8

34.0
14.9
51.1

92.1

100.0

93.6

71.1
13.2
15.8

11.1
55.6
33.3

59.6
21.3
19.2

76.3
23.7

77.8
11.1

Some sections do not add up to 100% due to rounding or missing data.
a
Data not reported in 1 study.
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76.6
21.3
Continued

Continued from previous page
Proportion of studies with characteristic
Experiments Quasi-Experiments
Total
(N=38)
(N=9)
(N=47)
Sample Characteristics
Age of sampleb
Juveniles
Youth and adults
Gender c
All males
All females
Mixed
Offender risk level
High/mostly high risk
Mixed risk levels/no
assessment
Outcome Characteristics
Arrest outcomes reported
Technical violation outcomes
reported
Conviction outcomes reported
Other outcomes available
Length of follow-up period
12 months or less
More than 12 months

42.1
52.6

44.4
55.6

42.6
53.2

29.0
5.3
34.2

44.4
0.0
55.6

31.9
4.3
38.3

71.1

77.8

72.3

29.0

22.2

27.7

55.3

77.8

59.6

42.1

77.8

48.9

71.1
39.5

55.6
0.0

68.1
31.9

60.5
39.5

88.9
11.1

66.0
34.0

Some sections do not add up to 100% due to rounding or missing data.
b
Data not reported in 2 studies.
c
Data not reported in 12 studies.

Table 1.2: Overall Mean Effect Sizes for Crime Outcomes

RCTs
Arrests
Convictions
Technical violations
Drug arrests
Quasi-experiments
Arrests
Convictions
Technical violations

N

Mean
OR

21
27
16
11

.93
.98
1.54
1.18

.74
.85
.99
.86

1.17
1.13
2.39
1.61

61.55***
20.38
120.11***
11.50

7
5
7

.83
.60
1.29

.66
.33
.86

1.04
1.11
1.94

7.55
22.74***
18.91**

** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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95% C.I.
Lower
Upper

Q

Table 1.3: Moderator Variable Effects (Arrest/Conviction, RCTs)
QB

Mean
OR

11.86**

1.20
1.01
.70**

.98
.78
.55

1.48
1.30
.88

6
13
19

.87

1.09
1.00
.90

.77
.76
.72

1.55
1.33
1.13

33
5

1.10

.93
1.17

.80
.79

1.10
1.74

36
2

1.44

.99
.69

.84
.39

1.17
1.23

34
4

3.42

1.01
.65

.87
.41

1.17
1.01

21
17

.49

1.01
.90

.83
.71

1.22
1.15

11
27

2.76

.80
1.05

.62
.88

1.04
1.24

15
6
17

1.73

.92
1.20
.93

.73
.84
.73

1.16
1.72
1.17

27
5
6

.65

.92
1.07
1.04

.76
.75
.69

1.12
1.51
1.56

29
9

.92

.93
1.10

.78
.81

1.10
1.49
Continued

N
Study Characteristics
Publication type
Academic publication
Government/technical report
Other unpublished
Research timeframe
1970s and earlier
1980s
1990s and 2000s a
Location of study
USA
Non-USA
Program Characteristics
Program type
Probation enhancement
Prison diversion
Reduced caseload component
Yes
No
Increased contact component
Yes
No
Increased drug testing component
Yes
No
Prevailing supervision philosophy
Control/surveillance
Treatment
Hybrid
Target population
Probationers
Parolees
Mixed
Target offense types
Any offending
Specialized caseloads

16
13
9

95% C.I.
Lower Upper

Mixed effects (method of moments) mean odds ratios
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01.
a
Categories combined: only one study in 2000s, which had large effect favoring treatment group.
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Continued from previous page

Sample Characteristics
Age
Juveniles
Youth/adults
Gender
All males
All females
Mixed
Risk level
High/mostly high risk
Mixed risk levels

N

QB

Mean
OR

16
20

.07

.97
.93

.76
.75

1.23
1.14

11
2
13

1.59

.99
1.50
.89

.75
.70
.06

1.30
3.21
1.17

11
27

< .01

.96
.97

.73
.80

1.27
1.17

Mixed effects (method of moments) mean odds ratios.

47

95% C.I.
Lower Upper

Table 1.4: Moderator Variable Effects (Technical Violations, RCTs)
N
Study Characteristics
Publication Type
Academic publication
Government/other
unpublished report
Research timeframea
1980s
1990s
Program Characteristics
Reduced caseload component
Yes
No
Increased contact component
Yes
No
Increased drug testing component
Yes
No
Prevailing supervision
philosophyb
Control/surveillance
Hybrid
Target population
Probationers
Parolees
Mixed
Target offense types
Any offending
Specialized caseloads
Sample Characteristics
Gender
All males
Mixed
Risk level
High/mostly high risk
Mixed risk levels

QB

8
2.31

8

Mean
OR

95% C.I.
Lower Upper

2.08**

1.22

3.54

1.19

.74

1.94

11
4

.63

1.81*
1.22

1.09
.54

3.03
2.80

14
2

.17

1.49
2.04

.93
.48

2.38
8.61

13
3

.41

1.44
2.16

.89
.70

2.34
6.67

9
7

1.37

1.19
2.13*

.62
1.02

2.28
4.45

13
3

.01

1.55
1.46

.93
.51

2.58
4.24

7
4
5

.31

1.66
1.72
1.24

.77
.67
.50

3.55
4.40
3.08

10
6

3.95*

1.19
2.44**

.78
1.38

1.82
4.32

5
11

< .01

1.54
1.53

.68
.85

3.52
1.41

10
6

.04

1.59
1.45

.93
.73

1.69
2.89

Mixed effects (method of moments) mean odds ratios.
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01.
a
No observations for 2000s. The single observation for 1970s and earlier (a study conducted in the 1950s)
was dropped rather than being combined into another category due to potentially excessive influence from
its large overall weight.
b
No observations for ‘Treatment.’
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Table 1.5: Effect of Intensity Variation (Arrest/Conviction, RCTs)

Contact frequency difference
High
Low
Drug test frequency difference
High
Low

N

QB

Mean
OR

95% C.I.
Lower Upper

13
4

.42

1.08
.91

.87
.56

1.35
1.47

9
2

.30

.81
1.28

.52
.26

1.27
6.26

Mixed effects (method of moments) mean odds ratios.
Caseload size variation not included because only one study had low caseload variation. That study
indicated large effect in favor of control group.

Table 1.6: Effect of Intensity Variation (Technical Violations, RCTs)

Contact frequency difference
High
Low
Drug test frequency difference
High
Low

N

QB

Mean
OR

95% C.I.
Lower Upper

11
4

.04

1.67
1.49

.98
.58

2.83
3.80

7
2

2.03

1.05
2.07

.80
.85

1.38
5.01

Mixed effects (method of moments) mean odds ratios.
Caseload size variation not included because only one study had low caseload variation. That study
indicated large effect in favor of treatment group.
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Effect of Intensive Probation on Arrests (RCTs)

Figure 1.2: Effect of Intensive Probation on Arrests (Quasi-Experiments)
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Figure 1.3: Effect of Intensive Probation on Convictions (RCTs)

Figure 1.4: Effect of Intensive Probation on Convictions (Quasi-Experiments)

51

Figure 1.5: Effect of Intensive Probation on Technical Violations (RCTs)

Figure 1.6: Effect of Intensive Probation on Technical Violations (Quasi-Experiments)
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Figure 1.7: Effect of Intensive Probation on Drug Arrests (RCTs)
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CHAPTER 2. ‘Low-Intensity’ Probation: Is It a Viable Policy for LowRisk Offenders?

Introduction
What works in probation supervision? Researchers have been struggling with this
question since the 1960s, yet the nature of supervision itself remains under-studied
(Taxman, 2002; 2008a). Much of the research that is available has focused on initiatives
to step up the power of probation as a punitive sanction. Such programs usually involve
imposing strict, frequent reporting requirements on offenders, and providing supervision
in small caseloads designed to increase surveillance as much as service provision. These
intensive supervision probation (ISP) regimes have generally proven unsuccessful. For
example, the field experiments with ISP in the 1980s showed null effects on crime and
increases in technical violations (Petersilia & Turner, 1993). Despite more recent efforts
to link supervision to treatment and services showing some promise (Taxman, 2008b),
probation appears to suffer from an identity crisis. It was not originally intended for use
with high-risk or serious offenders or as a punitive alternative to prison. Historically,
probation was a ‘second chance’ for low-level, often first time offenders who posed little
threat of serious harm (Clear & Braga, 1995). Yet, intensive probation has proved even
more unsuccessful with low-risk offenders than their higher risk counterparts (Erwin,
1986; Hanley, 2006; Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006). Is this simply because
ISP was not designed to target low-risk offenders, and the high levels of control and
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scrutiny provoked defiant responses (Sherman, 1993) resulting in failure? Or do failure
rates increase for low-risk probationers under more intensive supervision because the
increase in the overall probability of detection is compared to a lower baseline?
This paper considers whether an experiment designed to test the premise that lowrisk offenders can safely receive less intensive supervision than the ‘standard’ model of
probation is sensitive to heterogeneity in the type of low-risk offender receiving
treatment. As the willingness to use probation for offenders eligible for prison persists,
more resources will be needed to serve their needs and adequately protect the public. If
the low-risk, low-need offenders can be supervised more efficiently, probation officers
will be freed up to focus on more serious cases. This sensitivity analysis mounts a
comprehensive ‘attack’ on the low-intensity supervision model to ensure there is no way
in which a policy reducing supervision for a section of the criminal population could
increase the threat of harm to society. More broadly, we investigate the nature of lowrisk offenders and their propensity to reoffend. The criminological literature has largely
focused on the risk factors and characteristics of higher-level offenders, but these serious
cases make up a much smaller proportion of the criminal population.

This paper

examines the characteristics of low-level offenders and their relationship with treatment
effects. If the observed heterogeneity in the sample does not impact outcomes on lowintensity supervision, it seems reasonable to conclude that low-intensity supervision is a
viable policy option compared to ‘treatment as usual.’
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What Works in Probation Supervision?
Despite being one of the most widely-used criminal sanctions in the U.S.A., with
one in forty-five adults on probation or parole (Glaze & Bonczar, 2009), much of the
research on probation has failed to shed light on the characteristics of effective
supervision practice. Correctional research has mainly focused on programming and
treatments provided in addition to criminal justice sanctions like probation orders. In
many probation agencies, standard practice is driven by resource constraints more than
evidence-based strategies. With caseloads often averaging 150 to 200 offenders per
probation officer in a given agency, supervision levels vary from weekly or twice-weekly
meetings for the highest-risk or delinquent probationers to telephone reporting for those
towards the end of their sentences. Some probationers simply mail in a card to confirm
their current address (Petersilia & Turner, 1993).
Over the last thirty years, the use of probation has grown in response to (and as a
result of) increasing prison populations. In this climate, intensive supervision probation
(ISP) emerged as a supervision strategy that was deemed punitive enough to be used with
offenders who would otherwise have been incarcerated, yet cheaper than the cost of
keeping someone in prison. While few ISP programs are exactly alike, they usually
involve a reduction in caseload size and increased frequency of contact with the
probation officer, increased drug testing requirements and service provision or brokerage.
The first wave of research in the 1960s was generally described as the “search for
the magic number” (Carter & Wilkins, 1976) because it involved experimentation with
caseload size to find the optimal ratio of offenders to probation officers. The rationale
was that smaller caseloads would allow probation officers to spend more time helping
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their clients (Petersilia & Turner, 1990). However, these studies showed little difference
in recidivism rates by caseload size, and technical violations increased for those offenders
receiving more supervision (e.g., Neithercutt & Gottfredson, 1974; Banks et al., 1976;
Carter & Wilkins, 1976). The caseload variation strategy was deemed unsuccessful.
The re-emergence of ISP in the 1980s was largely independent of prior interest in
the topic. ISP at this time was at the forefront of an array of so-called ‘intermediate
sanctions’ intended to provide a cost-effective but punitive alternative to incarceration.
The focus of these programs was on crime deterrence through surveillance and control,
which was effected through small caseloads and frequent face-to-face contacts and drug
testing. A study of this model in Georgia, U.S.A., in the early 1980s showed early
promise (Erwin, 1986), and in 1986 the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) funded the
RAND Corporation to conduct a multi-site randomized controlled trial of the ‘new’ ISP
in comparison to regular probation or incarceration (Petersilia & Turner, 1993). Again,
the results were disappointing: programs had little impact on recidivism, and technical
violations and re-incarcerations increased due to increased surveillance.
Thus, intensive supervision probation appears to be an ineffective way to
supervise offenders (Sherman et al., 1997; MacKenzie, 2006). The early ISP models
were designed on the assumption that probation supervision in itself is ‘good’ for
offenders, so more of it must be better. However, it appears that no theoretical basis for
this assumption was ever articulated (Bennett, 1988).

Clear and Hardyman (1990)

suggest that the early experiments in caseload size variation failed because of a lack of
knowledge about how probation supervision could serve the ultimate goal of offender
treatment. Probation officers had more time to spend with clients, but did not know what
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to do with it. Furthermore, the more intensive strategies were not always targeted at the
highest-risk offenders in the greatest need of treatment, a policy now known to be crucial
to successful correctional programming (Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990). There is no
standard definition of ‘high’ or ‘low’ risk in the earlier studies, and the most serious
offenders were often excluded. For example, in the RAND studies, participants were
generally more serious offenders, but risk levels varied (Petersilia & Turner, 1993).
Offenders convicted of homicide, robbery, and sex offenses were excluded from the
studies for safety reasons, even though it is not unusual for such offenders to appear in
probation and parole caseloads. In some cases, ISP was reasonably effective for highrisk offenders but backfired for low-risk offenders (e.g., Erwin, 1986; Hanley, 2006;
Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006).
More recent research on probation supervision has accounted for some of these
problems, making careful assessments of risk and targeting supervision appropriately.
For high-risk offenders, intensive supervision has shown more positive results when it
includes a greater emphasis on treatment and service brokerage by probation officers in
addition to small caseloads and frequent contact (e.g., Latessa et al., 1998; Paparozzi &
Gendreau, 2005; Aos, Miller, & Drake, 2006; Taxman, 2008b). Probation agencies have
also begun experimenting with reducing the intensity of supervision for those offenders
at the lowest risk of reoffending. New York City’s probation department piloted an
electronic kiosk reporting system for a considerable portion of its caseload that was
considered to be low-risk. These offenders checked in regularly using an ATM-style
device, and could request or be compelled to see a probation officer if adverse
circumstances arose. Two-year rearrest rates for all crimes for low-risk probationers
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declined from 31 per cent to 28 per cent after the kiosks were introduced, suggesting that
it made little difference from traditional supervision for that population. The system also
freed up probation officers to supervise high-risk offenders more intensively. Rearrest
rates for high risk offenders subsequently decreased from 52 per cent to 47 per cent
(Wilson, Naro, & Austin, 2007). Another recent study in Oregon used a similar model,
assigning low-risk offenders to a “casebank” caseload where they received minimal faceto-face contact with their probation officer, again with the purpose of allowing high-risk
offenders to receive intensive supervision (Johnson, Austin, & Davies, 2003). Although
the analysis did not separate results for low- and high-risk offenders, a pre-post analysis
of crime rates among probationers on community supervision in the county indicated that
overall crime rates decreased after the implementation of risk-based supervision.
The recent attempts at implementing low-intensity probation supervision are
important steps in developing effective supervision practices across the board. The latest
research on intensive supervision has begun to unpack the relationship between
surveillance, treatment, risk, and need. It suggests that intensive supervision may be an
effective strategy for dealing with high-risk offenders. At the same time, probation
departments remain chronically under-resourced. Caseloads are large and money to
employ new probation officers to downsize high-risk caseloads is rarely available. Lowintensity supervision could be a vital resource-saving strategy.

Allowing low-risk

offenders to receive minimal supervision in a large caseload means that existing officers
can be reallocated to concentrate on higher-risk clients who pose a greater public safety
risk. However, the ‘more is better’ approach that guided prior research suggests that
reducing supervision, even to low-risk offenders, could increase their reoffending. Prior
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to the New York City and Oregon studies, large caseloads have always been portrayed as
detrimental to crime prevention (e.g.,Worrall et al., 2004; Lemert, 1993).

Theories of Probation
There are several logical theoretical mechanisms by which a policy of lowintensity supervision for low-risk probationers could in fact offer a safe way to allocate
resources more efficiently. In order to understand how any probation practice might
work, one must first consider the fundamental purpose of probation. That discussion has
not featured prominently in the literature on community corrections. Probation today is
usually recognized solely as a sanction. Indeed, the popularity of intensive probation is
largely due to its place at the forefront of intermediate sanctions for punishing more
serious offenders without sending them to prison.

However, the roots of probation

supervision lie in rehabilitation rather than retribution. John Augustus, who is credited
with the invention of probation in 1841, intended it as a diversion from court allowing
defendants to prove their desire to reform prior to trial, underpinned by the threat of
criminal sanctions if they failed (Petersilia, 1997). He derived the term ‘probation’ from
the Latin probare, meaning to prove or demonstrate. Petersilia (ibid.) notes a shift in the
probation officer’s role, starting in the mid-twentieth century, from social worker to the
“eyes and ears of the local court” (p. 157). There remains a tension between the social
work and surveillance/control philosophies. Thus, in considering the deterrent effect of
sanctions, one must consider probation not only as a punishment designed to deter future
crime, but as a ‘second chance’ to go straight and avoid harsher sanctions.
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A low-intensity probation model involving minimal contact with a probation
officer allows low-risk offenders who do not pose a threat of serious future harm to
rebuild their lives relatively unencumbered by probation office visits and programming.
From a punishment perspective, such a low-level sanction is commensurate with their
offending and the risk they pose to society. From a rehabilitation perspective, it may be
argued that low-risk offenders have less need for services and programs than their highrisk counterparts, and thus need less attention from probation officers. In these respects,
the ‘carrot’ of low-intensity supervision, along with the ‘stick’ of being returned to
increased supervision or jail for failure, may act as a deterrent to future offending. The
deterrence literature lends some support to this idea. Studies of the perceived certainty
and severity of punishment have indicated that individuals with greater experience of
criminal offending perceive a lower risk of punishment than individuals with little or no
experience (Paternoster et al., 1983; Nagin, 1998). If we assume that low-risk offenders,
in general, have less extensive criminal careers than higher-risk offenders, we could make
the argument that low-risk offenders might be more likely to be deterred by the threat of
losing the relative ‘freedom’ of low-intensity supervision if they reoffend. Furthermore,
one might argue that low-risk offenders will commit more crime if they receive more
supervision than they need. The perception that the sentence is disproportionate to their
risk level and thus unfair may weaken offenders’ respect for the criminal justice system,
leading to a defiant response expressed as an escalation of recidivism (Sherman, 1993).
Thus, assignment to low-intensity supervision may help to ensure that low-risk offenders
perceive the sanction as legitimate.
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Barnes et al. (forthcoming) have suggested that being placed on probation
supervision could increase the risk of reoffending for low-risk offenders through deviant
peer contagion (DPC). Having antisocial and delinquent associates is one of the most
important and consistently reported risk factors for crime (e.g., Andrews, 1989). One
proposed mechanism by which association with delinquent peers increases the risk of
crime is through DPC: contact between offenders or at-risk juveniles who come together
in group-based interventions and programs that leads to reinforcement and support of
delinquent values (Dishion, McCord, & Poulin, 1999; Dishion & Dodge, 2006). The fact
that DPC (which is largely rooted in social psychology) has so many parallels in classic
criminological theories of differential association and social learning, which focus on the
relationship of crime with attachment to and behavior of antisocial peers (e.g.,
Sutherland, 1947; Akers, 1973; Agnew, 1991; Warr & Stafford, 1991), suggests that the
concept could be extended to other environments in which offenders gather. Barnes et al.
(forthcoming) propose that the probation department could create a similar dynamic. In
the probation department they observed, offenders spent a great deal of time waiting in
line together outside the office and talking to each other in waiting areas and elevators.
Although the content of discussions between probationers in this environment has not
been studied, it is reasonable to assume that at least part of the discussion focuses on the
reason for their presence at the office and their opinions about the sanction.
The DPC literature suggests that lower-level delinquents are most susceptible to
the influence of delinquent peers (Rosch, 2006; Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger,
2006). If DPC occurs in probation departments, it perhaps makes sense to focus first on
limiting the exposure of low-risk offenders who do not currently pose a threat of serious
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offending. This can be achieved through a low-intensity supervision model in which the
need for low-risk offenders to attend the probation department is minimal. Of course, a
caveat to using this reasoning to justify low-intensity supervision is that research on DPC
and related criminological theories has largely focused on juveniles and it is not clear
whether the same mechanisms operate for adults.

More importantly, we can limit

exposure to other probationers at the probation office but it is not possible to control
offenders’ access to delinquent networks in their home neighborhoods.

However,

informal social controls may also operate there that do not exist in the probation waiting
room – for example, family or a job opportunity – that allow offenders to engage in prosocial activity without the encumbrance of regular probation visits. Lowenkamp and
Latessa (2004) note that such pro-social networks play an important role in explaining
why some offenders remain at low risk for future criminal behavior. Subjecting low-risk
offenders to increased supervision may disrupt their positive social networks.
A further theoretical mechanism by which low-intensity probation may
successfully operate is through the principles of effective intervention (PEI). The PEI
were introduced by Andrews, Bonta, and Hoge (1990) in response to the ‘nothing works’
attitude to correctional treatment that persisted in the 1970s and 1980s. The PEI state that
correctional treatment can in fact be effective when programs are designed to be
responsive to offenders’ specific risk and need levels (the risk-need-responsivity, or
RNR, model: see also Taxman & Thanner, 2006). Thus, high intensity interventions are
best reserved for high-risk, high-need offenders. Although the principles seem obvious,
Andrews (1989) explains that thinking prior to the elucidation of the PEI held that
treatment did not work for high-risk offenders. Andrews calls this the “social work
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paradox.” He suggests that ‘nothing works’ proponents did not consider the fact that
high-risk offenders, by definition, will always reoffend more than low-risk offenders.
They mistakenly took higher recidivism rates to mean that treatments were not effective,
but rigorous research comparing intensive treatment to non-intensive programs actually
shows that intensive treatment programs can help to reduce reoffending for high-risk
offenders.

Low-risk offenders continue to reoffend at a lower rate than high-risk

offenders in both intensive and non-intensive treatment, but studies frequently find that
their recidivism increases when they are subjected to intensive programs. Drawing on a
wide body of Canadian research, Andrews (1989) concludes that “lower risk cases may
be assigned safely to the least restrictive settings” (p. 15). Since then, numerous metaanalyses of correctional treatment have consistently shown that both treatment and
supervision work better when the PEI (particularly the risk principle) are adhered to; that
is, when a larger proportion of high-risk offenders are served. More importantly for the
present study, they have shown that low-risk offenders tend to have less favorable
outcomes when they receive higher-intensity programming or supervision (see
Lowenkamp & Latessa, 2004 for a summary of the research). As we have seen, this
finding is also borne out in studies of intensive probation (Erwin, 1986; Hanley, 2006).
While the idea of placing high-risk offenders in low-intensity supervision clearly
seems inadvisable, the commonly-held notion that ‘more is better’ also means that the
thought of reducing supervision of low-risk offenders is not intuitive to policymakers or
researchers. Nevertheless, we have presented several theories – deterrence/defiance,
deviant peer contagion, and the principles of effective intervention – suggesting that
assigning lower-level offenders less supervision may be more appropriate. Low-intensity
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probation allows deterrence to work because in terms of sanctions, the consequences of
failure are much greater than they are under more intensive conditions. The lowerintensity sanction may also result in less stigma for the offender, which may lead to a
defiant criminal response. We also suggested that low-intensity probation, by reducing
required attendance at the probation office, may reduce the likelihood that probationers
will associate with more serious offenders and strengthen ties with pro-social networks
closer to home. Finally, we noted that the idea of low-intensity supervision is consistent
with strongly-established principles of correctional treatment in which only those in the
most need of services receive them.

The Philadelphia APPD Low Risk Experiment
The Philadelphia APPD Low Risk Experiment was designed as a rigorous test of
a policy of reducing the intensity of probation supervision for low-risk offenders. The
Philadelphia experiment is the first to test this proposition using a randomized controlled
trial (RCT) design. The following section describes the study design and main results.
Additional details may be found in Barnes et al. (forthcoming).

Background to the experiment
Philadelphia’s Adult Probation and Parole Department (APPD), like other
probation departments in the U.S., grapples with the problem of increased caseloads and
limited resources. The average caseload of a Philadelphia probation officer is 150 to 200
offenders (Berk et al., 2009). Around 19 per cent of people arrested for fatal and non65

fatal shootings in Philadelphia are under APPD supervision at the time of arrest (Ahlman
et al., 2008). Although the amount and intensity of supervision does vary across cases
and some offenders are mandated (by judges or probation officers) to specialized units,
there is little systematic variation in Philadelphia in the investment of resources according
to risk. Thus, in most cases, offenders are assumed to be at similar risk of serious
reoffending at baseline, and judgments are modified according to information that
becomes available later in the supervision process.1
Philadelphia’s APPD has around 50,000 clients under supervision at any time.
Supervision is usually organized according to the sector of the city in which the offender
lives, with a smaller number assigned to specialized units for certain types of offenders or
needs (such as drug-involved or sex offenders).

Intake decisions are made by

administrative staff based on court orders or the offender’s residence.

Within

departmental standards and judicial constraints, supervision of offenders is highly
discretionary. Clients usually see their probation officer once a month, and receive
routine drug tests at some visits, but the officer can increase or decrease the frequency of
office visits as s/he sees fit.

Reporting frequency may be increased to weekly or

biweekly as a result of noncompliance. It may be reduced to as infrequently as once
every three months toward the end of a successful term, or based on the officer’s
judgment that the offender is not at high risk of recidivism. For similar reasons, the
officer may vary the type of supervision between office, telephone, and non-reporting.
Starting in 2005, APPD worked with the University of Pennsylvania to develop a
new approach to supervision. They aimed to allocate the highest risk offenders to more
intensive supervision, with a small ratio of officers to clients so that more resources could
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be put into assessing and addressing those clients’ needs. In order to do so, the lowest
risk offenders in the agency needed to be assigned to large caseloads with minimal
supervision, so that officers would be freed up to work more closely with high-risk
clients. This represented a departure from the initial ‘one size fits all’ approach to
supervision previously used by the agency (see Fig. 2.1). A risk prediction model was
developed to assess which offenders were at low and high risk of offending. The Low
Risk Experiment then randomly assigned offenders predicted to be low risk to a lowintensity model of supervision (‘LIS’) or the normal model of supervision as described
above (supervision as usual: ‘SAU’). The results of the experiment indicated that LIS
can safely be used with low-risk offenders without increasing the risk of serious
recidivism. APPD next plans to test the allocation of high-risk offenders to high-intensity
or regular supervision.

Forecasting model
The statistical model used to forecast the risk of serious offending is described in
full in Berk et al. (2009). Random forests methods were applied to a dataset of all
probation and parole cases in Philadelphia between 2002 and 2004 to predict the risk of
being charged with a new serious crime2 within two years of the probation or parole case
start date. The prediction was based only on the type of data that would be available to
probation officers at intake.3 At the request of APPD, the model was designed to stratify
61 per cent of cases as low risk, with the remainder either high risk (approximately 10 per
cent) or neither low nor high (approximately 30 per cent) (Fig. 2.1). APPD also deemed
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the proportions of false positives and false negatives expected in the final model to be
operationally acceptable.

The proportion of false positives (offenders erroneously

identified as low risk) was set at 5 per cent, and the proportion of false negatives
(offenders erroneously identified as high risk) was 20 per cent. A higher false negative
rate was accepted given the lesser public safety concerns around this type of error.

Experimental design
Selection of Cases
APPD selected the West and Northeast regional supervision units as the sites from
which experimental participants would be drawn. All cases active on probation in these
two units on July 27, 2007 were extracted. The random forests model was applied to
each case to produce an individual risk assessment (some probationers had multiple
cases) in the form of a ‘reliability score.’ The reliability score is a number between 0 and
1. Cases with a reliability score above 0.5 were designated as low risk. From this
assessment, 2,859 offenders were serving probation terms for low-risk offenses. They
were pre-screened for eligibility for the experiment. Low-risk cases were excluded from
the random assignment pool if any one of the following factors made them ineligible for
low-intensity supervision:


The case was due to expire within thirty days of the extraction date.



The offender was placed under the supervision of a specialized unit by court order
after the extraction date.



The offender was in an existing low-risk caseload.4
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The offender was potentially in direct violation of their probation (had been arrested
for a new offense after the start of their term of supervision).5



The offender had multiple active probation cases, one or more of which was not
classified as low-risk.

Random Assignment
Following the exclusions, a final sample of 1,559 offenders was put forward for
random assignment on October 1, 2007. Note that almost half of the probationers with
low-risk cases were excluded from the random assignment pool. The most common
reason for exclusion was having fewer than thirty days remaining on probation (see Fig.
2.2). APPD wanted to test a low-intensity caseload of 400 clients per officer, so the
random assignment sequence was designed to allocate 800 offenders to the treatment
(LIS) group, with 400 each in the West and Northeast regions. The control (SAU) group
consisted of 759 offenders (401 in the West and 358 in the Northeast). A considerable
number of the sample were later found to be ineligible for the experiment, some due to
potential violations that occurred between the time of pre-screening and random
assignment, and most others for reasons that arose later that made low-intensity
supervision too difficult.6 A flowchart (Moher et al., 2001) showing exclusions and case
flow through each stage of the project may be found in Fig. 2.2. The experiment
followed an ‘intention-to-treat’ analysis (Montori & Guyatt, 2001), so those offenders
who were randomly assigned to LIS but subsequently excluded were analyzed in their
assigned groups rather than according to the type of supervision they actually received.
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Interventions and Follow-Up
Probation clients assigned to the treatment group (LIS) were placed in a caseload
of four hundred. Two probation officers handled the entire low-intensity caseload of 800
offenders. Clients received a considerably reduced level of supervision compared to the
standard model described above. The full supervision protocol, including details about
contact frequency and type, may be found in Appendix E. At their first visit with the
low-intensity probation officer, treatment group subjects were informed that they were in
a low-risk caseload and subject to these new reporting requirements. They were told that
they would be transferred back to standard supervision if they were arrested for a new
crime. Low-intensity officers were not expected to handle new offenses. However, they
were expected to deal with technical violations that did not result in an arrest or warrant
(e.g., missed contacts).

In order to maintain low-intensity caseload sizes at 400,

probationers who were transferred back to standard supervision were replaced by
‘backfill’ cases. These were offenders from the general caseload who had been predicted
low-risk but were not initially randomly assigned. These cases are not analyzed as part of
the experiment, but they ensured the integrity of the low-intensity model by keeping
caseloads too large for the officers to spend more time with their low-risk clients.7
The control group received SAU according to the description above.

While

probation officers in this group had smaller caseloads and could in theory spend more
time working to address offenders’ needs, in practice caseloads were still large enough
that the content of meetings was essentially the same in both the treatment and control
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groups. However, control group offenders saw their probation officers more frequently.
Control group offenders continued their regular appointments with their usual probation
officer and were not informed of their low-risk prediction or experimental status.
Reoffending data, including charges for new offenses, technical violations, and
wanted card issuances, were collected for each participant.

New charge data are

available for the two years post-random assignment. For the low-intensity model to be
considered a success, failure rates in the treatment group had to be at least the same, if
not lower, than in the control group. As long as recidivism was not worse in the
treatment group, the APPD deemed low-intensity supervision an acceptable policy.

Main results
Barnes et al. (forthcoming) report experimental outcomes one year post-random
assignment. They note that treatment group cases received approximately 45 per cent
fewer contacts than they had in the year prior to random assignment, while the amount of
contact in the control group did not change. Assuming control group offenders had a
face-to-face meeting with their probation officers once a month, treatment group
offenders were expected to receive one face-to-face contact for every six control group
contacts, or one contact of any type (face-to-face or telephone) for every three control
group contacts. This standard was not quite met, but LIS participants still received a
lower-intensity intervention. They received about half the number of contacts as the
control group overall. In practice, some control group members met their probation
officers less than once a month, and some treatment group members saw their probation
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officers more often than the experimental protocol required.8 Nonetheless, as Barnes et
al. note: “The two groups were clearly subjected to different numbers of contacts with
their probation officers, and the experimental treatment appears to have been delivered as
designed in strategy, if not in dosage.”
No significant differences in new offending were found between the treatment
and control groups after one year. Sixteen per cent of the treatment group and 15 per cent
of the control group were charged with a new offense of any type (p ≤ .593). Similarly,
15 per cent of treatment group offenders and 16.5 per cent of the control group were
incarcerated during the same time period (p ≤ .426). Overall, it appeared that lowintensity probation did not lead to more crime compared to supervision as usual, and is a
safe strategy for restructuring probation supervision according to APPD’s plans.

Sensitivity analysis of main results
The idea of reducing the amount of resources made available to low-risk
offenders may be controversial to policymakers and the public, however logical it may
seem to concentrate probation efforts on the higher end of the risk spectrum. Distinctions
are rarely drawn between high- and low-risk offenders in popular dialogue. Although
murderers and sex offenders usually arouse stronger emotions than low-level thieves or
drug offenders, the idea that some people who are involved with the criminal justice
system at any level may ‘get away with’ minimal supervision may offend the public’s
sense of fairness. Unequal distribution of resources may also make policymakers uneasy,
despite being a somewhat obvious money-saving proposition. Sherman (2007, p. 303)
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notes that concentrating on the ‘power few’9 may at the same time be considered
“perfectly rational and morally reprehensible.” Although only a small proportion of
probation clients are at the highest risk of involvement in serious crime (as offenders or
victims), why should those deemed to be at low risk of serious reoffending be denied the
same level of attention from a probation officer if they need it? Not only could low-risk
offenders be denied help and services they still need, but they may still pose a serious
threat in the future.

As one anonymous Philadelphia probation officer told a local

newspaper after the restructuring of Philadelphia APPD: “Anybody is capable of
anything. You can’t just assume [low-risk offenders] won’t pose a problem.” Another
stated: “We don’t want to give people a chance to go out and commit more crimes”
(Gambacorta, 2009).
These concerns cannot be discounted if Philadelphia’s model of low-intensity
supervision is to become a viable policy beyond the RCT.

However rigorous the

experimental design, the main outcomes may mask subtle variations in effects. Different
conceptualizations of the outcome measure, differential treatment take-up, and
differential subgroup effects may all affect our conclusions about the efficacy of the
policy.

This paper examines the extent to which different outcome measures and

heterogeneity in offender characteristics explain any differences in recidivism outcomes
in the sample of probationers assigned to LIS, compared to the control group who
received ‘SAU.’

Our analysis also extends the main results discussed above by

increasing the follow-up period to two years post-random assignment, to examine
whether the null findings are sensitive to a longer follow-up period.
The specific research questions addressed in this paper are:
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1. Does the effect of LIS on recidivism (new charged offenses) differ if we consider
recidivism frequency as well as participation?
2. Does assignment to LIS affect the time to failure?
3. Does differential treatment take-up affect the probability of recidivism?
4. Do the effects of LIS differ across offender subgroups?
5. Do the outcomes for the above research questions hold across specific offense types?

Analytic Strategy
Offending participation versus frequency
A common concern in criminal career research is the distinction between
offending participation and offending frequency. Participation refers to whether or not a
person was involved in criminal behavior (a dichotomous outcome), while frequency
refers to the number of crimes committed within a certain period of time. These two
conceptualizations of crime outcomes are open to different interpretations. As Blumstein
et al. (1988) note in the context of lifetime offending: “Participation distinguishes active
offenders from non-offenders within a population; frequency is a reflection of the degree
of individual criminal activity by those who are active offenders” (p. 4). Thus, an
experimental intervention could produce differential effects on outcomes depending on
how the outcome is measured before and after treatment.
Ideally, we want an intervention that reduces participation and frequency of
recidivism, resulting in some offenders desisting from crime completely and those that do
not at least reoffending less often. However, in practice we may see an impact on one but
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not the other. For example, the results of a set of experiments carried out in the United
Kingdom to test the effect of face-to-face restorative justice on recidivism showed no
change in the number of offenders who participated in crime after the program compared
to before. However, those offenders committed 27 per cent fewer crimes on average than
they did prior to the program (Shapland et al., 2008). Looking at participation alone, one
might conclude that restorative justice was no more effective than regular court
processing.

However, society still benefits if fewer crimes are committed overall.

Conversely, the success of the low-intensity supervision strategy might be doubtful if the
lack of difference between groups in the proportion of offenders participating in crime
masked an increase in the frequency of offending for the LIS group compared to those
receiving SAU. Measures of participation and frequency also produce different policyrelevant estimates of the treatment effect. In the present experiment, the participation
measure gives the more accurate effect of assignment to LIS versus SAU, since LIS
offenders are returned to SAU after their first new offense. However, if we continue to
follow experimental participants after they complete or fail LIS, the number of offenses
they commit in the longer term offers an indication of whether spending any amount of
time in LIS has a deterrent effect on subsequent criminal behavior.
We assess the effect of the experimental treatment on participation and frequency
using regression models designed for binary and count data. We construct a binary logit
model for participation. Frequency of offending is analyzed according to a Poisson
regression model and several of its variants. When there is evidence of over-dispersion –
excess variation not captured by the Poisson distribution – a negative binomial regression
model is examined. Because a substantial proportion of our sample did not reoffend at
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all, resulting in a large number of zero counts in our data, we explore whether zeroinflated Poisson or negative binomial models fit the data better.10 Zero-inflated models
correct for the large share of zero observations by allowing the zeros to be predicted by
two different theoretical processes (e.g., Sarkisian, 2009): the “always zeros” (offenders
who will never reoffend, regardless of changes in other conditions); and the “possible
zeros” (those who might have reoffended but did not do so during the follow-up period).
We present the results of several diagnostic tests used to assess the appropriateness of
each model. All the models control for baseline offender characteristics, and account for
time at risk according to the time during which offenders were not in jail one year preand one year post-random assignment. These features are described in detail below.

Time to failure and survival analysis
An alternative approach to assessing experimental outcomes is to look at the time
to failure (time to first offense) rather than simple proportions or counts of new offenses.
An experimental intervention may affect time to failure as well as, or even independently
of, its effect on participation and frequency. In a probation agency, an understanding of
how quickly probationers tend to recidivate after the probation term begins may be
important for the allocation of supervision resources. Whether we analyze participation
or frequency, we can only say that the treatment group was more or less likely to offend
than the control group. We lose important information about the timing of events, and
cannot account for the participants who did not reoffend. As Allison (1984) notes: “One
might suspect … that someone arrested immediately after release [from prison] had a
76

higher propensity toward criminal activity than someone arrested 11 months later” (p.
11). Survival (event history) analysis techniques overcome the problems of truncation
and omitting the time element by incorporating special regression techniques that allow
for the censoring of cases. If low-intensity supervision had no effect on participation or
frequency compared to SAU, but survival analysis revealed that low-intensity
participants were likely to fail more quickly than the control group, it may still be
necessary to re-evaluate the policy to avoid turning the low-risk unit into a ‘revolving
door’ that sends participants right back into the criminal justice system.
We use the Kaplan-Meier (KM) method to compare the average risk of failure
over time for the treatment and control groups. The KM survival estimator gives the
estimated probability of the offender surviving to the end of each time interval for which
failure events are calculated. In the present analysis, we measure time to failure in days
post-random assignment.

We then construct a Cox proportional hazards regression

model to explore the risk of failure depending on experimental status and other
covariates. The Cox model also allows us to control for post-random assignment time at
risk. The proportional hazards model is a semi-parametric model, meaning that it does
not impose a specific shape for the hazard function, or probability of failure over time
(although we assume that each individual’s hazard is proportional to those of others).
This allows a greater degree of flexibility than parametric models for time, which require
us to choose a particular distribution for the hazard function. Our choice of covariates
and methods for accounting for time at risk are described in detail below.
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Differential treatment take-up and subgroup effects
Treatment take-up (who actually receives the treatment, regardless of random
assignment) and subgroup effects are two different but related issues that could affect the
impact of LIS on recidivism. Very few experiments conducted in ‘real world’ settings
operate perfectly (Berk, 2005).

Characteristics or circumstances of the offender,

probation officer, or agency (as well as errors and individual overrides or ethical
concerns) could prevent the delivery of the treatment to those assigned to receive it, or
lead to control group members receiving the treatment (‘crossover’). Both situations
affect the conclusions we are able to draw about experimental outcomes. Similarly, it is
conceivable that these characteristics may also interact with treatment, leading to
differential outcomes that could masked by the average effect for the full sample. For
example, a treatment could prove to be more effective for women than it is for men.
As described above, the analyses of both the main first year results of this
experiment and the other research questions presented here are based on the randomly
assigned treatment condition (ITT) rather than the treatment actually delivered (TAD).
ITT is the preferred method of analysis of the two, because it reduces the possibility of
bias resulting from differences in treatment compliance. For example, we know that
some treatment group members did not receive LIS because they were later found to be
wanted for absconding.

Their noncompliance may place them at higher risk of

reoffending than other LIS participants.

Excluding them from the analysis of the

treatment group outcomes could introduce an upward bias in the effectiveness of LIS.
The ITT approach avoids this bias by retaining these offenders in the treatment group.
As such, ITT provides a better estimate of the policy of LIS, because in the real world
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some probationers will be eligible for LIS but will not receive it because they abscond or
for some other reason. However, the ITT approach involves an unavoidable trade-off
between this and a test of the actual effectiveness of the treatment.

Because most

experiments will include some degree of non-delivery and/or crossover, any treatment
effect will be attenuated (Angrist, 2006). In this experiment it is very likely that nondelivery of treatment affected the outcome: 17.8 per cent of probationers assigned to LIS
did not receive it (see above and Fig. 2.2). Crossover poses a smaller problem, but does
exist: 3.2 per cent (N = 24) of the control group were assigned to LIS at some time. It is
not known why the crossover occurred, but it is possible that offender characteristics
could be associated with the non-delivery. Factors like gender, race, age, and prior
offending history may well be linked to reasons for non-delivery such as absconding or
transfer to a specialized caseload for more intensive supervision.
A powerful technique for modeling heterogeneity in treatment effects created by
treatment non-delivery and differential subgroup effects is the instrumental variables (IV)
method (e.g., Angrist, 2006; Angrist & Pischke, 2009).

IV methods can help to

overcome the attenuation of the treatment effect involved in ITT analysis by using
assigned treatment (ITT) as an instrument for predicting actual treatment take-up.
Predicted take-up, rather than assigned treatment or treatment delivered, is then used as
the experimental status variable in the crime outcome model. This is different from – and
avoids the bias of – estimating the effect of treatment delivered. In more formal terms, it
reflects the local average treatment effect (LATE), which is the treatment effect for
“compliers” – those who receive the treatment to which they were randomly assigned –
rather than the average effect on all treated individuals (ATET), who may be compliers or
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control group members who received the treatment anyway (Angrist, 2006, pp. 30-31).
Thus, we get as close as possible to estimating the actual effect of the treatment. The risk
of bias in the basic treatment as delivered approach is minimized in the IV model because
treatment as assigned (ITT) is incorporated in the prediction of treatment take-up. Due to
the random assignment, treatment status is independent of observable features of the
cases.

Furthermore, by including interaction terms between assigned treatment and

selected offender characteristics (subgroups) as instruments in the IV model, we can also
account for their potential indirect impact on treatment take-up and use the resulting
estimates to examine differential effects of subgroup membership on recidivism for LIS
compliers.
The subgroups we explore include age, sex, race, socioeconomic status (based on
neighborhood-level data for the offender’s recorded address), prior offending record, and
probation region (West or Northeast). We include region as a subgroup because only two
probation officers, one from each regional unit, handled low-risk cases, whereas a much
broader range of officers was represented in the control group. With such a limited
number of low-intensity supervision officers, it is likely that each officer’s personality
and willingness or ability to follow the experimental protocol could have affected the
operation of the low-intensity model. Unfortunately, the quality of additional data on
important crime risk and protective factors like marital status, employment, and drug,
alcohol, medical, and psychological issues is poor. Reporting by probation officers of
these details is inconsistent. Thus, we are unable to explore these additional factors.
IV methods are applied using two-stage least-squares regression (2SLS), which is
related to ordinary least-squares regression (OLS) and incorporates simultaneous
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equations. The first stage equation uses the instrument variables to predict treatment
take-up (the endogenous variable):
^

T = "0 + "TA + "REGION + "GENDER + "RACE + "AGE + "SES + "PRIORS + "TAR
+"TA * "REGION + "TA * "GENDER + "TA * "RACE + "TA * "AGE + "TA * "SES + "TA * "PRIORS
^

where T is the endogenous variable (predicted treatment take-up), "0 is the intercept,

!
!
!

"TA is the instrument for assigned treatment, the interactions between "TA and the
!
subgroup variables are the additional instruments, and "TAR is a control (exogenous)
!
variable for post-RA time at risk. Note that only the interactions and not the main effects
!
variables for our subgroups are used as instruments.
We hypothesize that race, gender,

etc. predict treatment take-up through their association with treatment assignment. In the
second stage equation, we replace the instruments with the predicted treatment take-up
from the first stage ( "^ ) to predict the crime outcome Y:
T

Y = "0 + " ^ + "TAR + "REGION + "GENDER + "RACE + "AGE + "SES + "PRIORS
T

!
The main effects for the subgroups remain in the second stage model as controls for any
! variation in outcomes by subgroup. Another important part of the 2SLS approach
direct

is the estimation of the ‘reduced form,’ which is simply the OLS estimate of the ITT
effect of the instrument and exogenous covariates on crime. Angrist (2006) notes that it
is acceptable to use OLS even if the outcome variable is dichotomous.
The coefficient for "^ tells us the actual effect of treatment received, or local
T

average treatment effect (LATE) on the probability of reoffending. It can be compared
! for assigned treatment in the reduced form model (or the outcomes
with the coefficient

from our logistic participation model, as described above) to assess whether the estimated
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effect of LIS on recidivism is different when treatment actually received is predicted
rather than treatment assigned. We can then use the predicted values from the 2SLS
model to assign an individual probability of reoffending for each subject, and compare
the mean probability of reoffending at different levels of each subgroup for those who
received LIS.
Although 17.8 per cent (N = 142) of the 800 offenders assigned to LIS are known
to have been excluded from the treatment, only 16.8 per cent (N = 134) are recorded in
our data as such. Since we cannot tell which offenders constitute the remaining eight
non-treated cases, we simply analyze them as if they received the treatment. We do not
expect this to be a substantial limitation of this analysis, since cases with missing data
represent just 1 per cent of the treatment group and 0.5 per cent of the entire study
sample. Another limitation of our treatment take-up prediction is that it does not account
for the actual dosage of contacts received, which varied from the experimental protocol in
some cases. However, we are able to estimate outcomes for those offenders who were
assigned to the LIS caseload and were likely to have seen the LIS officer at least once
during the course of the experiment.

Model construction
All the models we estimate include the same covariates and controls for time at
risk, both pre- and post-random assignment. The covariates we include are gender (male
= 1), race (white vs. non-white),11 the offender’s age on the date of random assignment, a
basic indicator of socioeconomic status (SES),12 probation region (West = 1), and the
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offender’s monthly offending rate in the year pre-random assignment. The monthly
offending rate was calculated by dividing the number of offenses for which the offender
was charged that took place in the year prior to random assignment by the number of
months during that year that the offender was able to offend (i.e., was not in jail). Our
dataset contained dummy variables showing whether or not the offender was in jail
during each month in that time period. We checked for multicollinearity between the
race and SES variables by obtaining the correlation coefficient for the two variables,
which was 0.44. Although this is a fairly large coefficient, we also obtained the variance
inflation factors, which were all between 1 and 1.5 – well within the conventional
threshold for assessing multicollinearity.
We account for time at risk post-random assignment slightly differently in each
model. In count models, the logged number of months at risk post-random assignment is
included as the exposure or offset variable, allowing us to estimate the incidence rate
ratios for person-months of follow-up time for the LIS versus SAU groups. In the binary
and two-stage least squares models, we include the number of months at risk as a control
variable.13 We lacked detailed information about time at risk, which is an important
limitation of our analysis.14
The format of our jail time data causes the most problems for assessing time at
risk in the survival analysis model. As previously explained, survival analysis techniques
allow us to assess whether experimental participants were offenders or non-offenders on
a daily basis. Because we are only interested in the time to first offense, offenders who
fail are removed from the risk set because they are no longer at risk of that first failure.
However, offenders who are in jail cannot offend, so the days on which they are
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incarcerated must also be removed from the risk set – their risk of failure on those days is
zero. This would be straightforward if we knew the exact dates of entry and exit from jail
as well as the exact offense dates, but our dataset only includes monthly jail status
indicators. When the jail variable is measured at less frequent time intervals than the
failure event, a possible solution is to treat jail as a time-varying covariate (TVC) and
interpolate jail data for each day. For example, if the monthly jail indicator for January
2008 shows that the offender was in jail during that month, we code each day from
January 1 to January 31 as a day in jail. Cox regression allows for this approach using
‘episode splitting,’ which involves creating a separate observation for each person-day up
to the day of failure or censoring. It is also possible to work around the potential problem
of overlapping jail and failure dates created by the interpolation (e.g., when the original
dataset indicates that the offender was in jail in February 2008, but he offends on
February 23) by simply dropping the month of jail time in which the offense took place.
Thus, the offender in this example is coded as being out of jail during February.
An obstacle to using the episode-splitting approach in the present application is
that the method is usually used in cases in which it is possible to observe either level of
the TVC on the failure date. For example, if our TVC were employment status, the
offender could be either employed or unemployed on the offense date. However, we
forced the offender to be out of jail on the failure day because it did not make sense
theoretically to allow for the overlap. Thus, our jail indicator variable is always coded 0
when our failure variable is coded 1. This results in perfect collinearity between the
covariate and the failure event, which prevents us from estimating parameters for the jail
variable using the Cox model. We could still have dropped jail days out of the risk set
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(albeit based on our interpolated dates rather than accurate ones), but to maintain
consistency this would require us to ignore failures that overlapped with jail time. Since
this would have meant ignoring one-third of our failure outcomes (111 of 335 failures
overlapped with interpolated jail days), we compromised by including the twelve original
monthly indicator variables in our model to control for each post-RA month in jail. This
is another important caveat in interpreting the results.

Outcome data and measures
Our main outcomes of interest in the present analyses are the prevalence and
frequency of any offense committed within two years after the date of random
assignment and resulting in a formal charge. Our pre-RA measures of crime are also
based on charged offenses occurring in the year before the RA date. To answer our final
research question, we examine these outcomes using specific data on drug and violent
offenses.

We select violent and drug offending as secondary outcomes of interest

because they may be most interesting to policymakers15.
One considerable limitation of our crime outcomes is that they only reflect
charges as an adult for offenses in Philadelphia, as we only had access to local adult
criminal justice system databases.

While almost all of the participants reside in

Philadelphia, the city’s proximity and ease of access to surrounding counties and state
lines mean that the local data almost certainly underestimate the number of charged
offenses recorded for these offenders. In addition, we do not have juvenile data available
to give a full picture of offenders’ lifetime criminal involvement. While most of the
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offenders in our sample are older (see Table 2.1), we would expect to see the majority of
their criminal offending taking place during their teenage years, so the lack of data on
charges filed under the age of eighteen is a substantial omission. However, data are
available where the offender was charged as an adult, even if the offense was committed
while s/he was under eighteen.
Some of the covariates and control variables we include in our model are likely to
be confounded with crime outcomes. For example, it is well-established that younger
offenders commit more crime than older offenders.

Months in jail post-random

assignment may also be associated with crime outcomes, as those who spend more time
in jail are likely to be more serious offenders, so will be at greater risk of reoffending
while at liberty. For reference we present the conditional distributions of these two
variables with the likelihood of committing a new charged offense in Appendix G.
Neither of these issues poses a substantial threat to the validity of the data because the
covariates are not additionally confounded with the treatment instrument.
Sample characteristics
We assess our four research questions using the full experimental sample of 1,559
offenders (800 LIS treatment and 759 SAU control). They were followed up from the
date of random assignment, October 1, 2007, for two years to September 30, 2009. Of
the 800 offenders randomly assigned to LIS, 94.5 per cent (N = 756) actually received the
treatment and 5.5 per cent (N = 44) did not. Of the 759 SAU offenders, 3.2 per cent (N =
24) were inadvertently placed on low-intensity supervision.

Offenders are analyzed

according to assigned treatment except in our instrumental variables model, as discussed
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above. The random assignment sequence was designed so that the West and Northeast
LIS groups each contained 400 offenders. The control group contained slightly more
cases from the West than the Northeast (52.8 per cent of the control group was from the
West regional unit).
Table 2.1 shows basic demographic and offending history characteristics for the
two groups. There are no statistically significant differences between the treatment and
control groups on any measure, indicating successful random assignment. The sample is
predominantly male (67.0%), nonwhite (60.1%), and on average 41 years old at the time
of random assignment. The majority (91.8%) of offenders lived in zip code areas with an
average household income of $20,000 or more. As we might expect from a sample
already predicted to be low-risk, prior offending rates are low. Approximately 12 per
cent (N = 193) members of the sample were incarcerated at any time post-random
assignment, for an average of 1.1 months. Members of both groups committed 1.3
offenses per month at risk on average in the year prior to random assignment, with much
lower rates for violent and drug offending. Post-RA, the marginal first year difference
between the treatment and control groups reported above disappears by year two.
Control group members tended to engage in violent recidivism more than the treatment
group in the first year post-RA (4.1% vs. 2.9%), but by the second year the gap has begun
to close (5.4% vs. 4.5%). Treatment and control group participants committed new drug
offenses in similar proportions in the first year post-RA (treatment: 6.4% vs. control:
6.5%), but slightly more of the control group had failed by the second year (control:
10.1% vs. treatment: 8.9%). In all, 21.5 per cent (N = 335) of the 1,559 offenders in the
sample committed a new offense of any kind two years post-RA. Among the 335
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recidivists in the sample, 77 committed violent offenses and 148 committed drug
offenses. The violent and drug offender samples are not independent: some engaged in
both types of offending during the follow-up period.

Results
Table 2.2 shows the odds ratios (OR) from the logistic regression model for the
effect of assigned treatment on offending participation two years post-random
assignment. The results indicate that when other offender characteristics are controlled,
there is no notable difference in the odds of recidivism between the LIS and SAU groups
(OR = 1.05, p ≤ .707). Several other offender characteristics appear to have a greater
impact on the odds of a new offense regardless of treatment status. Each additional year
of age at random assignment is associated with a 2 per cent decline in the odds of
recidivism (OR = .98, p ≤ .002).

SES is consistently associated with significantly

reduced odds of reoffending: between 40 and 75 per cent compared to the lowest SES
group. Each additional month in jail post-RA is associated with a 29 per cent increase in
the odds of a new offense (OR = 1.29, p < .001). This could suggest that offenders who
spent more time in jail were likely to be at higher risk of reoffending while on the
streets.16 We tested an additional model that included a squared term for post-RA jail
time, to account for nonlinearity, such that increased jail time could eventually lead to a
decline in reoffending by curtailing time at risk. This term was dropped as it did not
reach statistical significance,17 perhaps because we did not have jail data for the second
year.

Probationers in the West probation region had 40 per cent lower odds of
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reoffending than probationers in the Northeast (OR = .60, p ≤ .002). This is most likely
due to some significant demographic differences between the two regional samples,
rather than any effect of the treatment.18
Table 2.3 shows the count model outcomes for frequency of reoffending. We
used a zero-inflated negative binomial model to produce the coefficients. We display the
incidence rate ratios (IRR) for the number of new offenses in the sample across the total
time at risk. Following the strategy explained above, the zero-inflated negative binomial
model was selected following tests of its fit against the actual observed criminal
offending frequencies versus those fitted from the Poisson and negative binomial
regression models.19
The full model estimates presented in Table 2.3 indicate that assignment to LIS
supervision, controlling for other factors, is associated with a small, non-significant
reduction in the number of offenses committed post-random assignment (IRR = .89, p ≤
.489).

Other offender characteristics had a greater effect on offending frequency,

regardless of treatment assignment. Gender, which had no effect in the participation
model, appeared to be an important factor in explaining offending frequency. The rate of
offending for men was twice that of women (IRR = 2.03, p < .001). Increased age was
again associated with declining offending rates (IRR = .98, p ≤ .009), and was also an
important predictor of non-offending in the inflated model.

Interestingly, although

membership of the West region group was associated with a lower odds of committing
any new offense in the logistic model, and also predicts non-offending in the inflated
model, those probationers in the West who did offend committed considerably more
offenses than recidivists in the Northeast, although this was not statistically significant
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(IRR = 1.41, p ≤ .107). SES did not predict frequency of recidivism, but increasing status
was significantly associated with non-offending.
Figure 2.3 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for the treatment and
control groups. The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate is the probability of not offending
on a daily basis. The most striking feature of the graph is that the probability of failure is
very low for all low-risk offenders. Figure 2.3 is a visual representation of the figures
reported above: approximately 21 per cent of the sample had failed after two years. The
survivor functions for the treatment and control groups look extremely similar. This is
confirmed by the log-rank test for equality of survivor functions, which indicates that the
probability of survival in the two groups is identical (χ2 (1 d.f.) = .00, p ≤ .996).
We extend this basic comparison by modeling time to first failure with controls
for additional covariates using Cox proportional hazards regression.20 Table 2.4 presents
the results of the regression model in terms of hazard ratios (HR). The hazard is the risk
of failure over time, and thus is equivalent to the incidence rate ratio. The model
confirms that there is no difference in hazards between the treatment and control groups
(HR = 1.03, p ≤ .777). As we saw in the results for prevalence and frequency outcomes,
other factors appear to have a greater influence on the risk of failure regardless of
treatment assignment. Being in the West probation region is associated with a 36 per
cent lower risk of failure over time than being in the Northeast, as we would expect from
the result of our logistic model (HR = .64, p ≤ .001). Older and higher SES offenders
were also at a significantly lower risk of failure over time.
As we have seen, Cox regression does not require us to make assumptions about
the shape of the hazard or survivor functions. However, it is possible to graph the
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‘typical’ survivor function for the model.

Figure 2.4 shows the covariate-adjusted

comparative survivor functions for the treatment and control groups. In this graph, the
continuous covariates are held at their means and categorical covariates are set to the
modal category. Thus, the ‘typical’ offender is male, nonwhite, about 41 years old,
supervised in the West region, lives in a zip code area with an average household income
between $20,000 and $29,999, and was not incarcerated post-random assignment. The
graph shows no difference in the comparative survivor functions for the average
treatment group offender compared to the average control group offender, confirming
earlier findings. The ‘typical’ offender has a slightly lower risk of failure over time than
the uncontrolled sample average. Only around 15 per cent had failed after two years.
The results of the instrumental variables model used to explore whether
differential treatment take-up impacts the effect of LIS are presented in Table 2.5. The
first part of the table shows the results of the reduced form OLS regression, from which
we obtain the probability of offending by assigned treatment, and the first stage of the
2SLS regression, where assigned treatment and its interaction with offender
characteristics are used to predict treatment take-up. The second part of the table shows
the outcomes from the second stage regression, which shows the actual effect of
treatment on those who comply with random assignment.
The first result to note is that the reduced form (ITT) model is largely consistent
with our earlier findings about the impact of assigned treatment and other covariates.
There are slight differences because we include interaction terms in this model to adjust
for heterogeneity in treatment assignment, but we still see little impact of LIS on the
probability of recidivism. SES, region, and months in jail were again related to the
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probability of failure regardless of group assignment. The second stage model shows no
difference in recidivism for those who actually received the treatment, controlling for
time at risk (b = .009, p ≤ .686). The results from the reduced form also show no
significant interaction effects between observable case features and treatment assignment,
suggesting that differences in the main null finding are not driven by differences in who
was assigned treatment.
We used the fitted values obtained from the IV model presented in Table 2.5 to
assess subgroup differences in outcomes among those actually receiving the assigned LIS
treatment (N = 690). Table 2.6 shows the mean probability of failure for each level of
each subgroup. We observe significant differences in the probability of failure across all
the subgroups except race.

Consistent with the findings from the ITT models, the

probability of offending in the West was lower than that in the Northeast for LIS
compliers (17.8% vs. 22.3%; p < .001). We included region as a subgroup because only
one officer from each regional unit supervised all the low-risk offenders. Thus, we
hypothesized that the officers’ personalities and ability to follow the experimental
protocol might affect outcomes. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that the
difference is due to other unobserved factors, as discussed above, this finding provides
some evidence in support of that hypothesis. The regional difference continues to appear
when we examine only those offenders who were actually exposed to the LIS officers,
controlling for several other factors that may have affected treatment take-up and
recidivism. Gender had a significant impact on the probability of failure, with males
more likely to reoffend than females (20.7% vs. 18.3%, p ≤ .036). We see a significant
decreasing probability of recidivism with increasing age (probability range: 16.2% 92

24.1%; p ≤ .001). Offenders in the lowest SES category were most likely to reoffend,
and those in the highest category least likely; there was little difference between the
central groups (probability range: 10.8% - 25.1%; overall p < .001). The offender’s rate
of offending in the year before random assignment also predicts treatment failure.
Interestingly, those who had not offended in the preceding year were more likely to fail
than those with up to or more than one offense per month at risk (20.9% vs. 16.8% and
17.3% respectively; p ≤ .026). We explore this finding in the discussion section.
We now examine the offense-specific models for violent and drug recidivism.
Table 2.7 shows the logistic regression model for the prevalence of new charged violent
offenses in the two-year follow-up period. Assignment to the treatment group was
associated with a non-significant reduction in the odds of violent reoffending compared
with the treatment group (OR = .89, p ≤ .644). As was the case in the full reoffending
model, West probation region, increased age, and increased SES were associated with
significant reductions in the odds of recidivism, while post-RA jail time was associated
with increased reoffending.21 In addition, we see substantial effects of gender and prior
offending history on the prevalence of violent recidivism, which was not apparent in the
full offending model. The odds of a new violent offense were 3.5 times higher for males
than females (OR = 3.53, p < .001), and offenders who had committed at least one violent
offense during the months they were at risk one year pre-RA had 2.5 times the odds of a
violent offense as those who had not. Recall that the sample probability of committing a
violent offense was very small (less than 5%; N = 77), which may affect the size of the
test statistics for these estimates.
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The count model outcomes for violent reoffending are presented in Table 2.8.
Again, a zero-inflated negative binomial model proved to be the best fit for our data.22
Assignment to LIS supervision, controlling for other factors, is associated with a small,
non-significant decline in offending over the two-year follow up period than assignment
to the control group (IRR = .83, p ≤ .453). The only significant predictor in the full
model is the pre-RA violent offending rate, which is associated with a large decline in the
rate of violent reoffending (IRR = .34, p ≤ .047). This is surprising because violent
offending history was strongly associated with an increase in the prevalence of violent
recidivism. Similarly, gender, which was also associated with increased prevalence of
reoffending, is associated with a decline in offending frequency. Income and probation
region, which were associated with reductions in overall offending, are associated with
increased frequency of violent offending However, it is likely that these results are
skewed by the very small number of offenders charged with violent offenses post-RA,
and the wide variation in the number of charged offenses. Most of the 77 violent
offenders were charged with between one and three crimes, but the count ranges up to 52.
Figure 2.5 shows the comparative Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for violent
offenses in the treatment and control groups. The graph supports the estimates from the
prevalence and count models. It appears that the probability of failure is slightly higher
in the control group, and that they fail more quickly than the treatment group (although
note that the scale on the y-axis magnifies the size of the gap between the two lines). The
log-rank test indicates no significant difference between the time to failure across the two
groups (χ2 (1 d.f.) = .69, p ≤ .405). Similarly, when controlling for other covariates in a
Cox regression model, we see no difference between the treatment and control groups
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(HR = .91, p ≤ .686: Table 2.9 and Figure 2.623). As we saw in the logistic regression
model, males had a significantly higher risk of failure than females (HR = 3.24, p ≤ .001),
and offenders with prior violent offenses in the year pre-RA were at greater risk of failure
than those without (HR = 2.35, p ≤ .02). SES and age were also associated with declines
in the risk of failure.
Note that we only use one variable to control for time at risk post-RA in this
model, compared with the twelve monthly indicator variables included in the full
offending model. The dummy indicators were dropped from this model because of
problems that were likely caused by the very small proportion of failures in this sample.
In the first few months of the first year follow-up period, the numbers of eventually
failing offenders who were in jail did not vary at all. The resulting multicollinearity
between each of these monthly variables prevented us from being able to estimate their
parameters.

However, the single jail indicator violates the proportional hazards

assumption for this model (see Appendix H for the results of the diagnostic tests). This is
to be expected, because we are treating jail stays as time-constant in our model, when
they clearly vary with time. We account for this nonproportionality by constructing a
new model that allows jail to vary with time by including a jail*time interaction term.
The results of this model are presented in Table 2.10. We present the unexponentiated
coefficients for this model because the interaction term makes more sense on that scale.
However, if we obtained the hazard ratios for the other covariates we would see that the
addition of the interaction term barely makes a difference to our original estimates
overall. For example, the coefficient of -.092 for treatment group assignment converts to
a hazard ratio of .91 – identical to the estimate from the first model. The p-value for this
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estimate is also practically identical: .691 compared to .686. Thus, our two alternative
controls for time at risk do not appear to impact our estimates of the risk of committing a
violent offense over time.
Table 2.11 shows the results of the IV regression for violent offending.
Consistent with earlier findings, the reduced form (ITT) model shows a slight, nonsignificant reduction in the probability of violent recidivism for offenders assigned to LIS
(b = -.073, p ≤ .239). Gender, income, and months in jail are also significantly associated
with the outcome. However, as in the model for all offense types, the small effect of
treatment disappears completely for those who actually received it (b = - .007, p ≤ .586).
The subgroup effects for violent offending (Table 2.12) are similar to those for all
offenses. The overall probability of offending is small across all the subgroups. Region,
gender, age, and SES are all significantly associated with outcomes for LIS compliers,
and race is not. The prior offending rate (which is dichotomized into no offending vs.
any offending for violent and drug offending due to very low offending rates) does not
quite reach statistical significance, but the results are in the opposite direction from those
observed in the all offenses model. Those with no prior violent offenses were less likely
to reoffend compared to those with one or more charge (3.7% vs. 6.1%, p ≤ .073).
The outcomes of the logistic regression model for prevalence of drug offending
are presented in Table 2.13. The results are very similar to the preceding analyses.
Treatment group assignment has almost no effect on reoffending (OR = .92, p ≤ .644).
West region, age, and increasing SES are again associated with decreased odds of
reoffending, and males had twice the odds of females of committing a new drug offense.
On this occasion, we also found that an additional squared jail time term was significant
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(p ≤ .008),24 and it was retained in this model. It would appear that for drug offending,
more time in jail may lead to a reduced likelihood of reoffending to some degree. Since
we only have one year of jail data, it could be the case that the odds of drug offending
decline as jail time increases, but increase again when all offenders are ‘returned to the
risk set’ in the second year. However, because our outcome data extend beyond the
range of the jail data, these coefficients should be interpreted with caution.
We used a zero-inflated negative binomial model to assess the frequency of drug
offending (Table 2.14).25 Although it does not reach statistical significance, there is a
notable 22 per cent decline in the drug reoffending rate for the treatment group compared
to the control group (IRR = .78, p ≤ .169). Increased age was also associated with a
decline in the rate of drug offending of 2 per cent per additional year (IRR = .98, p ≤
.045). As before, males reoffended at a higher rate than females and increased SES was
associated with reduced reoffending, but these relationships were not as strong as in
previous models.
The Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for drug offending are shown in Figure 2.7.
The pattern of survival probability is very similar to the patterns for overall and violent
offending, with the control group at slightly greater risk of failure by the end of the twoyear follow-up period (log-rank test for equality: χ2 (1 d.f.) = .72, p ≤ .395). Table 2.15
and Figure 2.8 present the hazard ratios and graphical representation of the estimated
survivor functions from the Cox regression model.26 Again, no difference is evident in
the risk of failure over time between the treatment and control groups (HR = .93, p ≤
.673). Gender is again associated with a significantly higher risk of failure, with males at
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twice the risk of females (HR = 1.96, p ≤ .001), and age and increasing SES is associated
with a lower risk over time.
The IV regression results for drug offending are presented in Table 2.16. Again,
there is a slight reduction in the probability of drug offending associated with LIS
assignment and take-up, but its impact is extremely small and becomes even smaller
among those who actually receive the treatment, controlling for time at risk (ITT: 3.5%
reduction, p ≤ .680; second stage: 1% reduction, p ≤ .550). As before, age and increased
SES were associated with a reduced risk of reoffending in the ITT model. Those in the
highest SES category were 10 per cent less likely to commit a new drugs offense than
those in the lowest category, regardless of treatment assignment.
Contrary to other models, we see no effect of probation region or prior offending
history on recidivism for drug offenses among LIS compliers (Table 2.17). The only
significant differences we observe are by gender, age, and SES. Males had a 9.5 per cent
probability of reoffending compared to 4.5 per cent for females (p < .001) when actually
supervised in the LIS caseload. There is a linear relationship between increased age and
SES and a reduced probability of recidivism.

Discussion
Our first research question assessed whether the impact of LIS changes if we
consider offending participation (the proportion of offenders with a new offense)
compared to frequency (the number of offenses committed by the offenders who fail).
Overall, there was no difference at all in the prevalence of new charges between the
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treatment and control groups after two years. When we controlled for other factors that
could affect reoffending, such as offenders’ demographic characteristics, criminal
histories, and time at risk for reoffending, assignment to LIS was associated with no
differences in the odds of recidivism. On the other hand, age, SES, and gender were
strongly associated with both the probability and number of new offenses.
Although no difference in the prevalence of new offenses was observed, it is still
possible that the frequency of offending could be affected by the experimental
supervision strategy. In particular, in an analysis where our controls for post-random
assignment time at risk are relatively weak (see above), any impact on offending
frequency might be telling because the proportion of offenders failing will be attenuated
by the fact that some did not have the opportunity to do so because of incarceration. Of
course, time in jail restricts the number of offenses that could be committed too, but it
allows us to examine whether those who had the opportunity to offend and received LIS
did so at a higher rate than those assigned to regular supervision. Further, offending
frequency is more informative about the longer-term effects of treatment than prevalence,
which measures the more immediate impact of LIS. However, in our analysis we found
little difference in offending frequency between groups. Some of the effect sizes were
moderate, but did not reach statistical significance.
Our third alternative outcome measure was time to failure. We examined whether
assignment to LIS might have caused offenders to commit a new offense more or less
quickly than their control group counterparts. A potential danger of reducing supervision
is that offenders may then be on a ‘free rein’ to engage in offending, whereas those under
closer scrutiny may have an incentive to wait until their period of supervision comes to
99

an end. On the other hand, research on intensive supervision programs has indicated that
increased supervision may result in increased detection of new offenses or violations.
We found no differences in the time to failure for LIS and control offenders, regardless of
whether or not other covariates were controlled. In reality, the probability of offending in
both groups of low-risk offenders was so low that any differences that might have existed
are probably too minor to detect. Our survival analyses confirmed that the average lowrisk offender has a very low probability of failure over time. A limitation of our entire
analysis that is particularly important here and has already been discussed at length is that
we were not able to account for offenders’ time on the streets and ability to reoffend on a
daily basis.
We found no evidence that the substantial non-delivery of treatment affected the
results we find elsewhere in our analysis. We predicted actual treatment take-up based
on assigned treatment and its interactions with offender characteristics that might predict
non-delivery. The effect of the treatment for ‘compliers’ who were randomly assigned to
and actually received LIS was even closer to zero than it was in our ITT-based analyses.
This provides further support for LIS as an appropriate strategy for dealing with low-risk
offenders. Many of those who did not receive the treatment as assigned were likely to
have been higher risk offenders. The majority were excluded because of factors that
occurred before random assignment but were not discovered until afterwards, such as
noncompliance, absconding, or placement in intensive treatment-based caseloads before
random assignment. These offenders may have been more likely to offend regardless of
the type of supervision they received, and their inclusion in the ITT analyses may have
led to the slightly higher prevalence of offending we saw in the treatment group.
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Our final analysis, which examined subgroup effects for those actually receiving
the treatment, did show some substantial differences between LIS and SAU.

Age,

gender, SES, and to a lesser extent prior offending history were significantly associated
with outcomes for general and specific crime types. Overall, it appeared that low-risk
offenders, despite considerable heterogeneity in characteristics compared to the
traditional image of the young, male offender that appears in the criminological literature,
were homogeneous in their propensity to reoffend.

However, when we predicted

outcomes according to offender characteristics, we saw that the offenders with the
highest probability of recidivism were those who look more similar to that ‘traditional’
offender. Young males from low-income neighborhoods were close to or above the
sample average in their likelihood of reoffending, while the less traditional offenders
were generally well below it. Our sample, on average, was ‘non-traditional,’ being older
and containing a broad mix of gender, SES and other characteristics. Thus, we may
conclude that there is such a thing as a typical low-risk offender, who looks different
from the norm.

The propensity to reoffend is homogeneous within this offender

subpopulation. The low-risk prediction model may also identify offenders who have had
little contact with the criminal justice system, or younger offenders who have so far only
engaged in low-level offending, but exhibit some of the risk factors usually associated
with more extensive criminal careers. Procedures could be built into the low-intensity
supervision model to subject these offenders to somewhat more monitoring than ‘typical’
low-risk cases (perhaps more frequent check-ins by telephone than the experimental
protocol requires). Focusing some more attention on the more traditional offenders in
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low-intensity supervision would improve the likelihood of picking up the false positives,
but resources would still have been conserved if the risk prediction proved accurate.
Two other notable findings from this analysis were the differential effects by
probation region, and the finding that offenders without any offending history in the
previous year were more likely to fail than those without. The latter can be easily
explained. This variable was a rate calculated by dividing the number of offenses by the
number of months in the year in which the offender was out of jail and able to reoffend.
Thus, those who spent the entire year in prison have a rate of zero, as do offenders who
were at liberty the whole time but did not engage in criminal behavior. Offenders who
spent more time in jail are more likely to be serious offenders with a higher risk of failure
once free. It is difficult to tell whether the difference in supervision styles between the
two probation officers really drove the difference in recidivism outcomes between the
two regions, but reduced recidivism in the West was consistently observed. Since the
officers were required to have minimal contact with their clients, it seems unlikely that
their personalities would have made a great deal of difference to offenders’ behavior.
Thus, unobserved factors most likely operated here. We discussed above some of the
differences in offender characteristics between the two regions. It is also possible that
more offenders from the West region were incarcerated (or incarcerated for longer
periods) during the follow-up period than those in the Northeast.
A major limitation of our subgroup analysis was a lack of available information
about offenders. The subgroups we studied – gender, race, SES, age, and offending
history – are theoretically some of the most important covariates with offending, but there
is no reason why they would specifically impact the performance of low-risk offenders
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on low-intensity supervision. There are many other factors that could be more relevant to
this association, especially given the possible theoretical foundations for low-intensity
probation set out above.

Do low-risk offenders perform better under a lack of

supervision if they have the support of a spouse, or the structure of employment? How
do drug, alcohol, or mental health issues interact with reduced supervision and more
limited opportunities for intervention? We can hypothesize that the lives of low-risk
probationers may be less chaotic than those of more hardened offenders, such that factors
related to stability like marriage and employment could have a more profound impact on
their success or failure. On the other hand, we would expect to see differences by gender
and past behavior in almost any sample subject to any intervention.
We also examined whether our results held for more specific offense types.
Although the offenders in this sample were predicted to be low risk and reoffended at a
very low rate, the range of offenses they committed ranged from bad checks to homicide.
We selected two fairly common offense types that may be of interest to policymakers,
especially in the context of a supposedly low-risk caseload: violence and drugs. Largely,
our results did not diverge from those found for all offenses (although these offenses are
a subset of the latter outcome measure, so this is to be expected to some extent). There
were no differences between groups based on time to failure or treatment delivered for
either offense type, and the same subgroup differences were observed, although there was
slightly more homogeneity in recidivism propensity across drug offender subgroups.
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Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to examine the viability of giving low-risk probationers
less supervision compared to usual probation standards, in order to reallocate resources
toward the highest risk offenders. We explored whether the characteristics of low-level
offenders and the types of outcome measures selected in the analysis of the first
randomized controlled trial of low-intensity supervision (LIS) affected the impact of LIS
on recidivism. Overall, we found no evidence against the hypothesis that reducing
supervision for the lowest-risk offenders is an efficient strategy.
The credibility of probation and parole supervision as a safe and effective strategy
for dealing with offenders in the community is under threat from a poor image driven by
a severe lack of resources and some high-profile failures. Although most probation
agencies do use some form of risk assessment or triage process to steer higher-risk
offenders into smaller, more intensive caseloads, real-world constraints may mean that
even these caseloads operate at full capacity. This leaves probation officers with little
time or ability to provide appropriate services. The Philadelphia Adult Probation and
Parole Department (APPD) was one agency that experienced these difficulties first-hand,
and worked with the University of Pennsylvania to conduct an experimental analysis of a
new strategy for assessing risk as the basis for channeling offenders into appropriate
supervision. The first stage of the restructuring of supervision, on which the present
study is focused, involved directing offenders at the lowest risk of serious reoffending
into large caseloads, in which they received few probation contacts. This strategy was
intended to free scarce staffing resources to be used for reducing caseloads and increasing
APPD’s ability to provide suitable surveillance and services at the highest end of the risk
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spectrum. However, this strategy is politically risky. Arguably, even the lowest risk
offenders are still adjudicated criminals who pose a threat to society and should not be
left effectively unsupervised. One could also claim that the needs of probationers should
not be ignored by an agency supposedly put in place to serve them, simply on the basis of
a decision that those probationers are unlikely to reoffend.
The consideration of a policy of LIS also raises the broader theoretical question:
what is the nature of low-risk offending? Little research has been produced on this
question to date. Philadelphia’s statistical prediction model proceeded from the basic
argument that any offender unlikely to commit a serious crime within two years of their
probation start date should be considered ‘low-risk.’ The present analyses use the modelgenerated sample to explore further the general characteristics of low-risk offenders, and
whether heterogeneity among the sample affects LIS take-up and outcomes.
We were unable to find any evidence that reducing probation supervision for lowrisk offenders causes harm. After two years, the probability of failure was identical in
both the LIS and regular supervision groups. There was no indication that LIS clients
failed more quickly than their counterparts on regular supervision. We used a rigorous
analytic strategy to examine the impact of treatment on those who actually received it,
avoiding the bias associated with simpler methods by accounting for factors potentially
related to non-delivery and maintaining the integrity of random assignment. Although
we found significant differences in the likelihood of reoffending by subgroups, overall
reoffending rates were low and there was no indication that the main effects analysis
masked any major backfire effect of LIS. Our findings held up across specific offense
types as well as for all charged offenses.
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We found that low-risk offenders are a relatively heterogeneous group compared
to the ‘typical’ image of the young male offender.

Low-risk offenders appear to

encompass a much broader spectrum of society in terms of gender, race, age, social
circumstances and offending profiles. We found no evidence that this heterogeneity has
any impact on which offenders actually received the treatment. The homogeneity in lowrisk offenders’ propensity to reoffend is interesting from both theoretical and policy
perspectives, because it suggests that the relationship of crime risk factors to the
likelihood of reoffending may be considerably weakened when the risk of a future serious
offense is low. This may be a much more important theoretical basis for the effectiveness
of LIS than any of the possible mechanisms we considered at the outset of this paper.
The finding is also important for the operation of a probation agency because it implies
that specific case attributes do not affect probation performance for a large proportion of
the population. Differential attributes only appear to come into play for the majority of
this group at the risk prediction stage. After that, the propensity of low-risk probationers
to offend is going to be the same regardless of the level of supervision they receive, with
just a few modifications required for early-career or more ‘traditional’ clients who may
still be on an upward trajectory of offending. Overall, this seems to be a very powerful
justification for the use of LIS instead of ‘supervision as usual.’
Thus, we conclude that low-intensity probation supervision, coupled with a
rigorous method for predicting the risk of serious offending, is a defensible model for
effective probation operations. It remains to be seen whether the other arm of APPD’s
restructuring strategy – providing increased supervision and services to the most serious
offenders in small caseloads – proves successful, but we have ascertained that it can be
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done within existing departmental constraints by reducing supervision for those already
deemed unlikely to fail. This experiment clearly demonstrates that there is no need to
distribute valuable resources equally to all types of offender.

Struggling probation

agencies should ask whether it remains necessary to provide more supervision when it
makes so little difference to the offending outcomes of what will likely be a large
proportion of their total caseload. Whichever way one looks at it, probation supervision
for low-risk offenders is clearly one area where ‘more,’ in the usual care sense, does not
inevitably mean ‘better.’

Notes
1

All operational information about the Philadelphia APPD presented in this paper was gathered through
conversations with APPD staff and University of Pennsylvania research staff, and in-person visits to the
APPD offices.
2

In this experiment, murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and sexual offenses were
deemed ‘serious.’
3

Intake information includes the offender’s personal and residential characteristics, and information about
the instant offense and prior criminal history.
4

Prior to the implementation of the Low Risk Experiment, Philadelphia APPD already had several low-risk
caseloads within the regional units. Offenders were assigned to them based on the judgment of their
probation officer rather than a standardized prediction model. However, because they had already
experienced a systematic lower-intensity model of probation compared to standard practice that was too
similar to the experimental design, they were excluded from the Low Risk Experiment.
5

Offenders with potential direct violations were excluded because the workload of preparing new cases for
court was deemed too onerous for a probation officer with such a large caseload. All offenders assigned to
low-intensity probation were returned to standard supervision if they were arrested for a new offense during
the experimental period.
6

A major exclusion criterion that had not been considered at the time of random assignment was the FIR
(Forensic Intensive Recovery) condition. FIR offenders are supervised in regional caseloads but are
required to attend an intensive drug treatment program. The supervision of their participation in the
program was too involved for low-intensity probation officers to handle in their large caseloads. Prescreening also revealed that a considerable number of offenders were either on absconder warrants or had
not been in contact with their probation officer for more than 90 days (which is grounds for obtaining a
warrant). Again, because these offenders were in violation of their probation and more work would be
required to process them, they were not transferred to low-intensity supervision.
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7

LIS participants who were transferred back to standard supervision as a result of a violation were
analyzed as randomly assigned.
8

There was a transitional period after random assignment during which some treatment group participants
were still attending appointments that were scheduled before random assignment. In addition, one of the
low-intensity probation officers was somewhat resistant to the idea of reducing supervision and continued
to schedule monthly visits. This was discovered about two months into the experiment, and with further
training the officer began to schedule visits according to the protocol.
9

The ‘power few,’ as described by popular author Malcolm Gladwell (see Sherman, 2007) is a
phenomenon found throughout social research. It is the small fraction of a population to which a
disproportionate amount of a certain resource or condition may be attributed. In criminological research it
is often noted that a small proportion of offenders or places produce a substantial amount of the total crime
(e.g., Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 1989; Weisburd et al, 2004). Within a probation agency, a small
proportion of probationers are at the greatest risk for committing most of the serious offending among the
agency’s clients (see Fig. 2.1).
10

Regular Poisson or negative binomial models may underpredict zeros and overpredict larger numbers,
which is problematic when the majority of the data are zeros.
11

Problems in the coding of the race variable in our dataset forced us to use this dichotomy rather than a
more detailed categorical variable for race. The race indicator variable was populated with data from two
different sources, with one source selected as the default. However, serious discrepancies arose because
the categories of race in the two original sources were substantially different.
12

Information about SES at the individual offender level was not available. However, 2000 Census data
were obtained for each offender’s recorded zip code. We used the Census measure of average household
income for the offender’s zip code as an estimate of SES. This was coded as a categorical variable with
four levels: less than $20,000 (used as the reference category in our models); $20,000-$29,999; $30,000$39,999; and $40,000 or more.
13

We recognize that the jail time variables included in our models may be endogenous; that is, the effect of
jail time on the odds of recidivism may in fact represent a causal effect of the recidivism outcome on the
jail variable. We are unable to separate post-random assignment jail time resulting from pre- and post-RA
offending. Thus, while we present the models with jail time controls included, we also ran each model
without those variables and include the results in Appendix F. Appendix F shows that the inclusion of the
terms did not substantially bias our findings.
14

Our only data on the timing of jail stays are contained in monthly dummies for whether or not the
offender was in jail in that month. A further limitation is that these variables are only available for the first
year post-random assignment. Thus, while we control for post-RA time at risk as far as possible, it is
important to remember in the analysis that the second year of follow-up data is analyzed as if none of the
sample spent time in jail. While this does not greatly affect the participation-based outcome measures, it
does mean that our post-random assignment offending frequency estimates may be overstated and the
survival analysis models overstate the number of person-days at risk (some offenders who would have been
incarcerated in the second year are treated as if they had a nonzero probability of offending for the entire
year).
15

Where these offense-specific outcomes are used, the covariate for monthly pre-RA offending rate used in
our models is also based on these specific offense types, rather than all offending.
16

On the other hand, given the possibility of endogeneity, it could also suggest that offenders who commit
more than one offense post-random assignment spend more time in jail.
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17

OR = .98, p ≤ .08. A likelihood ratio test comparing the models with and without the squared terms also
indicated that the inclusion of the squared term did not improve model fit: LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 3.16, p ≤ .08.
18

Probationers from the West were significantly older than those in the Northeast, and significantly more
likely to be nonwhite and of lower SES. We examined several combinations of interaction terms between
region and these offender characteristics, and found that West region offenders at the $20,000-$29,999 SES
level were significantly less likely to reoffend (b = –1.84, p ≤ .023). When this interaction is controlled, the
probability of recidivism is higher in the West than the Northeast, but the association is non-significant (OR
= 2.91, p ≤ .172).
19

The likelihood ratio test comparing the negative binomial and Poisson models was highly significant,
suggesting that the negative binomial model fits the data better (LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 6913.3, p < .001). The
likelihood ratio test comparing zero-inflated negative binomial versus zero-inflated Poisson also supports
the use of the former model (LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 1930.81, p < .0001). The Vuong test statistic comparing the
zero-inflated and standard negative binomial models is positive and highly significant (z = 7.04, p < .0001),
again suggesting that the zero-inflated negative binomial model is the most appropriate.
20

The key assumption of Cox regression is that the hazard function for each individual follows the same
form, although we do not impose any shape for the form. We used scaled Schoenfeld residuals to examine
proportionality. The detailed results of this test are presented in Appendix G. Non-significant coefficients
indicate that the proportional hazards assumption is satisfied. For this model, our assumption appears to be
justified. One of the control variables for jail time appeared to be nonproportional, but this is not a
substantial cause for concern.
21

We again tested a squared jail time term in this model, which was not statistically significant and did not
improve model fit (OR = .99, p ≤ .630; LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = .23, p ≤ .634.
22

Likelihood ratio test for Poisson vs. negative binomial: LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 2946.78, p < .001. Likelihood
ratio test for zero-inflated Poisson vs. zero-inflated negative binomial: LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 304.47, p < .0001.
Vuong test for zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 5.68, p < .0001.
23

Covariates in Figures 2.6 and 2.8 are held at the same values as they were for Figure 2.4.

24

Likelihood ratio test comparing models with and without squared term: LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 6.62, p ≤ .010.

25

Likelihood ratio test for Poisson vs. negative binomial: LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 1041.73, p < .001. Likelihood
ratio test for zero-inflated Poisson vs. zero-inflated negative binomial: LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 90.93, p < .0001.
Vuong test for zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 5.62, p < .0001.
26

See Appendix G for test of the assumptions of proportional hazards. We proceeded with the
proportional hazards model despite some evidence for nonproportionality in one of the monthly jail
indicator variables.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Sample Characteristics

% West region
% Male
% White
Mean age at RA date
Average household income in ZIP
% less than $20,000
% $20,000 - $29,999
% $30,000 - $39,999
% $40,000 or more
Mean monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (any charged offense)
Mean monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged violent offenses)
Mean monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged drug offenses)
Mean number of months in jail 1
year post-RA
% with any charged offense 1 year
post-RA
% with any charged offense 2 years
post-RA
% with charged violent offense 1
year post-RA
% with charged violent offense 2
years post-RA
% with charged drug offense 1 year
post-RA
% with charged drug offense 2 years
post-RA

Treatment (N=800)
50.0
66.5
41.8
40.78

Control (N=759)
52.8
67.6
37.9
40.58

7.6
37.9
33.9
20.6

8.8
41.2
31.6
18.3

.13

.13

.02

.02

.03

.04

1.1

1.1

16.0

15.0

21.5

21.5

2.9

4.1

4.5

5.4

6.4

6.5

8.9

10.1

No significant differences between groups at p ≤ .05 (χ2 for proportions & 2-tailed t for means).

110

Table 2.2: Prevalence of Recidivism (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up)
Logistic Regression

Log likelihood = -685.013
Term
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (any charged offense)
Months in jail post-RA

Odds Ratio
1.05
.60
1.24
1.00
.98
.60
.52
.25

Number of observations = 1,559
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (10 d.f.) = 252.43
Pr > χ2 = .000
Pseudo R2 = .156
S.E.
z
p
.145
.38
.707
.098
-3.15
.002
.185
1.44
.151
.171
-.03
.978
.007
-3.03
.002
.147
-2.08
.037
.135
-2.54
.011
.076
-4.56
.000

.98

.132

-.15

.882

1.29

.025

13.06

.000

Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 for goodness-of-fit (8 d.f., 10 groups) = 9.84, p ≤ .276
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Table 2.3: Frequency of Recidivism (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up)
Zero-Inflated Negative
Binomial Regression

Number of observations = 1,559
Nonzero observations = 335
Zero observations = 1,224
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 29.77
Pr > χ2 = .001

Inflation model = logit
Log likelihood= -1700.398
Full Model

Incidence
Rate Ratio
.89
1.41
2.03
1.14
.98
1.53
1.35
1.11

Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
.99
pre-RA (any charged offense)
Log of post-RA months at risk [offset]
Inflated Model
b
Treatment group
-.067
West probation region
.494
Male
-.104
White
.003
Age at RA
.020
Income $20,000-$29,999
.569
Income $30,000-$39,999
.795
Income $40,000 or more
1.478
Monthly offending rate 1 year
.199
pre-RA (any charged offense)
Constant
-4.027
Log of post-RA months at risk [offset]
Ln(Alpha)
.779
Alpha
2.179

S.E.

z

p

.148
.296
.365
.227
.009
.464
.464
.435

-.69
1.61
3.93
.64
-2.62
1.41
.86
.26

.489
.107
.000
.521
.009
.160
.388
.798

.196

-.06

.951

S.E.
.152
.187
.171
.191
.008
.307
.331
.371

z
-.44
2.64
-.61
.01
2.62
1.85
2.38
3.98

p
.658
.008
.542
.989
.009
.064
.018
.000

.186

1.07

.287

.510

-7.90

.000

.162
.352

4.82

.000

Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 7.04, p < .001
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Table 2.4: Time to Failure (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up)
Cox Regression
(Breslow Method for Ties)

Log likelihood = -2275.151
Term
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (any charged offense)
In jail Oct 2007
In jail Nov 2007
In jail Dec 2007
In jail Jan 2008
In jail Feb 2008
In jail Mar 2008
In jail Apr 2008
In jail May 2008
In jail Jun 2008
In jail Jul 2008
In jail Aug 2008
In jail Sep 2008

Hazard Ratio
1.03
.64
1.24
1.04
.98
.60
.49
.29

Number of subjects = 1,559
Number of failures = 335
Time at risk (person-days) = 976,440
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (21 d.f.) = 298.04
Pr > χ2 = .000
S. E.
z
p
.116
.28
.777
.087
-3.30
.001
.152
1.76
.078
.146
.27
.790
.006
-3.03
.002
.118
-2.59
.010
.103
-3.42
.001
.071
-5.01
.000

.99

.119

-.09

.929

3.76
.60
.77
1.76
.35
3.79
2.37
.83
1.04
1.46
.68
1.08

1.915
.522
.947
1.938
.390
4.263
1.381
.397
.559
.686
.273
.348

2.61
-.59
-.21
.52
-.94
1.18
1.49
-.38
.07
.80
-.95
.24

.009
.556
.833
.605
.346
.236
.137
.701
.945
.422
.340
.812
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Table 2.5: Instrumental Variables Model: Prevalence of Recidivism (All Offenses, 2Year Follow-Up)

Instruments
Assigned LIS
Assigned LIS*West
Assigned LIS*Male
Assigned LIS*White
Assigned LIS*Age
Assigned LIS*Income20
Assigned LIS*Income30
Assigned LIS*Income40
Assigned LIS*Prior offending
Exogenous
Months in jail post-RA
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (any offense)
Constant

First Stage
Treatment Take-Up
Observations = 1,559
R2 = .663
Adjusted R2 = .659
b (S.E.)
.812 (.088)***
-.075 (.035)*
.014 (.032)
-.024 (.037)
-.000 (.001)
.026 (.057)
.086 (.060)
.028 (.066)
-.030 (.027)*

Reduced Form (ITT)
Post-RA Any Off.
Observations = 1,559
R2 = .193
Adjusted R2 = .183
b (S.E.)
-.047 (.113)
-.007 (.045)
-.004 (.040)
.029 (.048)
-.001 (.002)
.111 (.073)
.095 (.077)
.122 (.085)
.032 (.035)

-.014 (.002)***
.055 (.025)*
.009 (.023)
.009 (.027)
.001 (.001)
-.002 (.039)
-.013 (.042)
-.002 (.047)

. 052 (.003)***
-.068 (.032)*
.031 (.029)
-.017 (.034)
-.002 (.001)
-.126 (.050)*
-.139 (.054)**
-.245 (.060)***

-.012 (.022)

-.024 (.028)

-.025 (.064)

.408 (.081)***

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

Second-Stage Instrumental
Variables Regression

Number of observations = 1,559
Wald χ2 (10 d.f.) = 364.12
Pr > χ2 = .000
Any New Charged Offense
R2 = .189
Term
b
S. E.
Z
p
Predicted Treatment Take-up
.009
.023
.40
.686
Months in jail post-RA
.052
.003
17.50
.000
Constant
.383
.057
6.76
.000
Controlling for region, gender, race, age, SES and offending history.
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Table 2.6: Treatment Effects by Subgroup (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up)

339
351
464
226
283
407
34
182
176
236
62
52
261
239
138

Mean Pr.
of Failure
.223
.178
.214
.172
.203
.198
.241
.237
.187
.186
.162
.251
.218
.223
.108

550

.209

125

.168

15

.173

Subgroup
Region
Gender
Race
Age at
RA

Income

Northeast
West
Male
Female
White
Nonwhite
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 +
< $20,000
$20,000-$29,999
$30,000-$39,999
$40,000 +

Offending
No offending
rate per
month at
Up to 1
risk 1
year preMore than 1
RA
†

N

2-sample t-test or one-way ANOVA (F-test).
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t/F†

p

3.85

.000

-3.29

.001

-.47

.641

4.92

.001

22.91

.000

3.67

.026

Table 2.7: Prevalence of Recidivism (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up)
Logistic Regression
Log likelihood = -247.480
Term
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged violent off.)
Months in jail post-RA

Odds Ratio
.89
.53
3.53
.93
.97
.46
.32
.18

Number of observations = 1,559
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (10 d.f.) = 118.40
Pr > χ2 = .000
Pseudo R2 = .193
S.E.
z
p
.225
-.46
.644
.167
-2.00
.045
1.263
3.52
.000
.297
-.23
.820
.013
-2.13
.033
.195
-1.83
.067
.152
-2.41
.016
.099
-3.10
.002

2.61

1.139

2.20

.028

1.26

.030

9.47

.000

Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 for goodness-of-fit (8 d.f., 10 groups) = 5.82, p ≤ .668
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Table 2.8: Frequency of Recidivism (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up)
Zero-Inflated Negative
Binomial Regression

Number of observations = 1,559
Nonzero observations = 77
Zero observations = 1,482
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 7.08
Pr > χ2 = .629

Inflation model = logit
Log likelihood = -499.228
Full Model

Incidence
Rate Ratio
.83
1.18
.87
.99
.98
1.53
1.24
1.13

Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
.34
pre-RA (charged violent off.)
Log of post-RA months at risk [offset]
Inflated Model
b
Treatment group
.109
West probation region
.444
Male
-1.335
White
-.031
Age at RA
.032
Income $20,000-$29,999
.522
Income $30,000-$39,999
.923
Income $40,000 or more
1.530
Monthly offending rate 1 year
-1.469
pre-RA (charged violent off.)
Constant
-1.441
Log of post-RA months at risk [offset]
Ln(Alpha)
-.089
Alpha
.915

S.E.

z

p

.205
.389
.336
.331
.016
.717
.767
.767

-.75
.49
-.35
-.04
-1.08
.90
.34
.18

.453
.624
.724
.966
.280
.366
.731
.857

.185

-1.98

.047

S.E.
.243
.293
.350
.301
.013
.415
.459
.547

z
.45
1.52
-3.81
-.10
2.53
1.26
2.01
2.80

p
.654
.130
.000
.917
.011
.209
.044
.005

.814

-1.80

.071

.732

-1.97

.049

.268
.245

-.33

.740

Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 5.68, p < .001.
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Table 2.9: Time to Failure (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up)
Cox Regression
(Breslow Method for Ties)

Log likelihood = -511.625
Term
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged violent off.)
In jail 1 year post-RA

Number of subjects = 1,559
Number of failures = 77
Time at risk (person-days) = 1,103,248
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (10 d.f.) = 105.11
Pr > χ2 = .000
Hazard Ratio
S. E.
z
p
.91
.211
-.40
.686
.65
.180
-1.55
.122
3.24
1.108
3.44
.001
.97
.279
-.09
.927
.97
.012
-2.25
.024
.45
.175
-2.05
.040
.36
.153
-2.41
.016
.22
.113
-2.94
.003
2.35

.864

2.33

.020

7.81

1.839

8.73

.000

Table 2.10: Time to Failure with Jail-Time Interaction (Violent Offenses, 2-Year FollowUp)
Cox Regression
(Breslow Method for Ties)

Log likelihood = -508.130
Term
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged violent off.)
In jail 1 year post-RA
Jail*time

b
-.092
-.425
1.173
-.025
-.027
-.791
-1.013
-1.513

Number of subjects = 1,559
Number of failures = 77
Time at risk (person-days) = 1,103,248
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (11 d.f.) = 112.10
Pr > χ2 = .000
S. E.
z
p
.231
-.40
.691
.277
-1.53
.126
.342
3.43
.001
.287
-.09
.932
.012
-2.23
.025
.391
-2.02
.043
.425
-2.38
.017
.518
-2.92
.003

.859

.366

2.35

.019

3.017
-.004

.455
.001

6.64
-2.51

.000
.012
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Table 2.11: Instrumental Variables Model: Prevalence of Recidivism (Violent Offenses,
2-Year Follow-Up)

Instruments
Assigned LIS
Assigned LIS*West
Assigned LIS*Male
Assigned LIS*White
Assigned LIS*Age
Assigned LIS*Income20
Assigned LIS*Income30
Assigned LIS*Income40
Assigned LIS*Prior offending
Exogenous
Months in jail post-RA
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (violent offense)
Constant

First Stage
Treatment Take-Up
Observations = 1,559
R2 = .661
Adjusted R2 = .658
b (S.E.)
.808 (.088)***
-.075 (.035)*
.013 (.032)
-.021 (.037)
-.000 (.001)
.025 (.057)
.083 (.060)
.021 (.066)
-.004 (.099)

Reduced Form (ITT)
Post-RA Violent Off.
Observations = 1,559
R2 = .117
Adjusted R2 = .107
b (S.E.)
-.073 (.062)
.005 (.025)
.009 (.022)
.048 (.026)
.000 (.001)
.078 (.040)
.060 (.043)
.053 (.047)
-.104 (.070)

-.013 (.002)***
.056 (.025)*
.010 (.023)
.009 (.027)
.001 (.001)
-.001 (.039)
-.014 (.042)
-.002 (.047)

.021 (.002)***
-.028 (.017)
.037 (.016)*
-.028 (.019)
-.001 (.001)
-.066 (.028)*
-.070 (.030)*
-.085 (.033)**

-.069 (.082)

.133 (.058)*

-.029 (.063)

.131 (.045)**

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

Second-Stage Instrumental
Variables Regression

Number of observations = 1,559
Wald χ2 (10 d.f.) = 192.81
Pr > χ2 = .000
New Charged Violent Off.
R2 = .110
Term
b
S. E
z
p
Predicted treatment take-up
-.007
.013
-.54
.586
Months in jail post-RA
.020
.002
12.27
.000
Constant
.010
.031
3.19
.001
Controlling for region, gender, race, age, SES and offending history.
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Table 2.12: Treatment Effect by Subgroups (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up)

Northeast
West
Male
Female
White
Nonwhite
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 +
< $20,000
$20,000-$29,999
$30,000-$39,999
$40,000 +

339
351
464
226
283
407
34
182
176
236
62
52
261
239
138

Mean Pr.
of Failure
.045
.030
.053
.006
.038
.038
.048
.050
.032
.034
.025
.059
.044
.042
.011

No violent
offending

667

.037

Subgroup
Region
Gender
Race
Age at
RA

Income
Offending
rate per
month at
risk 1
year preRA
†

Violent
offending

N

23

.061

2-sample t-test or one-way ANOVA (F-test).
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t/F†

p

3.09

.002

-9.76

.000

.01

.989

3.38

.009

12.13

.000

-1.79

.073

Table 2.13: Prevalence of Recidivism (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up)
Logistic Regression
Log likelihood = -426.233
Term
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged drug off.)
Months in jail post-RA
Months in jail postRA(squared)

Odds Ratio
.92
.88
1.93
1.18
.97
.49
.43
.27

Number of observations = 1,559
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (11 d.f.) = 125.97
Pr > χ2 = .000
Pseudo R2 = .129
S.E.
z
p
.169
-.46
.644
.195
-.59
.554
.420
3.00
.003
.275
.72
.473
.009
-3.13
.002
.154
-2.27
.023
.147
-2.47
.013
.108
-3.29
.001

1.55

.694

.99

.324

1.58

.165

4.42

.000

.98

.009

-2.65

.008

Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 for goodness-of-fit (8 d.f., 10 groups) = 4.96, p ≤ .762
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Table 2.14: Frequency of Recidivism (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up)
Zero-Inflated Negative
Binomial Regression

Number of observations = 1,559
Nonzero observations = 148
Zero observations = 1,411
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 15.07
Pr > χ2 = .089

Inflation model = logit
Log likelihood = -736.235
Full Model

Incidence
Rate Ratio
.78
1.42
1.53
.90
.98
.99
.91
.57

Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
1.10
pre-RA (charged drug off.)
Log of post-RA months at risk [offset]
Inflated Model
b
Treatment group
.032
West probation region
.148
Male
-.589
White
-.242
Age at RA
.029
Income $20,000-$29,999
.512
Income $30,000-$39,999
.716
Income $40,000 or more
1.071
Monthly offending rate 1 year
-.009
pre-RA (charged drug off.)
Constant
-2.477
Log of post-RA months at risk [offset]
Ln(Alpha)
-.473
Alpha
.623

S.E.

z

p

.143
.311
.379
.212
.009
.315
.325
.244

-1.38
1.60
1.72
-.45
-2.01
-.02
-.27
-1.31

.169
.111
.086
.655
.045
.981
.785
.189

.668

.16

.873

S.E.
.192
.230
.236
.243
.010
.326
.357
.427

z
.16
.64
-2.49
-.99
2.92
1.57
2.01
2.51

p
.870
.520
.013
.320
.004
.116
.045
.012

.545

-.02

.987

.563

-4.40

.000

.331
.206

-1.43

.153

Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 5.62, p < .001
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Table 2.15: Time to Failure (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up)
Cox Regression
(Breslow Method for Ties)

Log likelihood = -1009.539
Term
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged drug off.)
In jail Oct 2007
In jail Nov 2007
In jail Dec 2007
In jail Jan 2008
In jail Feb 2008
In jail Mar 2008
In jail Apr 2008
In jail May 2008
In jail Jun 2008
In jail Jul 2008
In jail Aug 2008
In jail Sep 2008

Number of subjects = 1,559
Number of failures = 148
Time at risk (person-days) = 1,071,848
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (21 d.f.) = 142.68
Pr > χ2 = .000
Hazard Ratio
S. E.
z
p
.93
.157
-.42
.673
.87
.178
-.70
.483
1.96
.399
3.32
.001
1.14
.243
.63
.529
.97
.009
-3.40
.001
.44
.127
-2.85
.004
.40
.122
-3.01
.003
.26
.093
-3.77
.000
1.46

.595

.93

.353

2.42
1.13
1.94
.22
2.33
1.72
2.03
.99
.55
2.84
.48
.86

2.445
1.599
2.750
.308
3.319
2.130
1.640
.628
.428
1.930
.257
.395

.88
.08
.47
-1.08
.60
.44
.88
-.01
-.76
1.54
-1.37
-.33

.382
.934
.641
.282
.552
.661
.378
.991
.445
.124
.171
.744
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Table 2.16: Instrumental Variables Model: Prevalence of Recidivism (Drug Offenses, 2Year Follow-Up)

Instruments
Assigned LIS
Assigned LIS*West
Assigned LIS*Male
Assigned LIS*White
Assigned LIS*Age
Assigned LIS*Income20
Assigned LIS*Income30
Assigned LIS*Income40
Assigned LIS*Prior offending
Exogenous
Months in jail post-RA
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (drug offense)
Constant

First Stage
Treatment Take-Up
Observations = 1,559
R2 = .662
Adjusted R2 = .658
b (S.E.)
.803 (.088)***
-.077 (.035)*
.011 (.032)
-.021 (.037)
-.000 (.001)
.024 (.057)
.082 (.060)
.021 (.066)
.193 (.092)*

Reduced Form (ITT)
Post-RA Drug Off.
Observations = 1,559
R2 = .103
Adjusted R2 = .093
b (S.E.)
-.035 (.085)
.009 (.034)
.037 (.030)
.015 (.036)
.000 (.001)
.018 (.055)
-.008 (.058)
.013 (.064)
.022 (.089)

-.013 (.002)***
.056 (.025)*
.009 (.023)
.010 (.027)
.001 (.001)
-.001 (.040)
-.013 (.042)
-.002 (.047)

.026 (.002)***
-.017 (.024)
.028 (.022)
.004 (.026)
-.002 (.001)*
-.063 (.038)
-.060 (.040)
-.104 (.045)*

-.025 (.054)

.023 (.052)

-.028 (.063)

.205 (.061)***

Second-Stage Instrumental
Variables Regression

Number of observations = 1,559
Wald χ2 (10 d.f.) = 176.88
Pr > χ2 = .000
New Charged Drug Offense
R2 = .102
Term
b
S. E
z
p
Predicted treatment take-up
-.010
.018
-.60
.550
Months in jail post-RA
.026
.002
11.67
.000
Constant
.191
.043
4.50
.000
Controlling for region, gender, race, age, SES and offending history.
124

Table 2.17: Treatment Effects by Subgroups (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up)

339
351
464
226
283
407
34
182
176
236
62
52
261
239
138

Mean Pr.
of Failure
.083
.074
.095
.045
.083
.076
.110
.104
.071
.068
.048
.116
.083
.085
.045

607

.079

Subgroup
Region
Gender
Race
Age at
RA

Income

Northeast
West
Male
Female
White
Nonwhite
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 +
< $20,000
$20,000-$29,999
$30,000-$39,999
$40,000 +

Offending
No drug
rate per
offending
month at
risk 1
year pre- Drug offending
RA
†

N

83

.078

2-sample t-test or one-way ANOVA (F-test).
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t/F†

p

1.42

.156

-7.97

.000

-1.11

.268

9.86

.000

12.87

.000

.133

.894

Figures
Figure 2.1: Risk-Based Allocation Strategies in the Philadelphia APPD
High risk – 10%
Low risk – 60%

Respond to and treat all
offenders the same,
modify with clinical
predictions

Respond to and treat all
offenders based on actuarial risk
of a new serious offense
(Diagram provided by Lindsay Ahlman, Philadelphia APPD)

Figure 2.2: Case Flow Chart for the Philadelphia APPD Low Risk Experiment
Excluded from random assignment: 6,271
Pre-screening on 28-Aug-2007

Assessed for eligibility: 7,830
All cases under active supervision in
West and Northeast, 27-Jul-2007

Missing unique ID no.: 431
Missing reliability score: 576
Not predicted low risk: 3,964
Low risk exclusions: 1,300
Existing low-risk caseload: 177
Mixed low and non-low cases: 95
Potential direct violation: 320
< 30 days remaining on probation: 565
Transferred to specialized caseload by
date of pre-screening: 143

Enrollment

Random Assignment: 1,559
1-Oct-2007

Control Group: 759

Treatment Group: 800
Transferred to low-intensity caseload
3-Oct-2007

Received allocated intervention: 639
Did not receive allocated intervention: 120
Transfer to specialized caseload: 8
No open probation cases: 10
Abscond/no contact 90+ days: 40
Require Spanish-speaking officer: 2
FIR condition: 50
Potential direct violation: 10

Received allocated intervention: 658
Did not receive allocated intervention: 142
Transfer to specialized caseload: 4
No open probation cases: 10
Abscond/no contact 90+ days: 47
Require Spanish-speaking officer: 2
FIR condition: 58
Potential direct violation: 16
Transfer out of county: 2
Deceased: 2
Held back by director due to poor
casework: 1

Adapted from Barnes et al., forthcoming.
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Figure 2.3: Survival Time for LIS Experiment Participants, by Assigned Treatment (All
Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up)

Figure 2.4: Cox Proportional Hazards Survivor Function by Assigned Treatment (All
Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up)
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Figure 2.5: Survival Time for LIS Experiment Participants, by Assigned Treatment
(Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up)

Figure 2.6: Cox Proportional Hazards Survivor Function (Violent Offenses, 2-Year
Follow-Up)
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Figure 2.7: Survival Time for LIS Experiment Participants, by Assigned Treatment (Drug
Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up)

Figure 2.8: Cox Proportional Hazards Survivor Function (Drug Offenses, 2-Year FollowUp)
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CHAPTER 3. Risk Prediction for Effective Offender Management:
Patterns of Offending Severity among Probationers.

Introduction
Probation in the early twentieth century was generally used as a disposition for
first-time or minor offenders, while felons and recidivists tended to receive parole after
incarceration. By mid-century, the use of probation expanded as interest in rehabilitation
and community corrections increased (Clear & Braga, 1995). The backlash against
community sentences and the pervasive retributive attitude to punishment since the 1970s
has continued to pressurize probation agencies, as many struggle to deal with supervising
parolees on their release from prison alongside offenders on more intensive probation
programs. Furthermore, probation is now frequently used in addition to, rather than in
place of, a jail or prison sentence (Ruth & Reitz, 2003). The complementary use of
probation and prison may increase the number of serious offenders who come under the
supervision of probation agencies, placing a strain on their limited resources. Figures
from Philadelphia’s Adult Probation and Parole Department (APPD) indicate the extent
of the problem: in 2006, over 22 per cent of murder arrestees and 16 per cent of homicide
victims in the city were under community supervision (Berk et al., 2009, p. 192).
Sherman (2007, p. 843) has argued that in the absence of short-term solutions to
funding problems, probation agencies should focus their efforts on these most serious
cases, “perform[ing] triage on their caseload to concentrate scarce resources on homicide
prevention” at the expense of closely supervising offenders who pose little threat of harm
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to society.

This is the ultimate purpose behind the Philadelphia APPD Low Risk

Experiment, which aims to identify and divert the lowest-level offenders in the agency
into a large caseload with reduced (‘low-intensity’) supervision to allow probation
officers to work more closely with serious offenders.
The implementation of a low-intensity model of probation supervision for lowrisk offenders is dependent on the development of a reliable method of predicting the risk
of serious recidivism. First and foremost, such a method must ensure that individuals at
the highest risk of committing a serious crime do not receive less supervision than they
need. However, if less severe offenders are included, probation officers will continue to
be overwhelmed. Furthermore, research has suggested that probation supervision that is
too ‘intense’ (in terms of frequency of contact and time spent with probation officers)
may increase recidivism among offenders at the lowest risk level (e.g., Erwin, 1986;
Hanley, 2006). Assigning low-risk offenders to excessively intensive programs might
provoke defiant reactions (Sherman, 1993), reinforce delinquent attitudes and behavior,
and disrupt pro-social networks and opportunities such as family ties and employment by
requiring too much intervention from the criminal justice system. All of these factors
may have unfavorable effects on future offending (Lowenkamp & Latessa, 2004).
Following Sherman’s (2007) proposition, then, the definition of ‘serious’ must
incorporate only those crimes that represent the greatest threat to public safety.
The aim of this paper is to provide an in-depth analysis of the risk prediction and
supervision strategies described above. We examine actual serious recidivism outcomes
for a sample of probationers predicted by the statistical model used in the Philadelphia
experiment to be at low risk of committing the most serious crimes. We examine the
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sensitivity of the selected threshold for determining ‘low risk’ according to the model by
contrasting the serious reoffending outcomes of offenders predicted to be low risk to
those of offenders not predicted to be low risk. We also examine the model’s sensitivity
to different definitions of offending severity beyond the original substantive definitions it
was designed to predict. Finally, we examine whether the intensity of supervision affects
the relationship between past and future serious offending by comparing low risk
experimental participants randomly assigned to low intensity supervision with those
subject to standard reporting requirements.

Risk Prediction in Offender Management
The prediction and assessment of risk is a long-standing concern of
criminological theory and research. While it may not be possible (or indeed ethical) to
precisely predict and act against those who will commit crimes in the future, the policy
and practice implications of understanding the risk factors of crime and how they relate to
offender management and crime prevention are obvious.
The history of risk prediction in criminal justice dates back at least to the first half
of the twentieth century, when criminologists such as Burgess (1928) and the Gluecks
(1950) developed simple predictive models based on checklists of risk and protective
factors. Burgess, for example, combined unweighted predictors considered by expert
opinion to be related to parole outcomes. More recently, risk prediction has been refined
by extensive research on the factors that contribute favorably or unfavorably to offending
behavior, many of which are now strongly confirmed by numerous studies and meta132

analyses (see e.g., Andrews, 1989; Farrington, 1998; Lipsey & Derzon, 1998). Risk
factors for crime may be classified as static (characteristics that do not change or change
in only one direction, such as age or age at first arrest), or dynamic (measurements of
change in the offender, such as attitudes and employment) (Bonta, 2002).
The prediction of risk based on such variables falls into two distinct categories:
clinical and actuarial/statistical.

Clinical prediction is based on subjective human

judgment and experience, informal consideration, and discussions with others. Statistical
risk prediction is formal, objective, structured, quantitative, and grounded in theory,
research and empiricism (Grove & Meehl, 1996; Bonta, 2002; Gottfredson & Moriarty,
2006).

Clinical prediction is frequently used in criminal justice agencies, although

statistical methods have also been introduced, largely from the psychology/psychometric
disciplines. The statistical methods used by probation and other criminal justice agencies
are generally inventories based on cognitive, emotional, and social development. Some
widely-used and well-validated examples are the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCLR); the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R), which is frequently used for risk
management in probation settings; and the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG)
(Bonta, 2002); and the Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS), which was
developed for probation risk management in the United Kingdom (Howard et al., 2009).
Although the measurement and prediction of risk has always been a crucial part of
criminological theory and practice, risk has been brought to the forefront of crime
prevention programming with the development of the ‘principles of effective
intervention’ (PEI: Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990).

The PEI set out the optimal

circumstances and considerations for providing effective correctional treatment.
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Programs should be designed to adhere to three core principles: risk, need, and
responsivity. The principles are interlinked: programs must be responsive to offenders’
specific risk factors and needs. The risk principle is the most widely researched and
validated of the PEI. Its key implication is that high-intensity interventions should be
reserved for high risk, high need offenders. Thus, the risk principle corresponds to an
earlier paradigm for correctional treatment set out in the criminological literature: the
principle of the ‘least restrictive alternative’ (Rubin, 1975), which posits that punishment
should be as unobtrusive as possible – no more than the minimum level needed to
manage offenders’ behavior.
The risk principle clearly highlights a need to develop effective and reliable risk
prediction instruments in order to identify low- and high-risk offenders and direct them to
appropriate sentences, supervision, and treatment. This is important not only in ensuring
that offenders receive suitable services, but also in developing effective resource
management in criminal justice agencies. Probation and parole agencies are a classic
example of an environment in which good risk assessment is crucial. The growing use of
probation and parole in the last two decades (e.g., Glaze & Bonczar, 2009), coupled with
a crisis in funding (Petersilia, 1997), has led to large caseloads and limited ability of
probation officers to supervise offenders appropriately.

In Philadelphia, average

caseloads can be as large as 150 to 200 clients to one officer (Berk et al., 2009). This is
not unusual, or particularly new: similar standard caseload sizes were reported in the
California probation agencies included in the RAND Corporation’s intensive probation
experiments in the 1980s (Petersilia & Turner, 1990). In the absence of short-term
solutions to funding difficulties, risk assessment is needed to identify the most serious
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offenders and focus the most intensive supervision on them, rather than treating them in
the same way as low-risk offenders (Sherman, 2007). Berk et al. (2009) argue that both
false positives (offenders incorrectly predicted to be low-risk) and false negatives
(offenders incorrectly predicted to be high-risk) are detrimental to the effective operation
of the criminal justice system, as well as public safety. False negatives drive up prison
populations, leading to overcrowding and financial pressures as well as the social
consequences for offenders, their families and communities. False positives lead to tragic
crimes (such as the fatal shootings of several Philadelphia police officers in 2008 by
paroled felons that lead to a moratorium on parole releases in Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania
Fraternal Order of Police, 2008) and undermine public and political confidence in the
criminal justice system. Thus, reliable risk prediction is vital for ensuring that as many
offenders as possible are correctly classified and managed.
There is considerable evidence that statistical risk prediction is superior to clinical
methods in criminal justice (see Grove & Meehl, 1996 for a detailed review; also Van
Voorhis & Brown, 1997; Lowenkamp, Holsinger, & Latessa, 2001). For example, one
study of violent recidivism among mentally ill offenders indicated predictive correlation
coefficients of .09 for clinical predictions and .30 for statistical predictions. Similarly,
for sex offender recidivism, the correlation coefficient was .10 for clinical predictions and
.46 for statistical instruments (reported in Bonta, 2002). Gottfredson and Moriarty (2006)
cite numerous studies supporting their contention that statistical predictions outperform
clinical predictions in almost all situations involving human decision-making. They
argue that humans do not use information reliably: in particular, we are poor at
considering base rates, easily influenced by spurious causation, and do not systematically
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weight information in an appropriate manner. Furthermore, clinical prediction is not
standardized. Bonta (1996) notes that clinical decision rules are not easily observable or
replicable.
This is not to say that clinical predictions are not useful, nor that statistical
prediction methods are without flaws.

Statistical predictions by definition provide

average results, and the experience of criminal justice professionals plays an important
role in highlighting deviations from the mean. In fact, professional override is the littlediscussed fourth ‘principle of effective intervention’ (Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990).
Some critics of statistical models have also pointed out the ethical concerns about
imposing such impersonal judgments on offenders with individualized needs (see
Gottfredson & Jarjoura, 1996, for a review of the criticisms of statistical models). One
important and much-discussed ethical concern about risk prediction highlighted by
Gottfredson and Jarjoura is that many risk factors of crime are highly correlated with
race. This makes agency staff fearful of taking them into account in decision making.
However, Gottfredson and Moriarty (2006) defend statistical risk assessment, noting its
importance at the “nexus of research and practice,” and pointing out that: “Properly
developed and implemented, risk assessment devices can impose criminal justice
decision making, properly target and potentially save resources, and potentially increase
the public safety” (p. 195). Gottfredson and Jarjoura (ibid.) also set out a solution for
reducing the bias in risk assessment. Although the role of professional override cannot
be discounted, both papers argue that ignoring important predictive variables because of
ethical concerns, rather than investigating how prediction instruments can empirically
deal with these difficult issues, severely limits the utility of predictive devices and thus
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does not contribute to the development of good practice in offender and resource
management. Furthermore, clinical decision-making is not immune to these problems
either. Bridges and Steen (1998) showed that probation officers’ clinical judgments
about the causes of offending can be influenced by the client’s race, and may
subsequently factor into case planning and sentencing recommendations.
The Philadelphia APPD and the University of Pennsylvania have developed a
new risk prediction model that is the focus of the present study. The following section
describes the model, its contribution to the existing body of literature on risk assessment,
and its use in a practical setting.

The Philadelphia APPD Low Risk Model and Supervision Experiment
The foundation for the Philadelphia APPD low risk prediction model and
supervision experiment was laid in 2005, when APPD and the University of Pennsylvania
began working together to restructure the agency’s probation supervision practice
according to predicted risk of serious crime. This approach represented a change from
the existing standard supervision model for all offenders that was modified on an ad hoc
basis largely according to officer discretion.

In accordance with the risk principle,

APPD’s eventual goal was to reallocate the highest risk offenders to more intensive
supervision, with a small ratio of clients to officers so that more time could be put into
assessing and addressing those clients’ needs. In order to do this without spending scarce
resources on new staff, the lowest risk offenders in the agency needed to be assigned to
large caseloads with minimal supervision. The first step in this process was to create a
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statistical model that would predict the risk of serious reoffending1 so that the whole
APPD population could be stratified by risk level.

The risk prediction model
The statistical model used to forecast the risk of serious offending is described in
full in Berk et al. (2009). Random forests methods were applied to a dataset of all
probation and parole cases in Philadelphia between 2002 and 2004, containing only the
data available to probation officers at intake,2 to predict the risk of being charged with a
new serious crime within two years of the probation or parole case start date. Random
forests is a statistical learning procedure that forecasts outcomes by aggregating results
from multiple classification and regression trees. The model was designed to stratify the
population according to APPD’s operational needs, with the assumption that the majority
of the caseload was at low risk of serious recidivism and thus appropriate for lowintensity supervision. At the agency’s request, 61 per cent of cases were to be deemed
low risk, with the remainder either high risk (approximately 10 per cent) or neither low
nor high (approximately 30 per cent) (Fig. 3.1). APPD also deemed the proportions of
false positives and false negatives expected in the final model to be operationally
acceptable. The proportion of false positives (offenders erroneously identified as lowrisk) was set at 5 per cent, and the proportion of false negatives (offenders erroneously
identified as high risk) was 20 per cent. A higher false negative rate was accepted given
the lesser public safety concerns around this type of error.

The initial 2002-2004

probation dataset is described as a “training sample,” which is used to ensure the
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independence of data (i.e., the model parameters were not derived from the same sample
for which predictions would then be made).

This helps to determine whether the

relationships found in the initial sample are generalizable to other members of the same
population. Once the model has been specified, it may then be used to derive risk
predictions for probationers in current caseloads.
The model assigns each probation case (not each offender) a ‘reliability score’ to
indicate its risk level. The reliability score is a value between 0 and 1. The selected
threshold for low-risk cases was 0.5, so that cases with a reliability score greater than 0.5
were designated as low risk and scores equal to or less than 0.5 were not low risk. A
specific offender’s risk score is based on the average reliability score across all his or her
active probation cases. However, even if the average reliability score exceeded 0.5, an
offender could not be designated low risk if any one of his or her active cases scored 0.5
or below.
The Philadelphia model meets many of the recommendations set out by Bonta
(2002) and Gottfredson and Moriarty (2006) for optimal risk prediction. Bonta suggests
that risk assessments require predictive validity, direct relevance to criminal behavior and
the correctional setting, and should adhere to the principle of the least restrictive
alternative. The Philadelphia model is validated by its development on a training sample
of cases for which outcomes were already known and its application to other members of
the same population. The present paper attempts to further validate its ability to predict
who will be low risk. The model’s focus on serious offending is directly relevant to
correctional priorities. Finally, the express purpose of the model is to ensure that the
most intensive supervision and treatment is only reserved for those who need it most.
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The Philadelphia model differs from other risk assessment and prediction
instruments in several ways. Its focus on only the most serious offenses is its primary
distinguishing feature. Berk et al. (2009) argue that it is not helpful for the purposes of
effective resource allocation to predict any type of reoffending, as many existing
prediction instruments do.

There are both operational and political advantages to

focusing only on the most extreme cases. Furthermore, the model uses charges rather
than convictions as the outcome measure. While all recidivism outcome measures have
well-documented advantages and disadvantages, charges are appropriate in this context
because serious crimes are more likely to be pursued, but they do not all result in a
conviction, often because of issues such as witness intimidation, which is a significant
problem in Philadelphia (Berk et al., 2009, p. 194).
Although the Philadelphia model is clearly statistical, it also respects the clinical
decision making processes that are used by probation intake officers. The model uses
only information routinely available to intake officers (demographic characteristics and
criminal history) and already used by probation officers when making clinical judgments.
While this may not fully assuage the ethical concerns about statistical prediction, it
cannot be said that the model imposes constraints on decision making beyond standard
practice. It simply makes these processes more transparent and replicable.
The Low-Intensity Supervision Experiment
The Philadelphia APPD Low Risk Experiment ran from October 2007 to October
2008. It tested the hypothesis that low-intensity supervision (LIS) would not cause a
harmful increase in recidivism for low-risk offenders compared to APPD’s existing
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supervision model, or ‘supervision as usual’ (SAU).

Under SAU, offenders were

supervised in regional units based on their residence, unless they were ordered by the
court or APPD to be supervised in a specialist unit (e.g., sex offender or mental health
units). Offenders in APPD’s active caseload who were previously assigned to the West
or Northeast regional units and were predicted to be low risk according to the prediction
model described above were randomly assigned to LIS or SAU. In total, 1,559 offenders
were randomly assigned: 800 to the LIS (treatment) group (400 from each region), and
759 to the control group (401 in the West and 358 in the Northeast).3
Probation clients assigned to the treatment group were placed in a caseload of
four hundred.

Two probation officers handled the entire low-intensity caseload.

Probationers received only one office visit every six months, with telephone reporting
appointments every six months and approximately halfway between office visits (see
Appendix E for full details of the LIS model).

They were returned to standard

supervision if they were arrested for a new crime, because the LIS probation officers’
caseloads were too large to handle the extra work required to process these cases. The
experiment followed an ‘intention-to-treat’ analysis (Montori & Guyatt, 2001), so those
offenders who were randomly assigned but could not be supervised in the low-intensity
caseload due to failure or other operational issues were analyzed in their assigned groups
rather than according to the type of supervision they actually received. In order to
maintain the integrity of the LIS model, LIS officers’ caseloads were kept at 400 by
topping them up with so-called ‘backfill’ cases: offenders from the existing APPD
caseload who were also predicted to be low-risk but were not part of the random
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assignment pool. Backfill probationers were not included in the analysis of the main
results of the experiment.
SAU for the control group usually consisted of monthly office visits, although the
frequency could be increased or decreased at the probation officer’s discretion for reasons
relating to compliance or time left on the probation term.

They continued regular

appointments with their usual probation officer and no part of their supervision changed
as a result of their experimental status. Probationers and probation officers were not
informed of their status. Caseloads in this group were still large enough (approximately
145 clients per officer) that the content of meetings was essentially the same in both the
treatment and control groups. However, control group offenders saw their probation
officers more frequently.
Treatment group cases received approximately 45 per cent fewer contacts than
they had in the year prior to random assignment, while the amount of contact in the
control group did not change. Control group offenders received approximately twice as
many contacts as treatment group offenders. The experimental protocol called for three
control group contacts to every one in the treatment group, or six to one in terms of faceto-face contacts (assuming monthly office-based contacts in the control group), so
although this standard was not quite achieved, the treatment group still received lowerintensity supervision. No significant differences in recidivism were found between the
treatment and control groups after one year. Sixteen per cent of the treatment group and
15 per cent of the control group were charged with a new offense of any type (p ≤ .593).
Thus, it appeared that LIS did not lead to more crime compared to SAU, and was
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therefore a safe strategy for restructuring probation supervision according to APPD’s
plans (Barnes et al., forthcoming).

The Present Study
While the results of the Low Risk Experiment are promising, this summary does
not provide a full picture of the predictive power of the model or the severity of offending
in our sample. Despite the compelling evidence in favor of statistical risk prediction, it
can never be an error-free endeavor. As Grove and Meehl (1996) note: “[T]he statistics
furnish us with the probabilities so far as anything can” (p. 306). Actuarial prediction for
correctional policy provides neither individualized predictions nor actual outcomes for a
given person. The Philadelphia model identifies low-risk offenders in part based on their
prior history, but it is entirely possible that offenders with a criminal history considered
to be ‘serious’ on some basis could have been assigned a low-risk prediction, based either
on the balance of other factors or varying definitions of offending severity. It is also
possible that low-intensity supervision could lead to an escalation in offending severity as
it becomes less likely that probation officers will pick up and act on violations and
transgressions (and as offenders begin to realize this). These are the cases that get picked
up by the public, politicians, and the media, and serve to undermine an otherwise rational
policy. To this end, it is important to ensure that the low-risk prediction model and lowintensity supervision do not have hidden harmful effects.
The APPD experiment also raises a broader theoretical question – what is the
nature of ‘non-serious’ offending, and how does it differ from higher-level offending?
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Little research has been done on the characteristics of low-level offenders.

While

focusing on the more serious offenders is logical from a public safety perspective, the
premise of the Philadelphia model is that the majority of offenders are likely to be lowrisk. Thus, the population is worth considering for its size alone.
The objectives of this paper are to investigate the sensitivity of Philadelphia’s
prediction model to serious offending at various risk levels, and to examine whether lowintensity supervision could have the unintended consequence of increasing offending
severity in a sample that should indicate little history of serious criminal behavior. In
doing so, we learn more about the nature and degree of ‘serious’ crime among the
majority of lower-level offenders. Our specific research questions are:
1. How successfully does the model categorize offenders as low or non-low risk?
2. Does the sensitivity of the model change under different definitions of offending
severity?
3. How does the selected threshold for determining low/non-low risk (reliability score >
0.5) compare in its predictive ability to alternative cut-points?
4. Does low-intensity probation supervision affect offenders’ propensity for serious
offending?

Methodology
Outcome data
A wide range of data collected as part of the experiment and model development
are available for the present analysis. In addition to data on charges for offenses pre- and
post-random assignment for the low-risk offenders who participated in the experiment,
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we also have crime outcomes for the non-randomized low-risk backfill cases and for a
group of offenders predicted to be non-low risk by the model. Data for the latter group of
probationers were collected for comparison with low-risk cases in a regression
discontinuity analysis, the outcomes of which were contrasted with the experimental
results (Berk et al., forthcoming).

The full dataset contains information on 93,540

charges for 3,207 offenders (2,207 of whom were predicted to be low risk) covering a
period of 42 years (1967-2009).
One significant limitation of the charges database is that it only includes charges
as an adult for offenses in Philadelphia, as we only had access to local adult criminal
justice system databases. While almost all of the participants reside in Philadelphia, the
city’s proximity and ease of access to surrounding counties and state lines mean that the
local data almost certainly underestimate the number of charges recorded for these
offenders. In addition, we do not have juvenile data available to give a full picture of
offenders’ lifetime criminal involvement. While most of the offenders in our sample are
older (see Table 3.1), we would expect to see the majority of their criminal offending
taking place during their teenage years, so the lack of data on charges filed under the age
of eighteen is a substantial omission. However, data are available where the offender was
charged as an adult, even if the offense was committed while s/he was under eighteen.

Outcome measures
As we noted above, the definition of offending severity may extend beyond the
substantive nature of the offense itself. This is particularly true in a sample of offenders
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already predicted to be at low risk of serious reoffending. A successful model of low-risk
prediction should minimize the possibility that these offenders pose a serious threat to
society by any measure. This section considers the various ways in which offending
severity may be conceptualized, and how we operationalize some of these ideas as
outcome measures for the present study.
The assessment of offending severity has been a long-standing concern of
criminological research.

Blumstein et al. (1986), for example, describe offending

severity as a “key dimension of individual criminal careers” (p. 76) and note the crucial
policy interest in focusing on understanding and identifying serious offenders. Despite
this interest, there remains little consensus on how best to measure severity.

The

conventional approach (Ramchand et al., 2009, p. 130) has been to weight different crime
types based on the perceptual method established by Sellin and Wolfgang (1978). Sellin
and Wolfgang asked panels of university students, juvenile court judges, and police
officers to rate the severity of a range of crimes compared to a trivial baseline offense of
the theft of $1. Based on these ratings, they assigned a weight to each offense relative to
the baseline. This type of crime severity rating appears to hold across different samples
and contexts (although some race-based differences have been noted), and remains
popular despite criticisms that no context is provided to panel participants, leaving them
free to speculate about unreported details of the offenses (Ramchand et al., 2009).
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also provides an offense severity
classification that is used by police departments when they report crime data through the
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program. The classification of offenses into Part I and
Part II offenses was introduced in 1929 and now contains eight offenses in the Part I
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category and the remainder in Part II (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004). The
classification is based on offense seriousness, frequency of occurrence, nationwide
pervasiveness, and likelihood of being reported. The eight Part I offenses are criminal
homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor
vehicle theft, and arson. Thus, they are broader than the offenses considered as ‘serious’
in the development of Philadelphia’s low-risk prediction model (although the
Philadelphia model classifies a broader range of sexual offenses as ‘serious’).
An alternative to rating severity according to the substantive offense is to assess
the economic cost of crime. Interest in cost-benefit analysis as a part of criminal justice
program evaluation is beginning to grow (e.g., Marsh, Chalfin, & Roman, 2008), and
estimates of the cost of each type of crime to society is a key part of the methodology
entailed by this approach. The severity of crime is ranked by the extent of its cost to
society in terms of victimization costs (e.g., stolen property, loss of earnings, medical
expenses, trauma, and suffering: Cohen, 1988), and criminal justice system costs (police
investigation, court processing, cost of commensurate sentence: Marsh & Fox, 2008).
Cohen (2000) and colleagues (2004) also propose that the cost of crime can be quantified
in terms of the public’s theoretical willingness to pay for crime prevention programs that
would reduce the prevalence of a particular offense type by 10 per cent.
More recently, some sophisticated statistical approaches to assessing offending
severity have emerged. One recent example is Ramchand et al.’s (2009) developmental
model of crime severity. They hypothesize that offenders will progress to more serious
crime after engaging in low-level offending. This approach is appealing because, unlike
previous classification models, it accounts for offender preference and is culture-specific.
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It assumes that if offenders consider a particular crime type to be serious, they will only
be drawn to it as their offending career escalates. Thus, the sequencing of crime types
over the life course provides insight into which offenses offenders perceive as more or
less serious. We do not examine this approach in our paper because we lack full lifetime
offending data for our sample, so the utility of the developmental focus is limited. The
quality of the data do not justify the complexity of the methods.
Our operationalization of substantive severity is straightforward.

We simply

classify each charge as a serious or non-serious offense according to the definition of
severity used in the prediction model (see above). We also compare this definition of
severity with the standard UCR distinction between serious and less serious offending,
which includes more offenses than the Philadelphia model’s distinction.
We propose a simpler method for analyzing economic severity.

The more

complex cost models may not be well suited to our data. Because our sample has already
been deemed low-risk, in part because of their non-serious offending backgrounds,
serious offenses will be rare events.

Thus, it makes sense to simply dichotomize

offending history and outcomes into serious/non-serious rather than attempting to create
more detailed categories. However, an economic severity rating is more difficult to
dichotomize, beyond the rudimentary approach of assigning an arbitrary dollar value as a
threshold between serious and non-serious offending. The studies that do provide U.S.
dollar estimates for crime types (e.g., Cohen, 1988; Miller, Cohen, & Wiersema, 1996)
provide various formulas for assigning costs, and largely focus on the most serious
crimes, so it is difficult to obtain estimates for the lower-level offenses that are more
prevalent in our sample. For example, cost estimates set out in Cohen (2000) contain no
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specific information for drug offenses, which constitute 16 per cent of all the charges in
our sample. Furthermore, the age of these studies and changes in prices and monetary
value may limit the usefulness of their estimates (although procedures are available for
converting them into current values).
One proxy for dollar value that would also allow a basic distinction to be drawn
between more or less ‘expensive’ crimes is victim status (crimes with victims, such as
assault, versus ‘victimless’ crimes like drug and weapon possession). This approach
assumes that crimes with victims cost society more because the victims themselves suffer
both tangible (e.g., loss of earnings) and non-tangible (e.g. fear) costs, in addition to the
criminal justice system costs of processing the offender, while non-victim crimes
(crudely) only involve offender-related costs. Of course, the reality is less clear-cut, but
victim status remains a useful proxy for cost, and does not fully overlap with substantive
severity.4
We define ‘victim’ crimes as those offenses that were most likely to have
involved injury or death, psychological distress, loss of earnings, or other costs such as
loss of or damage to property of a personal (not corporate) victim. The process of
applying the definition was somewhat crude, because only limited information about the
offense was available. Our criminal history database contained a free-text description of
each offense and a statute section and subsection reference.5 The offense type was
initially determined by reference to the relevant statute, as we believed that variable
would be more accurate than the free-text description. The description was used for
confirmation and additional information about the offense. However, without full crime
reports for each offense, it was not possible to know for certain whether a victim was
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involved. Crimes that obviously met our definition included homicide, rape, assaults, and
residential burglaries. Arson was also included due to the high probability of costly
damage, although it was not always possible to determine whether the offense was
committed against personal or commercial property.

Some other offenses in

Pennsylvania (e.g., criminal mischief) have specific subsections relating to different types
of victims and these were classified as victim crimes where it was clear that personal
victims were involved. Retail theft and some other acquisitive offenses like theft of
services, which were most likely to involve corporate victims, were excluded. We also
excluded ‘non-permanent theft’ (unauthorized use offenses) against any victim type.

Analytic strategy
We use straightforward tests to compare the prevalence (proportion of offenders
involved in serious offending) and frequency of serious offending across groups.
Frequencies are compared using a two-sample t-test for the difference between means.
To assess prevalence, we examine the relative risk (risk ratio) of serious offending
between groups. The risk ratio is not often used in criminological research, but it is
common in epidemiological research for analyzing dichotomous outcomes in cohort
studies (in which known exposure/non-exposure to a risk factor is cross-tabulated with
disease/non-disease status). It is simply a ratio of the probability (risk) of disease given
exposure status, calculated by dividing the proportion of subjects with the disease at one
level of exposure by the proportion at the other level. As such, it is somewhat similar to
an odds ratio, but has a considerably more intuitive interpretation.6 Like the odds ratio,
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the risk ratio is bounded by zero at the lower end and has no upper bound. A risk ratio of
1 indicates no difference in risk between the groups. In the present study, a risk ratio of 2
would indicate that one group (‘exposure’: risk level or treatment status) is twice as likely
to have a serious offense (‘disease’) than the other.
We use another epidemiological tool, sensitivity/specificity analysis, to assess the
effect of changing the model’s cut-off point for classifying risk. We examine how many
offenders were correctly classified as low-risk (having no serious offense two years postrisk assessment date) at each cut point. Sensitivity is defined as the proportion of ‘true
positives’ correctly identified by the model, or the proportion of offenders without a
future serious offense who had been predicted low risk. Specificity is defined as the
proportion of ‘true negatives’ identified: the proportion of serious recidivists who were
classified as non-low risk. Sensitivity or specificity of 100 per cent indicate that the
classification tool is able to identify all the true positives or all the true negatives,
respectively. In practice, most classification models require a trade-off between one or
the other: no model will perfectly classify every case, so users must decide whether it is
more important to identify mostly true positives, or mostly true negatives. We also
present the positive and negative predictive values of the model. The positive predictive
value is the proportion of offenders predicted to be low risk who are actually low risk,
and the negative predictive value is the proportion of offenders predicted non-low risk
who go on to commit a serious offense. Formulas for calculating each of these measures
are presented in Appendix J. We also define false positives as the proportion of predicted
low-risk offenders committing serious offenses, and false negatives as the proportion of
predicted non-low risk offenders not committing serious offenses.
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We examine the potential interaction of low-intensity supervision and pre-random
assignment (RA) serious offending on post-RA serious offending for participants enrolled
in the Low Risk Experiment using Mantel-Haenszel methods for calculating an adjusted
risk ratio across different levels of a covariate. This is also a commonly-used approach in
epidemiological research. First, we calculate the unadjusted risk ratio for the prevalence
of post-RA offending by assigned treatment. We then stratify by presence or absence of
pre-RA serious offending, calculating two stratum-specific risk ratios.

The Mantel-

Haenszel method assigns a weight to each stratum and produces an adjusted overall risk
ratio based on the weighted stratum-specific values. The accompanying Mantel-Haenszel
chi-square test of homogeneity is used to consider whether an interaction effect may be
present. If χ2 is statistically significant, we reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity of
the stratum-specific risk ratios.

That is, we consider them sufficiently different to

constitute evidence that the stratifying variable (serious offending history) interacts with
the independent variable (assigned treatment) to affect post-RA serious offending
outcomes.7

All analyses are conducted using the epidemiological methods suite in

STATA 10.
Sample characteristics
We assess each of our four research questions using one of two separate samples
(‘full sample’ and ‘experimental sample’) drawn from the complete set of 3,207
probationers described above.

That dataset comprised 1,559 predicted low-risk

experimental participants (800 LIS treatment and 759 SAU control), 648 predicted low-
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risk backfill cases who were not randomly assigned but received LIS, and 1,000 predicted
non-low risk offenders selected as part of a separate study.
Our ‘full sample’ is a subset of all the groups that make up the 3,207-offender
dataset, divided into low and non-low risk cases. Most of the backfill cases (N = 588) did
not have a recorded reliability score from the prediction model. Although we could
assume that they were low risk because they were in the backfill group, they could not be
used to examine the questions relating to the cut-off point for a low risk prediction, and
we decided to exclude them from the analysis completely. In addition, one treatment
group case had no recorded reliability score and was excluded from the full sample, but is
included in the experimental sample. Finally, fifteen backfill cases had a reliability score
between 0.49 and 0.5. We strictly followed the requirement for classifying cases with a
reliability score of over 0.5 as low risk in this analysis, so those fifteen cases are
classified as non-low risk in the full sample. Thus, the full sample comprises 2,618
offenders in total: 1,603 predicted by the model to be low risk, and 1,015 predicted to be
non-low risk. Our ‘experimental sample’ consists of the 1,559 experimental participants,
analyzed on an intention-to-treat basis (i.e., they remain in their assigned groups
regardless of whether they actually received the assigned treatment).
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show basic demographic and offending history characteristics
for the two samples. Race is presented only as the proportion of white offenders because
of problems in the recording of race in the original dataset,8 which meant that it was only
possible to reliably say whether the offender was white or nonwhite. The mean age is
calculated according to the offender’s age (based on recorded date of birth) on October 1,
2007. This was the date on which experimental participants were randomly assigned, and
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age is based on this date regardless of whether or not the offender participated in the
experiment. The proportions and means of charged offenses are based on the full range
of offending data from the offender’s first recorded charge until September 30, 2009. For
the full sample, data were available on a total of 81,643 charged offenses committed
between 1967 and 2009. Our analyses are based only on those offenses committed after
the date of the risk assessment (July 27, 2007; N = 6,808), because prior offending
history variables were used in the predictive model. For the experimental sample we had
data on 34,777 charged offenses over the same timeframe. Of this number, around 6 per
cent (N = 2,147) were committed post-random assignment.
As we might expect, the low risk and non-low risk groups in the full sample look
very different (Table 3.1). The non-low risk group is much more likely to be male
(87.4% vs. 66.9%, p < .001), nonwhite (75.6% vs. 60.4%, p < .001), and younger (31
years old vs. 40.7, p < .001). The non-low risk group has also been charged with more
than twice as many offenses overall as the low risk group (45 vs. 22.4, p < .001).
The characteristics of the treatment and control groups in the experimental sample
are very similar, indicating successful random assignment. 66.5 per cent of the treatment
group and 67.6 per cent of the control group are male. Slightly more treatment group
members than control group members are white (41.8% vs. 38.0%, p ≤ .125).
Participants in both groups were, on average, just under 41 years old on the date of
random assignment, and members of both groups have been charged with an offense on
average 22.3 times as adults up to two years post-random assignment.
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Results
How successfully does the model categorize offenders as low or non-low risk?
The first three rows of Table 3.3 show the prevalence and frequency of post-risk
assessment serious offending (as defined in the Philadelphia APPD prediction model) for
probationers predicted to be low or non-low risk. The differences between the two
groups are substantial and highly statistically significant on both measures. Among
offenders predicted to be low risk, 3.4 per cent were charged with a serious offense such
as murder, aggravated assault, or a sexual offense over the course of their available
offending histories. In the non-low risk group, 10.2 per cent were so charged. Thus,
offenders receiving a low risk prediction were 67 per cent less likely to have ever been
charged with a serious offense than their non-low risk counterparts (risk ratio RR = .33, p
< .001). Similarly, the mean number of serious offenses committed by the non-low risk
group in the available records was almost three times greater than the mean for the low
risk group (.38 vs. .13, p < .001). It appears, therefore, that the predictive model was
successful in classifying offenders into low and non-low risk groups at the 0.5 reliability
score threshold, when applied to a new set of current probationers.
Table 3.4 shows more detail about the types of serious offenses committed by the
two groups, and provides compelling evidence that the low risk group poses a
substantially smaller threat to public safety. Offenders predicted to be non-low risk were
nearly eight times more likely than those predicted low risk to be charged with homicide
or attempted homicide after the risk assessment date (1.5% vs. .2%, p < .001). We see
similar, highly significant differences for sexual offenses, aggravated assaults, and
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robberies. The only crime on which the two groups did not differ statistically is forcible
rape (a subset of all sexual offenses), but this is most likely due to the very small number
of events.

Fewer than 1 per cent of each group were charged with rape, but the

probability is still more than three times greater in the non-low risk group (.39% vs.
.12%, p ≤ .160).

Does the model’s sensitivity change under different definitions of serious offending?
We conducted similar analyses with the low and non-low risk groups using two
alternative definitions of offending severity, based on UCR Part I offenses and offenses
deemed to be more likely to involve a victim or serious damage (i.e., involving a greater
economic cost). Of course, the Philadelphia model was not designed to predict such
offenses, so the purpose of this question is not to validate the model, but rather to
examine the types of offenses committed by probationers deemed to be at low risk of
serious harm, and whether they could be considered serious under alternative definitions.
The results of these analyses are presented in the remaining parts of Table 3.3.
As we would expect from the preceding analysis, the low and non-low risk groups
also differ substantially and significantly on these alternative measures of severity.
However, our alternative definitions slightly inflate the proportion of both groups that
would be identified as ‘serious’ offenders. 9.1 per cent of low risk offenders had been
charged post-risk assessment with a UCR Part I offense, which include murder and rape,
and also burglary and motor vehicle theft. The proportion of non-low risk offenders
charged with a UCR Part I offense is 15.7 per cent. Low risk offenders are 42 per cent
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less likely to have been charged with a Part I offense than non-low risk offenders (RR =
.58, p < .001). Again, the frequency of serious offending is much greater for the non-low
risk group, with a mean of .62 Part I offenses compared to .34 in the low risk group (p <
.001). The proportion of offenses involving a victim or serious damage is comparable to
the UCR Part I results for both groups (low: 8.2%, non-low: 17.5%; RR = .47, p < .001).
Again, victim/damage charges appeared much more frequently in the histories of non-low
risk offenders (.91 vs. .41 on average, p < .001). Thus, the predictive model is still able
to distinguish low and non-low risk participants based on either UCR Part I or
victim/damage offending, but considerably more probationers in both groups would now
be said to have been involved in ‘serious’ offending.

How does the model’s threshold for determining low risk compare to alternative cut-offs?
Tables 3.5 to 3.7 show the sensitivity, specificity, and positive and negative
predictive values for the model when different thresholds of the reliability score are used
for classifying offenders as low or non-low risk. In the present study, offenders with an
average reliability score of above 0.5 were classified as low risk. We compare the
model’s predictive ability at this threshold with alternative cut-off points ranging from
0.05 (at which all offenders were classified as low risk) to 0.95 (at which all offenders
were non-low risk).
Identifying the most suitable threshold necessarily involves balancing the model’s
ability to predict low risk cases against its ability to identify who will commit a serious
offense. We suggest that the latter concern is more important to the viability of a policy
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of low-intensity supervision based on risk of serious offending, because there may be
public and political anxiety about reducing criminal justice intervention to adjudicated
offenders. Thus, for low-intensity probation to maintain credibility, it is arguably more
sensible to demonstrate that few serious offenders slipped through the net than to show
how many non-serious offenders had their supervision requirements reduced. From the
model standpoint, we must ensure a high positive predictive value, which indicates the
proportion of predicted low-risk offenders who were actually low risk, and high
specificity (proportion of serious offenders who received a non-low risk prediction).
Large values for these two measures indicate a low rate of false positives (predicted lowrisk offenders who commit serious crimes).

Conversely, we expect to see lower

sensitivity and lower negative predictive values, because the sample contains many false
negatives. Most non-low risk probationers do not go on to be serious offenders in the
two-year follow-up. Serious offenses are rare events in our sample, and non-low risk
offenders are not necessarily high risk.9 Low values on these two measures are more
acceptable because there is no harm when an offense is not committed, regardless of the
risk prediction. However, we must also keep the purpose of the model in mind: the
diversion of a majority of offenders in APPD’s caseload to low-intensity supervision. If
sensitivity is too low (too few non-serious offenders received low-risk predictions), that
goal will not be fulfilled.
Table 3.5 shows the results of these tests using the model definition of severity.
The positive predictive values are high at all thresholds, indicating a low rate of false
positives in general. This is promising, but will be driven by the very low sample
prevalence of serious offending post-risk assessment. The present cut-off point of 0.5
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appears to be a good classification threshold.

Here, the model’s sensitivity and

specificity are most balanced compared to other cut-off points (Sn = 63.0%; Sp = 65.8%).
This means that the probability that a non-serious offender received a low risk prediction
and the probability that a serious offender received a non-low risk prediction are roughly
the same. Of the offenders receiving a low-risk prediction, 96.6 per cent were in fact
low-risk.

The ‘worst case scenario’ false positive rate (low-risk offenders who

committed serious offenses) is very low, at 3.4 per cent.
Table 3.5 suggests that the cut-off point should not be set below 0.5. Although
the positive predictive value remains high at thresholds of 0.45 and below, there is a
considerable loss of specificity at the expense of the less important sensitivity (Sn =
71.3%; Sp = 55.1% at 0.45 threshold). The probability of finding a false positive also
begins to increase. On the other hand, there may be a case for increasing the cut-off point
to 0.55, but no more. At 0.55, the positive predictive value increases to 97.3 per cent,
specificity increases to 78.5 per cent, and the likelihood of a false positive drops to 2.7
per cent. However, the sensitivity drops to just over 50 per cent, which starts to raise
questions about the model’s ability to meet its purpose. Thus, a threshold between 0.5
and 0.55 appears to provide the best trade-off between all the factors discussed above.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show the same analyses repeated for UCR Part I and
victim/damage offenses. Note that the model is not designed to predict these offense
types (as the slightly lower positive predictive values in these two tables suggest), so the
results from Table 3.5 should be taken as the definitive examination of the threshold.
However, we use these additional outcomes to examine whether the cut-off point allows
too many offenders who might be considered ‘serious’ by alternative standards to be
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classified as low risk. The 0.5 threshold again performed reasonably well. This cut-point
gave the best balance of sensitivity and specificity for both measures, but specificity was
lower than sensitivity (UCR: Sn = 63.0%, Sp = 52.1%; victim/damage: Sn = 63.7%, Sp =
57.4%). Again, increasing the cut point to 0.55 improved specificity for both measures,
at the expense of a reasonable degree of sensitivity (UCR: Sn = 50.6%, Sp = 63.9%;
victim/damage: Sn = 51.5%, Sp = 70.3%). At the 0.55 threshold the positive predictive
values increase slightly and the proportion of false positives is reduced. We see higher
rates of false positives in these analyses compared to Table 3.5 because there is a higher
prevalence of offending in these categories.

Does low-intensity probation supervision alter the propensity for serious offending?
This analysis focuses only on the experimental sample: 1,559 predicted low risk
offenders who participated in the Low Risk Experiment and were randomly assigned to
low-intensity supervision (LIS) or supervision as usual (SAU). Regardless of their lowrisk status, we would expect that those offenders who had been involved in serious
offending prior to random assignment (RA) would be more likely to continue to do so.10
However, because the ultimate practical purpose of the predictive model is to identify
low-risk offenders so that they can be diverted to LIS, it is very important to ensure that
low-risk supervision itself does not increase the likelihood that offenders will engage in
serious recidivism during or after supervision, over and above the extent to which we
would expect given their past behavior. Table 3.8 shows the proportion of the sample
that were charged with a serious offense post-RA. Because of the small number of
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serious offenses in the low risk sample as a whole, this analysis focuses only on
prevalence, not frequency. However, we do consider the two alternative definitions of
severity along with model-defined severity.

Table 3.9 presents a stratified analysis

according to whether or not the offender had committed a serious offense pre-RA.
Table 3.8 shows that control group members were slightly more likely to have
committed a serious offense post-RA, regardless of the definition, although none of the
results reaches statistical significance. The treatment group was 39 per cent less likely
than the control group to have committed a serious offense as defined by the model (RR
= .61, p ≤ .079); 17 per cent less likely to have committed a UCR Part I offense (RR =
.83, p ≤ .259); and 21 per cent less likely to have committed an offense involving a victim
or damage (RR = .79, p ≤ .179). It appears, then, that the low-intensity supervision
model did not lead to any increase in the propensity for serious offending. However, we
cannot say this with certainty, nor suggest that LIS helps to reduce serious offending,
because the analysis does not account for past behavior.
We examined whether prior offending interacts with treatment assignment to
affect future offending by stratifying our analysis according to the prevalence of pre-RA
serious offending. Table 3.9 sets out the stratum-specific and Mantel-Haenszel adjusted
risk ratios for each definition of severity. The stratum-specific risk ratios tell us if there
is any difference in the effect of LIS on post-RA offending depending on whether or not
the offender had previously committed a serious offenses. We then compare the overall
Mantel-Haenszel adjusted risk ratios to the unadjusted risk ratios from Table 3.8 to assess
whether the evidence for an interaction effect is sufficient.
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All the risk ratios in Table 3.9 indicate that treatment group participants were less
likely to commit a serious offense post-RA than the control group, although only one is
statistically significant. There is also a notable difference between the risk ratios of
probationers who had and had not committed a serious offense pre-RA. For modeldefined severity, treatment group participants who had not committed a prior offense
were 51 per cent less likely to have been charged post-RA than similarly-situated control
group members (2.0% vs. 4.0%, stratum-specific RR = .49, p ≤ .042). However, there
was little difference between treatment and control group participants who had
committed a prior serious offense (3.8% vs. 4.2%, stratum-specific RR = .90, p ≤ .816).
We see the same pattern with UCR and victim/damage crimes. For UCR offenses,
treatment group participants without a prior offense were 44 per cent less likely to be
charged than control group participants without a prior offense, but there was no
difference between treatment and control group participants with a prior offense (no
prior: 3.7% vs. 6.5%, RR = .56, p ≤ .136; prior: 10.2% vs. 11.1%, RR = .92, p ≤ .660).
For victim/damage crimes, the risk ratio was .58 for non-serious prior offenders
compared to .87 for serious prior offenders (no prior: 3.9% vs. 6.8%, p ≤ ..134; prior:
8.4% vs. 9.7%, p ≤ .494).
Despite the magnitude of some of these results, the Mantel-Haenszel adjusted risk
ratios show no evidence of an interaction effect between prior serious offending and
treatment. For all outcome measures they are identical to the unadjusted risk ratios, and
we were unable to reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity in any case (model defined:
p ≤ .294; UCR: p ≤ .248; victim/damage: p ≤ .326), meaning that the stratum-specific risk
ratios do not differ enough statistically to suggest a strong interaction. Nonetheless,
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although we should be cautious about reading too much into the stratum-specific risk
ratios due to the small number of events, it is clear that low-intensity supervision was
more effective than treatment as usual for offenders without a prior history of serious
offending, than it was for offenders who had committed a serious offense.

Discussion
Our first three research questions examined the sensitivity of the prediction model
used by Philadelphia APPD in classifying offenders by risk across several different
definitions of severity. The model appears to successfully categorize probationers into
low and non-low risk. Overall, the probability that an offender in our sample had been
charged with a serious offense (according to the model definition: murder, attempted
murder, aggravated assault, robbery and sexual offenses) was substantially lower if they
received a low risk prediction than if they did not. The average ‘reliability score’
assigned by the model to each offender across all of his or her probation cases also
appeared to be linearly related to the offender’s likelihood of serious offending: in
general, the higher the score (higher scores represent the lowest risk levels), the less
likely an offender was to have been charged with a serious offense.
The threshold used to distinguish predicted low risk offenders from predicted
non-low risk offenders in the model, an average reliability score of 0.5, largely appears to
be an appropriate cut-off point in the present sample. However, the model performs
slightly better in terms of avoiding the most serious errors – offenders who were
predicted to be low risk but committed serious offenses – if the threshold is raised to
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0.55. Raising the threshold results in a slight loss in the ability to predict who will not
commit a serious offense, but the trade-off is small and favors increased public safety.
This alternative threshold is close enough to the original 0.5 cut-off that the results of the
present study are unlikely to be greatly affected, and as a matter of policy any change
would depend on the extent to which the probation agency was willing to trade
considerable resource savings for a small potential decrease in false positives. Twelve
per cent of the full sample (323 offenders) had risk scores between 0.5 and 0.55, and
would not have been eligible for low-intensity supervision at the higher classification
threshold.
One limitation of these diagnostic tests is the very low prevalence of serious
recidivism post-risk assessment in the sample as a whole, which led to a large number of
false negatives. This in turn reduces the ability of the model to predict true positives
(true low-risk cases), which is the ultimate goal of the risk assessment process. This is an
issue that is unlikely to be easily overcome, because serious offenses like homicide and
rape will always be relatively rare events. However, the prediction model can be applied
to any new probationer entering the Philadelphia APPD, so the potential exists for more
data to be collected on low and non-low risk clients, their serious offending, and the
performance of low risk offenders under low-intensity supervision. These data could be
added to an analysis like those presented here, in order to conduct continuous validation
and refinement of the model.
Our analysis shows that the model is also somewhat successful in ensuring that
offenders who might not have committed one of the most serious offenses, but could be
considered serious offenders by other standards, are not channeled into receiving less
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supervision than they might need. When we repeated our analyses of the model using
UCR Part I offenses (those offenses considered by the FBI to be of greater concern to the
authorities, based on severity among other factors), and offenses with victims that were
likely to involve a greater economic cost, we saw similar patterns of offending as for
model-defined severity. The low risk group were still at lower risk of committing these
offenses than the non-low risk group, and our findings about the threshold held relatively
constant. However, using these alternative definitions may defeat the key object of
Philadelphia’s prediction model: to better distribute agency resources according to the
risk of the type of serious offending that poses the greatest threat to public safety and fear
of crime. Only 31 per cent of low risk offenders had ever been charged with such an
offense (3 per cent post-risk assessment), but nearly 70 per cent on average had been
charged with a UCR Part I or victim/damage offense (nearly 9 per cent post-risk
assessment). While these are undoubtedly offenses that contribute substantially to the
crime problem, their high prevalence in a sample of offenders known not to be causing
the worst kinds of harm to society suggests that it is less crucial to focus on these crime
types than homicide, robbery, serious assaults, and sexual crimes.
Our choice of alternative definitions of severity was the main limitation of this
part of the exploration because it was not possible with the available data to create a more
detailed ranking of severity based on different factors. Our two proxy measures were
necessarily too broad because of the difficulties (discussed above) in analyzing limited
data on rare events. They tended to overstate serious offending by including offenses that
might not be considered serious at all when deciding which offenders require more
intensive criminal justice system intervention. UCR Part I offenses, as discussed above,
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are partly selected on the basis of substantive severity, but also on other factors such as
frequency of commission and likelihood of detection. It is clear, given these additional
qualities of the UCR Part I offenses, that any offender, regardless of risk, would be much
more likely to commit some of these offense types. Since there is some overlap of the
most severe crimes in the UCR list with the model-defined serious offenses, it is likely
that the majority of additional UCR Part I offenses committed by the low risk group were
the less serious, more nationally prevalent crimes like motor vehicle theft. Similarly, our
victim proxy for cost likely captured some less serious crimes (substantively or
economically) simply because we selected them based on victim status only. The 1993
dollar estimates provided in Cohen (2000) show that the tangible and quality of life costs
of victim crimes vary widely, not to mention the costs of some non-victim crimes. For
example, the cost per victimization for homicide was thought to be nearly $3 million,
compared to just $2,000 for an assault without serious injury, but our measure included
both.

A more refined analysis of economic severity in comparison to the model’s

definition would require more data, updated cost estimates for a wide range of victim and
non-victim crimes, and more detail about each charge in order to make more accurate
judgments about injury and damage, beyond the simple victim/non-victim distinction.
Additional data on lifetime offending would also allow for some more sophisticated
developmental analyses of severity and offending escalation like the model proposed in
Ramchand et al. (2009).
In all, it would appear that the Philadelphia model has achieved its purpose with
this sample of offenders. Returning to the earlier discussion of the qualities that make the
model a valuable contribution to the risk prediction literature, we can confirm that the
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model provides predictive validity; is directly relevant to correctional priorities in its
focus on the rare but highly harmful crime events of concern to Philadelphia APPD, and
its role in facilitating the most effective allocation of operational resources; and adheres
to the principle of the least restrictive alternative by using a measure of offending severity
that does not overestimate the number of offenders requiring more intensive supervision.
The results of our investigation into a possible interaction between supervision
intensity and serious offending showed no evidence that reducing supervision intensity
for predicted low-risk offenders might increase the risk of serious offending. However,
although the analysis did not indicate a statistically significant interaction effect, we
found that probationers assigned to low-intensity supervision only reduced their
offending compared to controls when they had no prior serious offending history. In
such cases, the probability of a new offense was halved. Low-risk probationers with a
history of serious offending performed no better than their counterparts on traditional
supervision. It is possible that this interaction did not reach significance because of the
very small number of post-RA serious charges during the two-year follow-up period of
the Low Risk Experiment.
This finding provides further evidence that low-intensity supervision can be a
safe, effective probation strategy. The idea that some offenders receiving a low-risk
prediction might have a history of serious offending could be objectionable to
policymakers and the public. However, this analysis shows that reduced supervision is,
at worst, no different from the status quo.

At best, it may reduce reoffending for

probationers with the lowest-level criminal careers. This is also an important discovery
about the nature of low risk offenders in general. It appears that low-level offenders
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make up the majority of APPD’s caseload. Their overall propensity to reoffend at the
time of risk assessment is extremely low. Regardless of their past history, offenders
predicted to be at low-risk of committing a serious crime respond just as well to a less
restrictive intervention as they do to a more intensive one. The less severe their history,
the more likely they are to improve their outcomes, even with minimal involvement from
the criminal justice system. Building such knowledge about the cases that make up the
majority of a probation agency’s caseload could be vital for the planning and allocation
of resources, and the ability to tailor supervision to clients’ needs and requirements.
Our analysis is somewhat limited because of the low prevalence of serious
offending in the sample. With more data, it might be possible to shed further light on the
characteristics of low-level offending to improve probation agency decision-making.
One useful line of inquiry would be to look at the escalation in serious offending up to
the point of random assignment, and whether the timing of the serious priors has any
bearing on their interaction with supervision intensity. Our basic approach of examining
the presence or absence of serious prior offending may mask differences between, for
example, an older offender who was charged with a serious offense twenty-five years ago
and has only committed a few minor offenses since, and a younger offender whose
earliest offenses were trivial but whose career had started to escalate shortly before the
current probation term.

In addition, our measure of serious offending is based on

charges, and as with any crime outcome measure there are numerous factors in the
decisions to charge an offender, and to drop a charge or fail to convict, that are unrelated
to whether or not the offender actually committed the crime.

This is a crucial

consideration in any discussion of the relationship between past and future behavior.
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Although it is unlikely that we would be able to learn the full details of the offense and
subsequent criminal justice decision-making processes, it should be possible to take into
account the ultimate disposition of the charge in future analyses.

Conclusion
This paper examined patterns of offending severity in a sample of probationers in
order to assess how risk can best be predicted and managed for the effective operation of
a probation agency.

As the use of probation continues to grow, and especially as

offenders who pose a significant threat of harm to society are placed under community
supervision, creative resource allocation is required to manage these offenders
effectively.
Risk prediction techniques have been used in probation and other criminal justice
agencies for one-hundred years, with varying success. The Philadelphia Adult Probation
and Parole Department and the University of Pennsylvania developed a new statistical
risk prediction model that differs from other instruments in two main ways: it attempts to
operationalize the clinical, informal decision rules already used by probation officers in
the department, and it focuses only on predicting a handful of crimes considered to be the
most detrimental to public safety and confidence in the criminal justice system. The
ultimate goal in creating the model was to provide a tool for classifying the entire APPD
caseload along risk-based lines, and channeling a majority of offenders who posed little
risk of serious harm into a large caseload receiving reduced intensity supervision. This
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strategy allows probation officers to focus their time and resources on the highest-risk
clients.
We explored the ability of the model to correctly classify offenders as low or nonlow risk, using the sample of offenders who participated in the trial of low intensity
supervision and an additional group of APPD clients who also received low or non-low
risk predictions according to the model.

We also examined the possibility that

assignment to low-intensity supervision could interact with prior serious offending to
increase serious recidivism compared to regular probation. Our analyses revealed that
the model is largely successful, perhaps needing just a slight adjustment the threshold for
defining low-risk. In the context of the APPD’s goal of classifying the majority of its
caseload as low risk, we also found that the crimes defined in the model as ‘serious’
provided a better indication of who the higher-risk offenders were than did UCR Part I
offenses or a simple victim/non-victim crime status indicator. The majority of offenders
predicted by the model to be low risk had committed a ‘serious’ offense by those
definitions at some point in their careers, although their risk of an offense in these
categories remained lower than that of predicted non-low risk offenders. Thus, we
conclude that a statistical model of the type developed in Philadelphia would appear to be
a useful offender and resource management tool.
Proceeding from the assumption that a majority of a probation agency’s caseload
could be classified as low-risk for the most serious recidivism, we discovered that such
offenders respond just as well, if not better, to reduced supervision as they do to
traditional probation. Offenders with no prior history of serious offending appear to
improve their outcomes regardless of probation’s input. This is a strong justification for
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the use of low-intensity supervision with the lowest-level offenders. These clients need
no more than the minimum input of resources necessary to ensure that they are not ‘false
positives’ and have the tools needed to rebuild their lives.

The strength of the

Philadelphia prediction model allows us to say with some confidence that we can identify
a large proportion of offenders who fall into this category. This leaves the agency much
better equipped to deal with the ‘power few’ highest-risk offenders.
Of course, no assessment or validation of a statistical prediction model can bring
complete peace of mind in terms of guaranteeing the offender management approach that
best assures public safety, just as the model itself cannot indicate exactly who will turn
out to be low or high risk. We conclude that the Philadelphia model is successful in
classifying offenders by risk, but 30 per cent of the predicted low risk offenders in our
sample had committed at least one of the most serious offenses at some point in their
adult offending careers.

Some of that group do not react as well to low-intensity

supervision as their counterparts with no history of serious offending, and we do not yet
know why, or if their performance will worsen as more data are collected. We return to
consideration of Grove and Meehl’s (1996) comment: “The statistics furnish us with the
probabilities so far as anything can” (p. 306). Any attempt to routinize criminal justice
decision making will necessarily be concerned with averages, but it seems that
Philadelphia’s probation agency has developed a successful model that can help to
allocate resources where they are needed most, and can easily be adapted for use
elsewhere based on the information available to the specific agency.

171

Notes
1

In this study, murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and sexual offenses were deemed
‘serious’ offenses.
2

Intake information includes the offender’s personal and residential characteristics, and information about
the instant offense and prior criminal history.
3

Full details about the experimental design and how the sample was selected, assessed for eligibility, and
randomly assigned may be found in Barnes et al. (forthcoming).
4

An alternative approach could be to use incarceration status as a proxy for cost. The disadvantage is that
we must use either actual incarceration data for our sample, or assume the types of offenses that might
result in a sentence of imprisonment. Assumptions may be too subjective given the discretion involved in
sentencing (although state sentencing guidelines could assist), and full incarceration data are not available
for our sample. In particular, it is possible that some post-random assignment sentencing decisions are still
pending given the relatively short period of time since the experiment ended. While assigning victim status
to each offense type also involves assumptions, the level of subjectivity is likely considerably lower than it
would be for incarceration.
5

Most offenses in the dataset are derived from the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, Section 18 (Crimes
and Offenses).
6

The risk ratio is simply pE=1/pE=0 (where p = probability and E = dichotomous exposure status), whereas
the odds ratio is (p/(1-p)E=1)/(p/(1-p)E=0). The odds ratio tends to overstate our ‘natural’ interpretation of
relative outcomes: if the exposed group has a 50% risk of disease and the unexposed group has a 25% risk,
the risk ratio is clearly 2 (the exposed group is twice as likely to get the disease than the unexposed group),
but the odds ratio is 3 (the odds of disease in the exposed group are three times those of disease in the
unexposed group), which seems greater. The risk ratio also remains stable regardless of the size of the risk;
the magnitude of the odds ratio is closer to the risk ratio when the probability of disease in each group is
small, and further away when it is large. Following the example above, if the risks were reduced to 20%
and 10% respectively, the risk ratio would still be 2 but the odds ratio would fall to 2.25.
7

In addition, an adjusted risk ratio that is substantially different from the unadjusted risk ratio (a 10-15%
difference is a commonly-used rule of thumb) suggests that the stratifying variable is a confounder.
8

The race indicator variable was populated with data from two different sources, with one source selected
as the default. However, serious discrepancies arose because the categories of race in the two original
sources were substantially different.
9

On the other hand, it is also possible that non-low risk probationers are in fact more serious offenders, and
are more likely to be incarcerated as a result.
10

That past behavior is one of the strongest predictors of future behavior is one of the best documented
findings in criminological research (e.g., Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Nagin & Farrington, 1992).
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Tables
Table 3.1: Sample Characteristics (Full Sample)
Non-Low Risk Group
(N=1,015)

66.9
39.6
40.71

87.4***
24.4***
31.00***

99.9
22.43
22.7
1.46

99.9***
45.00***
37.5***
3.03***

30.8
1.08
3.4
.13
68.5
5.84
9.1
.34
67.4
5.87
8.2
.41

78.4***
5.00***
10.2***
.38***
89.7***
11.69***
15.7***
.62***
90.1***
14.34***
17.5***
.91***

Victim/
Damage

UCR
Part I

ModelDefined

Offender Characteristics
% Male
% White
Mean age
All Charges
%
Lifetime
Mean
Post-Risk
%
Assessment
Mean
Serious Charges
%
Lifetime
Mean
%
Post-Risk
Assessment Mean
%
Lifetime
Mean
%
Post-Risk
Assessment Mean
%
Lifetime
Mean
%
Post-Risk
Assessment Mean

Low Risk Group
(N=1,603)

*** p < .001, 2-tailed z (proportion) & 2-tailed t (mean).
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Table 3.2: Sample Characteristics (Experimental Sample)

Victim/
Damage

UCR
Part I

ModelDefined

Offender Characteristics
% Male
% White
Mean age
All Charges
%
Pre-RA
Mean
%
Post-RA
Mean
Serious Charges
%
Pre-RA
Mean
%
Post-RA
Mean
%
Pre-RA
Mean
%
Post-RA
Mean
%
Pre-RA
Mean
%
Post-RA
Mean

Treatment Group
(N=800)

Control Group
(N=759)

66.5
41.8
40.78

67.6
38.0
40.58

99.6
20.99
21.5
1.31

99.9
20.87
21.5
1.44

29.5
1.02
2.5
.13
65.9
5.19
8.0
.32
65.1
5.41
6.9
.34

27.9
.89
4.1
.13
67.7
5.73
9.6
.34
65.4
5.51
8.7
.42

No significant differences. 2-tailed z (proportion) & 2-tailed t (mean).

Table 3.3: Prevalence and Frequency of Post-Risk Assessment Serious Offending by Risk
Level
Low Risk
Non-Low Risk
(N=1,603)
(N=1,015)
% Serious
3.4
10.2
Model-Defined
Risk Ratio
.33***
Mean
.13
.38***
% Serious
9.1
15.7
UCR Part I
Risk Ratio
.58***
Mean
.34
.62***
% Serious
8.2
17.5
Victim/Damage
Risk Ratio
.47***
Mean
.41
.91***
*** p < .001, χ2 (prevalence) & 2-tailed t (frequency).
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Table 3.4: Types of Post-Risk Assessment Serious Charges by Risk Level
Low Risk Group
(N=1,603)
.2
.2
.3
.1
2.1
1.6

% Charged
Homicide
Murder
Sexual Offense
Forcible Rape
Aggravated Assault
Robbery/Carjacking

Non-Low Risk Group
(N=1,015)
1.5***
1.4***
.9**
.4
7.6***
3.5***

Includes attempts, except “Murder,” which includes only completed of the first to third degrees.
** p ≤ .01, *** p < .001, 2-tailed z.

Table 3.5: Predictive Ability at Alternative Thresholds (Model-Defined Severity)
Cutpoint

Positive
Predictive
Value (%)

Negative
Predictive
Value (%)

Sensitivity
(%)

Specificity
(%)

False
Positives
(%)

False
Negatives
(%)

0.05

94.0

-

100.0

0.0

6.0

-

0.1

94.0

-

100.0

0.0

6.0

-

0.15

94.0

-

100.0

0.0

6.0

-

0.2

94.1

60.0

99.9

1.9

5.9

40.0

0.25

94.5

27.6

98.3

10.1

5.5

72.4

0.3

94.9

18.8

94.2

20.9

5.1

81.3

0.35

95.1

13.2

86.9

31.0

4.9

86.8

0.4

95.9

13.2

79.9

47.5

4.1

86.8

0.45

96.1

11.0

71.3

55.1

3.9

89.0

0.5

96.6

10.2

63.0

65.8

3.4

89.8

0.55

97.3

9.3

50.7

78.5

2.7

90.7

0.6

97.6

8.2

39.1

84.8

2.4

91.8

0.65

97.4

7.4

29.4

88.0

2.6

92.6

0.7

97.8

7.0

20.3

93.0

2.2

93.0

0.75

98.1

6.6

12.7

96.2

1.9

93.4

0.8

98.9

6.4

7.4

98.7

1.1

93.6

0.85

98.6

6.2

2.9

99.4

1.4

93.8

0.9

100.0

6.1

0.9

100.0

0.0

93.9

0.95

100.0

6.0

0.0

100.0

0.0

94.0
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Table 3.6: Predictive Ability at Alternative Thresholds (UCR Part I Offenses)
Cutpoint

Positive
Predictive
Value (%)

Negative
Predictive
Value (%)

Sensitivity
(%)

Specificity
(%)

False
Positives
(%)

False
Negatives
(%)

0.05

88.3

-

100.0

0.0

11.7

-

0.1

88.3

-

100.0

0.0

11.7

-

0.15

88.3

-

100.0

0.0

11.7

-

0.2

88.4

60.0

99.9

1.0

11.6

40.0

0.25

88.8

29.3

98.2

5.6

11.3

70.7

0.3

89.1

22.2

94.1

12.8

10.9

77.8

0.35

89.5

18.5

86.9

22.6

10.5

81.5

0.4

90.1

18.1

79.9

33.8

9.9

81.9

0.45

90.4

16.4

71.3

42.6

9.6

83.6

0.5

90.9

15.7

63.0

52.1

9.1

84.3

0.55

91.4

14.6

50.6

63.9

8.6

85.4

0.6

92.0

13.9

39.3

74.1

8.0

86.1

0.65

91.5

12.9

29.4

79.3

8.5

87.1

0.7

92.7

12.7

20.4

87.9

7.3

87.3

0.75

93.7

12.4

12.9

93.4

6.3

87.6

0.8

95.7

12.2

7.7

97.4

4.3

87.8

0.85

93.2

11.8

2.9

98.4

6.8

88.2

0.9

100.0

11.7

1.0

100.0

0.0

88.3

0.95

100.0

11.7

0.0

100.0

0.0

88.3
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Table 3.7: Predictive Ability at Alternative Thresholds (Victim/Damage Offenses)
Cutpoint

Positive
Predictive
Value (%)

Negative
Predictive
Value (%)

Sensitivity
(%)

Specificity
(%)

False
Positives
(%)

False
Negatives
(%)

0.05

88.2

-

100.0

0.0

11.8

-

0.1

88.2

-

100.0

0.0

11.8

-

0.15

88.2

-

100.0

0.0

11.8

-

0.2

88.3

60.0

99.9

1.0

11.7

40.0

0.25

88.6

29.3

98.2

5.5

11.4

70.7

0.3

89.1

24.4

94.2

13.9

10.9

75.6

0.35

89.7

21.2

87.3

25.5

10.3

78.8

0.4

90.6

20.6

80.4

37.7

9.4

79.4

0.45

91.0

18.3

71.9

46.8

9.0

81.7

0.5

91.8

17.5

63.7

57.4

8.2

82.5

0.55

92.8

16.3

51.5

70.3

7.2

83.7

0.6

93.5

15.1

40.0

79.4

6.5

84.9

0.65

93.5

14.0

30.1

84.5

6.5

86.0

0.7

94.9

13.5

21.0

91.6

5.1

86.5

0.75

95.6

12.9

13.2

95.5

4.4

87.1

0.8

98.4

12.6

7.9

99.0

1.6

87.4

0.85

97.3

12.1

3.1

99.4

2.7

87.9

0.9

100.0

11.9

1.0

100.0

0.0

88.1

0.95

88.2

0.0

100.0

0.0

11.8

100.0

Table 3.8: Post-Random Assignment Serious Offending in Experimental Sample
Treatment Group
(N=800)
Model-Defined
UCR Part I
Victim/Damage

% Post
Risk Ratio
% Post
Risk Ratio
% Post
Risk Ratio

Control Group
(N=759)

2.5

4.1
.61

8.0

9.6
.83

6.9

8.7
.79

No significant differences (χ2).
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Table 3.9: Post-Random Assignment Offending Severity Stratified by Prior History
No Serious Offense
Pre-RA
Treatment
Control
564
547

ModelDefined

N
% Post

2.0

Stratum Risk Ratio

4.0

UCR Part I

3.8

.49*

4.2
.90

a

M-H Adjusted RR
N

.61
273

245

527

514

% Post

3.7

6.5

10.2

11.1

Stratum Risk Ratio

Victim/
Damage

Serious Offense
Pre-RA
Treatment
Control
236
212

.56

.92

M-H Adjusted RR
N

279

263

521

496

% Post

3.9

6.8

8.4

9.7

Stratum Risk Ratio

.84

.58

M-H Adjusted RR

.87
.79

2

* p ≤ .05, χ .
a
M-H: Mantel-Haenszel; RR: Risk Ratio.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Philadelphia APPD’s Risk-Based Caseload Stratification

High risk – 10%

Low risk – 60%

Respond to and treat all
offenders the same,
modify with clinical
predictions

Respond to and treat all
offenders based on actuarial
risk of a new serious offense
(Diagram provided by Lindsay Ahlman, Philadelphia APPD)
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Systematic Review Search Strategy
List of Online Databases
1. Australian Criminology Database (CINCH)
2. Campbell Collaboration Social, Psychological, Educational, and Criminological
Trials Register (C2-SPECTR)
3. Criminal Justice Abstracts
4. Dissertation Abstracts
5. Google, Google Scholar, Google Books
6. Government Publications Office Monthly Catalog
7. International Bibliography of the Social Sciences
8. ISI Web of Knowledge
9. JSTOR
10. National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) Abstracts
11. PsycINFO
12. Sage Full Text Collection: Criminology
13. Sage Full Text Collection: Political Science
14. Sage Full Text Collection: Sociology
15. Social Science Citation Index
16. Social Services Abstracts
17. Sociological Abstracts
18. Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
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List of Research Organizations and Government Department Websites
1. American Correctional Association
2. American Probation and Parole Association
3. Home Office Research, Development, and Statistics (U.K.)
4. International Community Corrections Association
5. Ministry of Justice (U.K.)
6. National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (U.K.)
7. National Institute of Corrections (U.S.A.)
8. National Institute of Justice (U.S.A.)
9. National Offender Management Service (U.K.)
10. National Probation Service (U.K.)
11. Pew Center on the States (U.S.A.)
12. RAND Corporation (chiefly U.S.A.)
13. Swedish National Council on Crime Prevention (BRÅ)
14. Urban Institute (U.S.A.)
15. Vera Institute of Justice (U.S.A.)
16. Washington State Institute of Public Policy (U.S.A.)

Keywords
The following search strings of key words were used to search the databases and
websites, adapted as necessary to meet the requirements of the different search engines.
Where including all the search terms was problematic, we opted for the broadest possible
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combination. The search terms were deliberately left broad (they do not include limiting
terms such as ‘evaluation,’ ‘experiment,’ ‘trial’) so that relevant background literature
could also be systematically obtained through the searches. ‘*’ indicates where terms
were truncated to find all possible variants of the word:
probation* AND supervis* AND case* AND (intens* OR frequen* OR ratio)
AND (recidiv* OR *arrest* OR *convict*)

Electronic Search Results
Total Hits: 30,591
(Includes duplicates within and across databases)

Potential Study Reports: 528
(Includes duplicates)

Report Title and Abstract Screening: 410

Reports Retrieved and Coded
in Full: 194*

Passed screen but could not be
obtained: 45**

Eligible Reports: 21***

Ineligible: 102

Experiments: 38
Independent Studies
(Modules): 47

Quasi-experiments and RCTs
with high attrition: 9

* Reports not classed ‘eligible’ or ‘ineligible contained supplementary information on eligible studies or
relevant background literature.
** Some of these reports may include information that was obtained from other retrieved documents.
*** Includes some studies obtained from sources other than the electronic search.
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Appendix B: Systematic Review Coding Protocol
A. STUDY LEVEL CODING SHEET
Instructions: One study level coding sheet to be used per study. If the study is reported in
multiple documents, use the primary publication as the study identifier and list other document
numbers below.
A1. Study ID:

studid

A2. Cross-ref document ID:

xref1

A3. Cross-ref document ID:

xref2

A4. Cross-ref document ID:

xref3

A5. Coder initials:

coder

A6. Date coded:

codate

A7. Title:

title

A8. Author(s):

author

A9. Publication type:
1. Book
2. Book chapter
3. Peer-reviewed journal article
8. Other:

pubtype
4. Government report (federal)
5. Government report (state/local)
6. Unpublished (e.g., dissertation, technical
report, conference paper

A10. Journal ref. (vol., issue):

jref

A11. Publication year:

pubyr

A12. Date range of research:

resdate

A13. Country of publication:

publoc

A14. Country of study setting:

resloc

A15. Number of treatment-comparison contrasts in report:

mods

Only independent treatment group samples should be counted; see Instructions for Section B.
If no comparison group, just complete B. ELIGIBILITY CHECKLIST.
A16. Is the same comparison group used in each contrast?
0. No
1. Yes
8. N/A
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cxlmod

B. ELIGIBILITY CHECKLIST
B1. First author’s last name:

elname

B2. Coder initials:

coelig

B3. Date eligibility determined:

eldate

To be eligible, a study must meet the following criteria. Answer each question with 1 = Yes,
0 = No.
B4. The study evaluates an intensive probation or parole program involving increased supervision
by probation officers in a reduced caseload, or low-intensity probation (increased caseload, less
supervision).
1. Yes
0. No
evpro
B5. A difference in probation intensity between the treatment and comparison groups, as
evidenced by a change in caseload size, ratio of clients to officers, or other control measures, is a
key component of the overall program.
1. Yes
0. No
evsep
B6. The study includes a comparison group receiving ‘standard probation,’ not comprised of
dropouts from ISP/low intensity, or other supervision by probation officer (not incarcerated
controls). Study design may be experimental or quasi-experimental, but not a one-group research
design.
1. Yes
0. No
evcomp
B7. The study includes a post-program measure of criminal behavior (arrest, conviction) or
technical violation of probation/parole – may be official or self-reported and dichotomous or
continuous.
1. Yes
0. No
evoutc
For documents that do not meet the above criteria, answer the following questions:
B8. Document is not a quantitative evaluation (no data regarding effects of ISP/LIP reported).
1. Yes
0. No
evndat
B9. Document is a review article relevant to this project (e.g., references to studies, background
information for write-up).
1. Yes
0. No
evusef
B10. Document status (circle one):
1. Eligible
0. Not eligible
9. Relevant review

elstat

Notes:
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C. TREATMENT-COMPARISON CODING SHEET
Instructions: If the study reports on multiple treatment-comparison contrasts, or multiple
treatments compared to a single comparison group, each contrast should be coded on separate
Treatment-Comparison Coding Sheets. Only independent evaluations should be included in
analyses (i.e., multiple treatment groups should not have overlapping participants).
Identifying Information
C1. Study ID:

studid

C2. Module ID:

modid

C3. Coder initials:

comod

Program Details
C4. Description of what happens to treatment group:

txdesc

C5. Description of what happens to control group:

cxldesc

C6. Primary program type:
1. Increase in probation intensity
2. Decrease in probation intensity
8. Other:

progtype

C6a. If increased intensity, what was the precise nature of the program?
1. ‘Front door’ prison diversion (probation instead of prison)
2. ‘Backdoor’ prison diversion (early release from prison)
3. Enhanced probation
4. Enhanced parole
5. Enhanced probation and parole
8. Other:

progdesc

C6b. Primary program components (indicate whether present or not):
Program increases ratio of clients to probation officers
Program decreases ratio of clients to probation officers
Program increases frequency of contact with probation officer
Program decreases frequency of contact with probation officer
Program increases drug testing requirements
Program decreases drug testing requirements
Other:

1. Yes
1. Yes
1. Yes
1. Yes
1. Yes
1. Yes
1. Yes

C6c. If Yes for any of the above, state exact numbers if available (999 if not):
Control ratio:
/ Treatment ratio:
Control freq:
/ Treatment freq:
Control drug tests:
/ Treatment drug tests:
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0. No
0. No
0. No
0. No
0. No
0. No
0. No

progir
progdr
progif
progdf
progidt
progddt
progoth

racxl/ratx
frcxl/frtx
drcxl/drtx

Other:

txcxloth

C6d. Additional program components (indicate whether present or not):
Curfew
1. Yes 0. No
Drug treatment
1. Yes 0. No
Electronic monitoring
1. Yes 0. No
Employment program/assistance
1. Yes 0. No
Halfway house
1. Yes 0. No
Home visits
1. Yes 0. No
House arrest
1. Yes 0. No
Offense-specific treatment
1. Yes 0. No
(e.g., sex offender treatment)
Other treatment
1. Yes 0. No
Other:
1. Yes 0. No
C7. What happened to the comparison group?
1. ‘Supervision as usual’
8. Other:

addcomp_curf
addcomp_drug
addcomp_em
addcomp_cmpl
addcomp_hh
addcomp_hv
addcomp_harr
addcomp_offtx
addcomp_tx
addcomp_oth
cxltype

C8. Was supervision for treatment group provided by anyone other than probation officer?
posup
0. No
1. Yes (explain):
9. Don’t know/can’t tell
C9. Length of intervention in months (weeks/4.3):
Minimum:
Maximum:
Mean:
Fixed (same for all subjects):

txlmin
txlmax
txlmn
txlfix

C10. Did the intervention follow a set protocol?
0. No
1. Yes
9. Don’t know/can’t tell

txprot

C11. What supervision philosophy was stated?
1. Control/surveillance
8. Other:
2. Treatment
3. Hybrid
9. Don’t know/not stated

txphil

C12. Did the intervention remain consistent over time?
0. No
1. Yes
9. Don’t know/can’t tell

txcons

Methodological Rigor
C13. Control variables used in statistical analyses to account for initial group differences?
0. No
cxlvars
1. Yes
C14. Subject-level matching?

matched
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0. No
1. Yes
C15. Random assignment to conditions?
0. No
1. Yes

rassgt

C16. Measurement of prior criminal involvement?
0. No
1. Yes

prior

C17. Rating of initial similarity between treatment and control group:

prsim

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

(1 = Nonrandomized; high likelihood of baseline differences between groups or known differences related
to future recidivism)
(5 = Nonrandomized design with strong evidence of initial equivalence)
(7 = Randomized design with large N or small N design with matching)

C18. Was attrition discussed in the report?
0. No
1. Yes

attrep

C19. Is there a potential threat to generalizability from overall attrition?
0. No
1. Yes

attgen

C20. Is there a potential threat to internal validity from differential attrition?
0. No
1. Yes

attint

C21. Did the statistical analysis attempt to control for differential attrition effects?

attstat

0. No
1. Yes
9. Don’t know/can’t tell
C22. Statistical significance testing used?
0. No
1. Yes

sigtest

C23. Overall methodology rating
methrat
1. Comparison group lacks demonstrated comparability to treatment group
2. Comparison between 2+ groups, one with and one without the intervention
3. Comparison between program group and one or more control groups, controlling for other
factors, or nonequivalent comparison group is only slightly different from program
group, or randomized controlled trial with high attrition
4. Random assignment and analysis of comparable program and comparison groups,
including controls for attrition
Notes on methodology:

187

D. SAMPLE LEVEL CODING SHEET
Instructions: A study may report results separately for distinct samples (e.g., persons with/without
prior arrests). Each distinct sample must have its own coding sheet. The treatment-comparison
contrast is the same for the different samples.
Samples should be independent; i.e., no overlapping participants. Some studies report the results
broken down by different subgroups (e.g., by gender). Only one of these breakouts can be used –
choose the one with the most information, or the one most relevant to the review.
Identifying Information
D1. Study ID:

studid

D2. Module ID:

modid

D3. Sample ID:

sampid

D4. Coder initials:

cosamp

Sample Description
D5. Description of treatment group sample:

txsamp

D6. Description of comparison group sample:

cxlsamp

D7. Total N in treatment group at beginning of study:

txn

D8. Total N in comparison group at beginning of study:

cxln

Note: D7 + D8 = total sample size prior to attrition. If multiple samples are being coded, the
sum across samples must equal the total sample size prior to attrition.
D9. Age range of study participants:
1. Adolescent (12-18)
2. Youth (18-21)
3. Adult (21+)
4. Adolescent and youth

sampage
5. Youth and adult
6. Adolescent, youth, and adult
8. Other:
9. Unspecified/can’t tell

D10. Youngest age included in sample (999 if unknown):

yage

D11. Oldest age included in sample (999 if unknown):

oage

D12. Exact proportion of males in sample (if known):

prmale

D13. Approximate gender description of sample:
1. All male (>90%)
2. More males than females (60-90%
male)
3. Roughly equal males and females
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sampgen
4. More females than males (60-90%
female)
5. All female (>90%)
9. Can’t tell

D14. Race/ethnicity of sample (999 if unknown):
% Asian:
rasian % Native American:
% Black:
rblack % White:
% Hispanic:
rhisp % Other:
D15. General offender type:
1. Violent and/or person crimes
2. Nonviolent and/or nonperson crimes
3. Mixed: violent/nonviolent
4. Specialized caseload: drugs
5. Specialized caseload: sex offenders

rnative
rwhite
rother

offtype
6. Specialized caseload: mental health
7. Specialized: domestic violence
8. Other:
9. Don’t know/can’t tell

D16. Composition of supervised offenders:
1. All probationers
2. All parolees
3. Probationers and parolees

offcomp

D16a. If combination of probationers and parolees (999 if unknown):
% probation:
pcpro % parole:
D17. Probationer/parolee risk level:
1. Low risk
2. Medium risk
3. High risk
4. Low and medium risks
5. Medium and high risks

pcpar
offrisk

6. All risk levels
7. No risk assessment
8. Other:
9. Don’t know/can’t tell

D18. How was risk determined?
1. Statistical model
2. Prior convictions
3. Instant offense
4. Judgment of probation officer/intake

riskjmt
5. Classification instrument
7. N/A
8. Other:
9. Don’t know/can’t tell

D19. Probationer/parolee need level:
1. Low need
2. Medium need
3. High need
4. Low and medium need
5. Medium and high need

offneed
6. All need levels
7. No need assessment
8. Other:
9. Don’t know/can’t tell
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E. DEPENDENT VARIABLE CODING SHEET
Instructions: Code each dependent variable reported in the study separately. The same dependent
variable measured at multiple times should be coded only once. For non-crime outcomes, code
only items E6, E9, and E10.
Identifying Information
E1. Study ID:

studid

E2. Module ID:

modid

E3. Sample ID:

sampid

E4. Outcome ID:

outid

E5. Coder initials:

coout

Outcome Information
E6. Outcome label (label used in the report):

outlab

E7. Recidivism construct represented by this measure:
1. Arrest
5. Probation revocation
2. Charge
6. Incarceration
3. Conviction
8. Other:
4. Technical violation

rconst

E8. Offense types included in recidivism measure:
All offenses (‘No’ for others)
1. Yes
Drug offenses
1. Yes
Person offenses, sexual
1. Yes
Person offenses, nonsexual
1. Yes
Person offenses, unspecified
1. Yes
Property offenses
1. Yes
Weapons offenses
1. Yes
Driving offenses
1. Yes
Technical or status offenses
1. Yes
Other:
1. Yes
E9. Measurement scale:
1. Dichotomous
2. Trichotomous

0. No
0. No
0. No
0. No
0. No
0. No
0. No
0. No
0. No
0. No

oall
odrug
opsx
opnsx
opuns
oprop
oweap
odriv
otech
ooth
mscale

3. 4-9 discrete ordinal categories
4. >9 discrete ordinal categories/continuous

E10. Source of data:
1. Self-report
8. Other:
2. Other report (e.g., probation officer)
9. Don’t know/can’t tell
3. Official records (police, probation, court, etc.)

dsrce

E11. Length of follow-up period:
1. < 6 months
2. 6-12 months
3. > 1, < 2 years

fulng
4. > 2 years
8. No follow-up
9. Don’t know/can’t tell

E12. Is cost/benefit data for the program included in the study? 1. Yes 0. No
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F. EFFECT SIZE LEVEL CODING SHEET
Instructions: Complete a separate coding sheet for each treatment-comparison contrast for each
dependent variable.
Identifying Information
F1. Study ID:

studid

F2. Module ID:

modid

F3. Sample ID:

sampid

F4. Outcome ID:

outid

F5. Effect size ID:

esid

F6. Coder initials:

coes

Effect Size Information
F7. Effect size type:
1. Baseline (pretest; prior to start of intervention)
2. Post-test (first measurement point, post-intervention)
3. Follow-up (all subsequent measurement points, post-intervention)

estype

F8. Which group does the raw effect favor (ignoring statistical significance)?
esdir
1. Treatment group
3. Neither (ES = 0)
2. Comparison group
9. Can’t tell (ES cannot be used if selected)
F9. Does the investigator report the difference as statistically significant?
0. No
8. Not tested
1. Yes
9. Can’t tell

essig

F10. If tested, what type of statistical test was used?
1. t test
7. N/A
2. F test
8. Other:
2
3. χ
9. Can’t tell

estest

4. Regression analysis
F11. Timeframe in months captured by the measure (weeks/4.3)
Minimum:
estmin
Fixed (same for all subjects)
Maximum:
estmax
Mean:
estmn
F12. Timeframe in months from end of program to measurement point (weeks/4.3)
Minimum:
esfumin
Fixed (same for all subjects)
Maximum:
esfumax
Mean:
esfumn
Effect size data – all effects
F13. Treatment group sample size for this ES:

estxn
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estfix

esfufix

F14. Comparison group sample size for this ES:

escxl

Effect size data – continuous outcomes
F15. Treatment group mean:

estxmn

F16. Comparison group mean:

escxlmn

F17. Are the above means adjusted?

1. Yes 0. No

esmadj

F18. Treatment group standard deviation:

estxsd

F19. Comparison group standard deviation:

escxlsd

F20. Treatment group standard error:

estxse

F21. Comparison group standard error:

escxlse

F22. t-value from an independent t-test or square root of F value from a
one-way ANOVA with 1 d.f. in the numerator (only 2 groups):

estval

F23. Exact probability for a t-value from an independent t-test or F-value
from a one-way ANOVA with 1 d.f. in the numerator:
F24. Correlation coefficient:

estvalp
escorr

Effect size data – dichotomous outcomes
F25. Number successful in treatment group:

estxs

F26. Number successful in comparison group:

escxls

F27. Proportion successful in treatment group:

estxspr

F28. Proportion successful in comparison group:

escxlspr

F29. Are the above proportions adjusted for pre-test variables?
1. Yes 0. No

espradj

F30. Logged odds ratio:

eslogor

F31. Standard error of logged odds ratio:

eslorse

F32. Logged odds ratio adjusted? (e.g., from logistic regression)
1. Yes 0. No
2

esloradj

F33. χ value with 1 d.f. (2x2 contingency table):

eschisq

F34. Correlation coefficient:

esdcorr

Effect size data – hand calculated
F35. Hand calculated d-type effect size:

eshand

F36. Hand calculated SE of the d-type effect size:

eshandse
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Appendix C: Meta-Analytic Procedures
Odds ratio effect size
The odds ratio (OR) is given by the following formula, based on a 2x2 table:
Events
a
c

Treatment Group
Control Group

ESOR =

Non-Events
b
d

ad
bc

(1)

Analyses are performed on the natural log of the OR and converted back for presentation.
Standard error of the!logged OR:
SE LOR =

1
a

+ 1b + 1c + d1

(2)

Inverse variance weight of the logged OR (fixed effects):
!

w LOR =

1
2
SE LOR

(3)

Heterogeneity (Q-statistic)
!
Q is distributed as a chi-square with k – 1 d.f.

Q = " w i ( ESi # ES )

2

(4)

ESi = individual effect size for i = 1 to k (the number of effect sizes).
ES = weighted mean effect size over the k effect sizes.
wi = weight for ESi .
!

!

Random effects model
A second variance component "# is computed, reflecting between-study error. We use
the DerSimonian and Laird method of moments estimator of "# (5). The inverse variance
!
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!

weight w is then recalculated (6), with "# added to the within-study variance component
2
( " i = SE LOR
) from the denominator of (3) above. If Q is smaller than k – 1 in (5), "# is set

!

!
to 0 and the random and fixed effects weights are the same.

!

"# =

!

Q $ ( k $1)
% w i $ (% w i2 /% w i )

w RANDOM =

!

1
"# + " i

(5)

(6)

Meta-analytic analog to the ANOVA
!
The total variability Q is partitioned into two groups: variability within categories of the
moderator variable ( QW ); i.e., the variability of the effect sizes around the category mean,
and variability between categories ( QB ).
!

(

QW = " w ij ESij # ES j

)

2

(7)

!

!

p

QB = " (ES j w j ) 2 #
j =1

$ p
'2
&& " ES j w j ))
% j =1
(
p

"w

(8)

j

j =1

j = 1 to c for c categories of the independent (moderator) variable.
ES j = weighted mean effect size for each group.

! group.
wj = sum of the weights within each

In the mixed effects analog to the ANOVA, the moderator variable is treated as fixed and

!
the variability between groups is random. Thus, the estimator for the random effects
component is based on QW , not Q (formula not shown). QW estimates from the model are
not interpretable. QB is the meta-analytic equivalent to the F-statistic.
!

!

References: Lipsey & Wilson (2001), pp. 47-49, 54, 115-116, 121.; Wilson (2010), pp. 195-198.

!
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Research
Design

Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

Study

California
1957
(Reimer &
Warren,
1957)

Dorset
1976
(Folkard,
Smith, &
Smith,
1976)

Inner
London
1976
(Folkard,
Smith, &
Smith,
1976)

195
Youth and
adult male
probationers,
1+ prior
conviction
since age 14.

Youth and
adult male
probationers
on all types
of probation
orders.

Treatment
group less
likely to fail on
convictions and
technical
violations.

Treatment
group more
likely to fail on
convictions.

Treatment
group more
likely to fail on
convictions.

90:1 caseload.
No stated
requirements
for contact.
Largely a test
of caseload
size.
Approx 4045:1 caseload,
traditional
probation
services,
around half as
many contacts
as treatment
group.
Approx 4045:1 caseload,
traditional
probation
services,
around half as
many contacts
as treatment
group.

15:1 caseload with
minimum one contact per
week.

20:1 caseload, 1
experimental officer in
each of 4 offices, intensive
intervention in family,
work, and social
situations, offenders
visited in home
environment.

20:1 caseload, 1
experimental officer in
each of 4 offices, intensive
intervention in family,
work, and social
situations, offenders
visited in home
environment.

Adult male
inmates
determined
eligible for
parole and
released.

Outcome

Comparison

Intervention

Population

Appendix D: Details of Included and Excluded Studies

Included Studies
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Research
Design

Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

Study

Sheffield
(Males) 1976
(Folkard,
Smith, &
Smith, 1976)

Sheffield
(Females)
1976
(Folkard,
Smith, &
Smith, 1976)

Staffordshire
1976
(Folkard,
Smith, &
Smith, 1976)

Contra Costa
SOP 1986
(Fagan &
Reinarman,
1986)

Intervention
20:1 caseload, 1 experimental
officer in each of 4 offices,
intensive intervention in family,
work, and social situations,
offenders visited in home
environment.
20:1 caseload, 1 experimental
officer in each of 4 offices,
intensive intervention in family,
work, and social situations,
offenders visited in home
environment.
20:1 caseload, 1 experimental
officer in each of 4 offices,
intensive intervention in family,
work, and social situations,
offenders visited in home
environment.
20:1 caseload, 6-month program,
weekly contacts. Officers
expected to direct clients to
treatment and services based on
needs.

Population
Youth and
adult male
probationers
on 2-3 year
orders with 2+
priors since
age 14.
Youth and
adult female
probationers
on 2-3 year
orders with 1+
priors since
age 14.
Youth and
adult male
probationers
on 2-3 year
orders with 2+
priors since
age 14.
Juvenile
offenders
judged
‘serious’ and a
physical threat
to others.

Routine probation.
Larger caseloads,
monthly contacts,
less opportunity to
build understanding
of needs.

Approx 40-45:1
caseload, traditional
probation services,
around half as many
contacts as
treatment group.

Approx 40-45:1
caseload, traditional
probation services,
around half as many
contacts as
treatment group.

Approx 40-45:1
caseload, traditional
probation services,
around half as many
contacts as
treatment group.

Comparison

Treatment
group
slightly less
likely to fail
on new
arrests.

Treatment
group more
likely to fail
on
convictions.

Treatment
group more
likely to fail
on
convictions.

Treatment
group less
likely to fail
on
convictions.

Outcome
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Randomized
controlled
trial

Atlanta GA
1992
(Petersilia,
Turner, &
Deschenes,
1992b)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Los
Angeles Co
CA 1990
(Petersilia
& Turner,
1990)
Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

Contra
Costa Co
CA 1990
(Petersilia
& Turner,
1990)

Ventura Co
CA 1990
(Petersilia
& Turner,
1990)

Research
Design

Study
40:1 caseload, 1 face-to-face
contact/drug test and 2 phone
calls per week, gradually
reduced. Employment
assistance, counseling, and links
with law enforcement.

Adults convicted
of felony and
misdemeanor
drug use, drug
dealing, and nonviolent drugrelated crime.

Augmented ISP with increased
surveillance (passive
monitoring, officer checks). 40:3
caseload. Rehabilitation,
employment, drug tests,
monitoring of activities. Same
contact level as controls.

Adults convicted
of felonies and
classified as high
risk or convicted
of serious crime.
Prisoners released
to ISP or
probationers due
to be revoked and
returned to
prison. Drug
involved, high
risk/need.

Existing ISP. 12
face-to-face, 10
phone per month,
random drug
tests, job
verification
weekly.

Existing ISP.
50:1 caseload, 2
face-to-face visits
and 1 phone call
per month, no
victim awareness.

19:1 caseload, 4 face-to-face
contacts, 2 phone calls, 1 drug
test per week, plus monitoring
checks, gradually reduced.
Employment assistance, victim
awareness, links with law
enforcement.

Treatment group
more likely to
fail on technical
violations,
arrests, and
convictions. No
convictions in
control group.

Treatment group
less likely to fail
on technical
violations,
arrests, and
convictions.

Treatment group
more likely to
fail on technical
violations,
arrests, and
convictions.

Treatment group
more likely to
fail on technical
violations and
arrests. No
difference for
convictions.

150-200:1
caseload,
infrequent,
discretionary
contact, random
drug tests,
employment
assistance.
250:1 caseload, 1
face-to-face
contact per
month.

Outcome

Comparison

33:1 caseload, 3-5 face-to-face
contacts and 2 phone calls per
week, gradually reducing.
Monitoring checks.

Adults convicted
of felonies and
classified as high
risk.

Intervention

Population
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Randomized
controlled
trial

Santa Fe
NM 1992
(Petersilia,
Turner, &
Deschenes,
1992b)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Des Moines
IA 1992
(Petersilia,
Turner, &
Deschenes,
1992b)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

Dallas TX
1992
(Turner &
Petersilia,
1992)

Houston
TX 1992
(Turner &
Petersilia,
1992)

Research
Design

Study

Probationers and
parolees with
high risk and
need.

35:2 caseload. Initially 12 faceto-face contacts, 8 unannounced
home visits, 4 drug tests per
month. Therapeutic approach:
counseling, job development,
group therapy.

Treatment group
less likely to fail
on technical
violations, more
likely on arrests
and convictions.

60:1 caseload,
routine supervision,
2 face-to-face and 1
office visit per
month, discretionary
testing and treatment
referral.

25:1 caseload with 10 contacts
per month – mix of in-person
office/home visits & telephone.
Employment assistance,
discretionary drug testing.

Adult property
offenders (mostly
male), initially in
prison and high
risk of recidivism
on parole.

Treatment group
more likely to
fail on technical
violations, less
likely on arrests
and convictions.
Treatment group
more likely to
fail on technical
violations and
arrests, but less
likely on
convictions.

70:1 mixed caseload,
routine supervision,
risk determines
contact levels. Most
on highest level: 2
face-to-face and 2
collateral/month.
Discretionary testing.

35:1 caseload. Initially 16 faceto-face, 4 phone contacts and 8
drug tests per month, gradually
decreasing. Curfew. Emphasis
on urinalysis, unannounced
visits and collateral contact
Treatment and employment
mandated.

Probationers and
parolees
convicted of drug
offense or
burglary with
drug abuse
history.

Treatment group
more likely to
fail on technical
violations,
arrests, and
convictions.

Outcome

85:1 caseload, 1
office visit per
month, occasional
home visits, no drug
testing requirement.

85:1 caseload, 1
office visit per
month, occasional
home visits, no drug
testing requirement.

25:1 caseload with 10 contacts
per month – mix of in-person
office/home visits & telephone.
Employment assistance,
discretionary drug testing.

Adult property
offenders (mostly
male), initially in
prison and high
risk of recidivism
on parole.

Comparison

Intervention

Population
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Randomized
controlled
trial

Philadelphia
PA 1993
(Sontheimer
&
Goodstein,
1993)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Waycross
GA 1992
(Petersilia,
Turner, &
Deschenes,
1992b)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

Seattle WA
1992
(Petersilia,
Turner, &
Deschenes,
1992b)

Winchester
VA 1992
(Petersilia,
Turner, &
Deschenes,
1992b)

Research
Design

Study

Prisoners released
to ISP or
probationers due
to be revoked and
returned to
prison. Drug
involved, high
risk/need.

Serious juvenile
offenders

12:1 caseload, weekly
contact with collateral and
out of hours contacts
mandated. Employment
assistance and education.

70-100:1 caseload,
monthly visits,
limited access to
services.

Augmented version of
existing ISP with increased
surveillance (increased drug
testing). 40:3 caseload.
Rehabilitation, employment,
drug testing, monitoring of
activities.

Felony drug
offenders likely
to have high
recidivism and
drug dependent.

24:1 caseload. Initially 12
face-to-face contacts, 4
phone contacts, 4 monitoring
checks per month.
Discretionary drug testing.
Counseling. Halfway house
and detox.

Routine probation
supervision. 85:1
caseload, 4 face-toface contacts per
month, additional
contacts/tests
discretionary.
Existing ISP.
Contact level same
in both groups: 12
face-to-face and 10
phone contacts per
month, random
drug tests, job
verification weekly.
Routine
supervision: 80:1
caseload. 2 face-toface and 2 phone
contacts per month.
Other contact and
testing
discretionary.

20:1 caseload. Focus on
treatment participation,
employment and drug
testing. Initially 12 face-toface contacts and 8 drug tests
per month, gradually
decreasing.

High risk
probationers and
parolees with
drug offenses and
history of abuse.

Comparison

Intervention

Population

Treatment group
less likely to fail
on new arrests.

Treatment group
more likely to
fail on technical
violations,
arrests, and
convictions.

Treatment group
more likely to
fail on technical
violations, less
likely on arrests.
No convictions
in either group.

Treatment group
more likely to
fail on arrests,
technical
violations,
slightly less on
convictions.

Outcome

200
Randomized
controlled
trial

CA Drug
Test 2002
(Haapanen
& Britton,
2002)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Midwest
1998
(Latessa et
al., 1998)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

Minnesota
ISR 1995
(Deschenes,
Turner, &
Petersilia,
1995)

Northeast
1998
(Latessa et
al., 1998)

Research
Design

Study

Parole with enhanced routine
unscheduled drug testing
requirements: 1 every week in
first 90 days of parole then
biweekly.

Youthful
parolees.
Generally serious
offenders with
substance abuse
and other
problems.

Routine parole
with drug
testing only
after arrest.

Treatment group
more likely to
fail on new
arrests.

Treatment group
more likely to
fail on technical
violations but
less likely to fail
on arrests.

200:1 caseload,
less frequent
contacts (about
half the number
in the treatment
group, no
services).

20:1 caseload, about 10
contacts a month, drug testing,
treatment referrals, probation
officers trained in CBT.

Rural population,
mostly white
males (youth and
adult), higher risk
and need levels.

25:1 caseload, 1-2 contacts per
week, drug testing/treatment,
home and office visits,
brokerage for needs assessment
and services.

Treatment group
more likely to
fail on technical
violations but
less likely to fail
on arrests.

100-200:1
caseload, less
frequent contact
(about half that
in treatment
group), no
services.

Parolees
considered a
“public risk
monitoring case”
(high risk).

Urban
population,
mostly males,
youth and adult,
higher risk and
need levels.

Treatment group
less likely to fail
on technical
violations and
arrests; slightly
more likely on
convictions.

Regular parole
supervision.
Larger
caseloads,
fewer contacts
(approx. 3 per
month).

12-15:1 caseload, 4
contacts/month reduced over
time, period of house arrest
followed by curfew, mandatory
40 hours/week of work, drug
treatment or education, random
weekly drug tests.

Outcome

Comparison

Intervention

Population

201
Randomized
controlled
trial

Clallam
WA 2003
(Barnoski,
2003)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Benton/
Franklin
WA 2003
(Barnoski,
2003)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

San Diego
CA 2002
(Howard
et al.,
2002)

Chelan/
Douglas
WA 2003
(Barnoski,
2003)

Research
Design

Study

High risk, first time
juvenile offenders.

High risk, first time
juvenile offenders.

High risk, first time
juvenile offenders.

15:1 caseload. Intensive
supervision and services, whole
family interventions, multi-agency
working, officers and service
providers. Education, home visits,
treatment, education, curfew.

Youths age 15 ½
and under, wards of
court, high risk,
school behavior
issues and family
problems.

25:1 caseload, team approach to
supervision, individualized case
plans for accountability and
services. Programs varied across
sites.

25:1 caseload, team approach to
supervision, individualized case
plans for accountability and
services. Programs varied across
sites.

25:1 caseload, team approach to
supervision, individualized case
plans for accountability and
services. Programs varied across
sites.

Intervention

Population

Treatment
group more
likely to fail on
felony
convictions.

Traditional
probation
supervision,
30-100:1
caseload
(varied across
sites).

Treatment
group less
likely to fail on
felony
convictions.

Treatment
group more
likely to fail on
felony
convictions.

Treatment
group more
likely to fail on
arrests and
technical
violations after
6 months.

40-50:1
caseload, 1
contact per
month.
Regular
probation or
anti-gang unit.

Traditional
probation
supervision,
30-100:1
caseload
(varied across
sites).
Traditional
probation
supervision,
30-100:1
caseload
(varied across
sites).

Outcome

Comparison

202
Randomized
controlled
trial

Kitsap
WA 2003
(Barnoski,
2003)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Cowlitz
WA 2003
(Barnoski,
2003)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

Clark WA
2003
(Barnoski,
2003)

King WA
2003
(Barnoski,
2003)

Research
Design

Study

High risk, first
time juvenile
offenders.

High risk, first
time juvenile
offenders.

High risk, first
time juvenile
offenders.

High risk, first
time juvenile
offenders.

Population

Outcome
Treatment
group less likely
to fail on felony
convictions.

Treatment
group less likely
to fail on felony
convictions.

Treatment
group more
likely to fail on
felony
convictions.

Treatment
group less likely
to fail on felony
convictions.

Comparison
Traditional
probation
supervision, 30100:1 caseload
(varied across
sites).
Traditional
probation
supervision, 30100:1 caseload
(varied across
sites).
Traditional
probation
supervision, 30100:1 caseload
(varied across
sites).
Traditional
probation
supervision, 30100:1 caseload
(varied across
sites).

Intervention
25:1 caseload, team approach to
supervision, individualized case
plans for accountability and
services. Programs varied across
sites.

25:1 caseload, team approach to
supervision, individualized case
plans for accountability and
services. Programs varied across
sites.

25:1 caseload, team approach to
supervision, individualized case
plans for accountability and
services. Programs varied across
sites.

25:1 caseload, team approach to
supervision, individualized case
plans for accountability and
services. Programs varied across
sites.
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Randomized
controlled
trial

Spokane
WA 2003
(Barnoski,
2003)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Skagit WA
2003
(Barnoski,
2003)

Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

Pierce WA
2003
(Barnoski,
2003)

Snohomish
WA 2003
(Barnoski,
2003)

Research
Design

Study

High risk,
first time
juvenile
offenders.

High risk,
first time
juvenile
offenders.

High risk,
first time
juvenile
offenders.

High risk,
first time
juvenile
offenders..

Population

Comparison
Traditional
probation
supervision, 30100:1 caseload
(varied across sites).

Traditional
probation
supervision, 30100:1 caseload
(varied across sites).

Traditional
probation
supervision, 30100:1 caseload
(varied across sites).

Traditional
probation
supervision, 30100:1 caseload
(varied across sites).

Intervention
25:1 caseload, team approach to
supervision, individualized case
plans for accountability and
services. Programs varied across
sites.

25:1 caseload, team approach to
supervision, individualized case
plans for accountability and
services. Programs varied across
sites.

25:1 caseload, team approach to
supervision, individualized case
plans for accountability and
services. Programs varied across
sites.

25:1 caseload, team approach to
supervision, individualized case
plans for accountability and
services. Programs varied across
sites.

Treatment group
less likely to fail
on felony
convictions.

Treatment group
less likely to fail
on felony
convictions.

Treatment group
less likely to fail
on felony
convictions.

Treatment group
less likely to fail
on felony
convictions.

Outcome

204
Mostly male,
convicted of
serious
nonviolent
felonies and
previously
incarcerated.

Randomized
controlled
trial

Quasiexperiment
(matched
sample
design) –
“Close OTI”
only.

New
Jersey
1988
(Pearson,
1988)

Adult female
offenders with
substance abuse
problem.

High risk, first
time juvenile
offenders.

Population

Drug involved
probationers at
high risk of
failing probation.

Randomized
controlled
trial

Randomized
controlled
trial

Research
Design

Hawaii
HOPE
RCT 2009
(Hawken
&
Kleiman,
2009)

San
Francisco
2008
(Guydish
et al.,
2008)

Whatcom
WA 2003
(Barnoski,
2003)

Study

No explicit caseload size or
contact requirements. Intensive
surveillance and services. Median
31 face-to-face contacts, drug tests
and curfew checks per month.
Community service, employment,
offense-specific treatment.

Increased drug testing: random
tests at least once a week with
brief incarceration and nonrevocation for failure.

50:1 caseload, 2 office, home, or
phone contacts per month.
Therapeutic/
advocacy orientation, service
referral, counseling, treatment,
employment assistance.

25:1 caseload, team approach to
supervision, individualized case
plans for accountability and
services. Programs varied across
sites.

Intervention

Treatment
group less likely
to fail on new
arrests.

Treatment
group less likely
to fail on
convictions
after two years.

Ordinary parole.
No further
details, except
that contact
frequency was
much lower than
treatment group
levels.

Treatment
group more
likely to fail on
new arrests.

Treatment
group more
likely to fail on
felony
convictions.

Outcome

Routine
probation with
monthly drug
tests as part of
contact schedule.

100-150:1
caseload,
traditional
probation
supervision.

Traditional
probation
supervision, 30100:1 caseload
(varied across
sites).

Comparison
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18:1 caseload, 3.1 contacts per
month average later reduced to 1.
Drug treatment, curfew, reentry
services, treatment linkages in
community.

High risk male
juvenile parolees
originally placed
in specific
correctional
facility.

Randomized
controlled
trial with
high
attrition.

Randomized
controlled
trial with
high
attrition.

Clark Co
NV 2005
(Wiebush et
al., 2005)

Denver CO
2005
(Wiebush et
al., 2005)

35.1 caseload,
1.7 contacts per
month average.
Caseloads also
reduced to allow
access to
services.

35+:1 caseload,
1.9 contacts per
month average,
regular parole
services.

18:1 caseload, 3.1 contacts per
month average later reduced to 1.
Drug treatment, education, home
visits, house arrest,, reentry
services, treatment linkages in
community.

High risk male
juvenile parolees
originally placed
in specific
correctional
facility.

Quasiexperiment
(matched
pairs design)

Maryland
2003
(Piquero,
2003)

Caseload and
contacts not
specified.
Traditional
probation/parole
supervision.

No explicit caseload or contact
requirements. Intensive
community probation: officers in
neighborhood offices and
conducting home visits and
curfew checks along with police
officers.

Adult
probationers and
parolees in
program
neighborhoods.

Comparison
Routine
probation.
Average 68:1
caseload,
monthly contact.

Intervention
20:1 caseload. Weekly contact.
Home visits, employment
verification, collateral contacts,
record checks.

Quasiexperiment
(matched
pairs design)

Virginia ISP
1994
(Orchowsky,
Merritt, &
Browning,
1994)

Population
Adults 18 and
over at high risk
to community
and in need of
services.

Research
Design

Study

Treatment group
less likely to fail
on arrests,
slightly more
likely to fail on
technical
violations.
No difference in
arrests.
Treatment group
less likely to fail
on convictions,
more likely on
technical
violations.
Treatment group
more likely to
fail on arrest
and convictions,
less likely on
technical
violations.

Treatment group
more likely to
fail on arrests.

Outcome
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Randomized
controlled
trial with
high
attrition.

Quasiexperiment
(matched
pairs
design)

Norfolk VA
2005
(Wiebush et
al., 2005)

Maryland
PCS 2006
(Taxman,
Yancey, &
Bilanin,
2006)

Mostly
probationers and
some parolees,
high risk for
recidivism.

55:1 caseload, emphasis on
nature and content of
contacts. Officer facilitates
behavior management:
treatment and pro-social
activity.

15:1 caseload, 10 contacts
per month average
gradually decreasing. Drug
treatment, education, home
visits, reentry services,
treatment linkage.

New Jersey
ISSP 2005
(Paparozzi &
Gendreau,
2005)
High risk male
juvenile parolees
originally placed
in specific
correctional
facility.

Quasiexperiment
(matched
sample
design)

Los Angeles
CA 2005
(Zhang &
Zhang, 2005)

20-25:1 caseload, treatmentfocused program. Drug
treatment, employment
assistance, public and
family provide assistance.

25:1 caseload, increased
frequency of contact, strong
focus on education and
ensuring access to social
services.

Juveniles under
court supervision,
meeting risk
factors for
delinquency, drug
use and school or
family problems.

Randomized
controlled
trial with
high
attrition.

Mixed youth and
adult parolee
sample – high
risk/need.

Intervention

Population

Research
Design

Study

Caseload not
specified.
Regular parole,
including
services (less
than treatment
group).

Treatment group less
likely to fail on new
arrests and violation
warrants.

Treatment group less
likely to fail on
arrests and
convictions, more
likely on technical
violations.

75-85:1
caseload.
Regular parole
– also received
services but
less so.

100:1 caseload,
regular
probation/parol
e supervision.

Treatment group
more likely to fail on
technical violation
but less likely to be
revoked for new
conviction.

100-150:1,
regular
probation
supervision.

Outcome
Treatment group
more likely to fail on
technical violation
but less likely on
arrest after 6 months
– eventually no
difference.

Comparison

Articles Containing Supplementary Details of Included Studies
Main Study Reference
Deschenes, Turner, &
Petersilia (1995)
Fagan & Reinarman
(1986)

Folkard, Smith, &
Smith (1976)
Guydish et al. (2008)
Pearson (1988)

Additional Documents
Deschenes et al. (1995). A dual experiment in intensive
community supervision: Minnesota’s prison diversion and
enhanced supervised release programs. Pris. J., 75, 330-56.
Fagan & Reinarman (1991)
The social context of intensive supervision: organizational
and ecological influences on community treatment.
In Armstrong (ed.): Intensive interventions with high-risk
youths: promising approaches in juvenile probation and
parole, 341-394.
Folkard et al. (1974). IMPACT Intensive Matched
Probation and After-Care Treatment. Volume I: The design
of the probation experiment and an interim evaluation.
Home Office Research Study 24. London: HMSO.
Chan et al. (2005). Evaluation of Probation Case
Management (PCM) for drug-involved women offenders.
Crime & Delinquency, 51, 447-69.
Pearson (1985). New Jersey’s Intensive Supervision
Program: a progress report. Crime & Delinquency, 31, 393410.
Pearson & Bibel (1986). New Jersey’s Intensive
Supervision Program: What is it like? How is it working?
Fed. Prob. 50, 25-31.

Petersilia & Turner
(1990)

Pearson (1987). Final report of research on New Jersey’s
Intensive Supervision Program. Rutgers University.
Petersilia (1989). Implementing randomized experiments:
lessons from BJA’s intensive supervision project. Eval.
Rev., 13, 435-458.
Petersilia & Turner (1990). Comparing intensive and
regular supervision for high-risk probationers: early results
from an experiment in California. Crime & Delinq., 36, 87111.
Petersilia & Turner (1991). An evaluation of intensive
probation in California. J. Crim. L. Criminol., 82, 610-58.

Petersilia, Turner, &
Deschenes (1992b)

Petersilia & Turner (1993). Intensive probation and
parole. Crime & Just., 17, 281-335.
Petersilia, Turner, & Deschenes (1992). The costs and
effects of intensive supervision for drug offenders.
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Fed. Prob., 56, 12-17.
Turner, Petersilia, & Deschenes (1992). Evaluating
Intensive Supervision Probation/Parole (ISP) for drug
offenders. Crime & Delinq., 38, 539-556.

Sontheimer &
Goodstein (1993)
Taxman, Yancey, &
Bilanin (2006)

Petersilia & Turner (1993). Evaluating Intensive
Supervision Probation/Parole: results of a nationwide
experiment. NIJ Research in Brief.
Goodstein & Sontheimer (1997). The implementation of
an intensive aftercare program for serious juvenile
offenders: a case study. Crim. Just. Behav., 24, 332-59.
Sachwald, Eley, & Taxman (2006). An ounce of
prevention: proactive community supervision reduces
violation behavior. Topics in Community Corrections, 31-8.
Taxman (2006). A behavioral management approach to
supervision: preliminary findings from Maryland’s
Proactive Community Supervision (PCS) pilot program.
Committee on Law & Just./Nat. Res. Council.
Taxman (2006). The role of community supervision in
addressing reentry from jails. Urban Institute/John Jay
College/Montgomery Co., MD Reentry Roundtable.
Taxman (2007). Reentry and supervision: one is impossible
without the other. Corrections Today (April), 98-105.

Wiebush et al. (2005)

Taxman (2008). No illusions: offender and organizational
change in Maryland’s Proactive Community Supervision
efforts. Crim. Pub. Pol., 7, 275-302.
Wiebush, McNulty, & Le (2000). Implementation of the
Intensive community-based Aftercare Program. OJJDP
Juvenile Justice Bulletin. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs.
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Excluded Studies
Study Reference
Adams (2001)
Specialized sex offender probation in Cook
County links supervision, treatment.
IL Criminal Justice Information Auth.
“On Good Authority,” 4(7), March.
Adams & Vetter (1971)
Probation caseload size and recidivism rate.
Brit. J. Criminol., 11, 390-3.
Agopian (1990)
The impact of intensive supervision probation
on gang-drug offenders.
Criminal Justice Policy Rev., 4, 214-22.
Altschuler & Armstrong (1994)
Intensive aftercare for high-risk juveniles:
policies and procedures. Program summary.
US Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile
Justice & Delinquency Prevention.
Austin, Quigley, & Cuvelier (1989)
Evaluating the impact of Ohio’s community
corrections programs: public safety and costs.
National Council on Crime & Delinquency.
Barnoski (2000)
Intensive parole model for high risk juvenile
offenders: interim outcomes for the first
cohort of youth.
Washington State Inst. for Public Policy
Barton & Butts (1990)
Viable options: intensive supervision
programs for juvenile delinquents.
Crime & Delinquency, 36, 238-256.
Barton & Butts (1991)
Intensive supervision alternatives for
adjudicated juveniles.
In Armstrong (ed.): Intensive interventions
with high-risk youths: promising approaches
in juvenile probation and parole, 317-340.
Bayens, Manske & Smykla (1998)
The impact of the ‘new penology’ on ISP
Criminal Justice Rev., 23, 51-62.
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Reason for Exclusion

Unmatched controls.

Unmatched controls.
Outcomes are only reported for the
treatment group.

No evaluation data reported.

Unmatched controls.

Unmatched controls.

Control group did not receive regular
probation supervision (90%
incarcerated).

Unmatched controls.
No crime outcomes.

Study Reference
Benekos & Sonnenberg (1998)
An evaluation of Erie County intermediate
punishment programs.
PA Commission on Crime & Delinquency.
Bennett (1987)
A reassessment of intensive service probation.
In McCarthy (ed.): Intermediate punishments:
intensive supervision, home confinement and
electronic supervision, 113-132.
Bonta, Wallace-Capretta, & Rooney (2000)
A quasi-experimental evaluation of an
intensive rehabilitation supervision program.
Crim. Justice & Behavior, 27, 312-329.
Boudouris & Turnbull (1985)
Shock probation in Iowa.
J. Off. Counseling Services & Rehab., 9(4),
53-67.
Brownlee & Joanes (1993)
Intensive probation for young adult offenders:
evaluating the impact of a non-custodial
sentence.
Brit. J. Criminol., 33, 216-230.
Burkhart (1969)
The parole work unit programme: an
evaluation report.
Brit. J. Criminol., 9, 125-147.
Clear & Shapiro (1986)
Identifying high risk probationers for
supervision in the community: the Oregon
model.
Fed. Prob., 50, 134-141.
Cochran, Corbett, & Byrne (1986)
Intensive probation supervision in
Massachusetts: a case study in change.
Fed. Prob., 50, 124-133.
Cox, Bantley, & Roscoe (2005)
Evaluation of the Court Support Services
Division’s Probation Transition Program and
Technical Violation Unit.
Central CT State Univ.
Dawson & Cuppleditch (2007)
An impact assessment of the Prolific and
other Priority Offender programme.
Home Office Online Report 08/07.
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Reason for Exclusion
Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.
Treatment and control conditions not
sufficiently different in terms of
contact/caseload size changes. More a
test of a case planning strategy.
Primarily a test of electronic
monitoring.
Unmatched controls consisting of
mixed corrections population
(prisoners, parolees, probationers etc.)

No comparison group.

Unmatched controls.

Not a test of probation supervision
intensity (tests the validity of a
classification model).
Not a matched design at the subject
level.

Unmatched controls.

Insufficient data to calculate effect
size.

Study Reference
Deschenes, Turner, & Petersilia (1995)
Minnesota ICS program (ICR is eligible)
See reference in Bibliography.
Diskind & Klonsky (1964)
A second look at the New York State parole
drug experiment.
Fed. Prob., 28, 34-40.
Drake & Barnoski (2006)
The effects of parole on recidivism: juvenile
offenders released from Washington State
institutions: final report.
Washington State Inst. for Public Policy
England (1955)
A study of postprobation recidivism among
five hundred federal offenders.
Fed. Prob., 19, 10-15.
English, Chadwick, & Pullen (1994)
Colorado’s intensive supervision probation:
report of findings.
CO Dept of Public Safety.
English, Pullen, & Colling-Chadwick
(1996)
Comparison of intensive supervision
probation and community corrections
clientele.
CO Dept of Public Safety.
Erwin (1987)
Evaluation of intensive probation supervision
in Georgia.
Georgia Dept. of Corrections.
Feinberg (1991)
Juvenile intensive supervision: a longitudinal
evaluation of program effectiveness.
In Armstrong (ed.): Intensive interventions
with high-risk youths: promising approaches
in juvenile probation and parole, 423-447.
GAO (1993)
Intensive Probation Supervision: mixed
effectiveness in controlling crime.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the
Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime &
Criminal Justice, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives.
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Reason for Exclusion
Incarcerated controls.
Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.
No comparison group.
Control group did not receive regular
probation/parole supervision
(unsupervised release).
Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.
No comparison group.

Unmatched controls.
Control group did not receive regular
probation supervision (halfway
house).

Unmatched controls.

Unmatched controls.
Compared programs did not differ
substantially in intensity.

Unmatched controls.

Study Reference
Giblin (2002)
Using police officers to enhance the
supervision of juvenile probationers: an
evaluation of the Anchorage CAN program.
Crime & Delinquency, 48, 116-137.
Gilbert (1977)
Alternate routes: a diversion project in the
juvenile justice system.
Evaluation Quarterly, 1(2), 301-318.
Gray et al. (2005)
Intensive Supervision and Surveillance
Program: the final report.
Youth Justice Board, U.K.
Green & Phillips (1990)
An examination of an intensive probation for
alcohol offenders: five-year follow-up.
Int. J. Off. Ther. Comp. Criminol., 34, 31-42.
Haas & Latessa (1995)
Intensive supervision in a rural county:
diversion and outcome.
In Smykla & Selke (eds.): Intermediate
sanctions: sentencing in the 1990s, 153-169.
Haghighi (1999)
A survey of juvenile intensive supervision
probation (ISP) programs in Texas.
TX Juvenile Probation Commission.`
Hanley (2002)
Risk differentiation and intensive supervision:
a meaningful union?
Ph.D. Diss., Univ. of Cincinnati
Hanley (2006)
Appropriate services: examining the case
classification principle.
J. Off. Rehab., 42, 1-22.
Hanlon et al. (1998)
The response of drug abuser parolees to a
combination of treatment and intensive
supervision.
Prison J., 78, 31-44.

Reason for Exclusion
Intensive supervision component
provided entirely by police officers
rather than probation officers.
No comparison group.
Pretrial program.
Program was not consistently
delivered by probation: not possible to
distinguish outcomes. Program more
of an addition to supervision.
No comparison group.

Unmatched controls.

No evaluation data reported.

Secondary data analysis of a
randomized controlled trial, but
random assignment is not maintained.

No comparison group.
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Study Reference
Hanlon et al. (1999)
The relative effects of three approaches to the
parole supervision of narcotic addicts and
cocaine abusers.
Prison J., 79, 163-181.
Harrell, Adams, & Gouvis (1994)
Evaluation of the impact of systemwide drug
testing in Multnomah County, Oregon
Urban Institute
Harrell et al. (2003)
The impact evaluation of the Maryland Break
the Cycle initiative.
Urban Institute.
Harris, Gingerich, & Whittaker (2004)
The ‘effectiveness’ of differential supervision.
Crime & Delinquency, 50, 235-271.
Irish (1990)
Crime, criminal justice and probation:
preliminary analysis of selected programs in
the Criminal Division for 1989.
Nassau Co. Probation Dept.
Jernigan & Kronick (1992)
Intensive parole: the more you watch, the
more you catch.
J. Off. Rehab., 17(3/4), 65-76.
Johnson, Austin, & Davies (2003)
Banking low-risk offenders: is it a good
investment?
Inst. on Crime, Justice & Corrections, George
Washington Univ.
Kurtz & Linnemann (2006)
Improving probation through client strengths:
evaluating strength based treatments for at
risk youth.
Western Criminol. Rev., 7, 9-19.
Land, McCall & Williams (1990)
Something that works in juvenile justice: an
evaluation of the North Carolina court
counselors’ intensive protective supervision
randomized experimental project 1987-1989.
Evaluation Review 14, 574-606.
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Reason for Exclusion
Primarily a test of a treatment program
not delivered by probation/parole
officers.
Unmatched controls.
No offender-level outcomes for posttrial probation experiment.
Unmatched controls.
Not a test of probation supervision
intensity (more risk classification).
Unmatched controls.
Review of programs with unmatched
comparisons.

Unmatched controls.

Unmatched controls.

Unmatched controls.
Some outcomes reported for treatment
group only.
Supervision provided by juvenile
court to mostly non-criminal juvenile
status offenders (runaways, truants
etc.)

Study Reference
Lasater et al. (n.d.)
School-based probation intervention results
with high-risk youth in Montana.
Character Development Systems, LLC.
Latessa & Travis (1988)
The effects of intensive supervision with
alcoholic probationers.
J. Off. Counseling, Services & Rehab., 12(2),
175-190.
Latessa & Vito (1988)
The effects of intensive supervision on shock
probationers.
J. Crim. Just., 16, 319-330
Lattimore et al. (2005)
Evaluation of the juvenile Breaking the Cycle
program
RTI International/NIJ
Martin & Inciardi (1997)
Case management outcomes for druginvolved offenders.
Prison J., 77, 168-183.
Maupin (1993)
Risk classification systems and the provision
of juvenile aftercare.
Crime & Delinquency, 39, 90-105.
Meisel (2001)
Relationships and juvenile offenders: the
effects of Intensive Aftercare Supervision.
Prison J., 81, 206-245.
MI Dept of Corrections (2002)
530 probationers use automated reporting
kiosks (Jan. 17).
MI Dept of Corrections Staff News Bulletin.
MN Office of the Legislative Auditor
(2005)
Community supervision of sex offenders:
evaluation report.
Nath (1974)
Intensive Supervision Program: final report.
Florida Parole Commission.
National Council on Crime & Delinquency
(2001)
Evaluation of the RYSE program: Alameda
County Probation Department.
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Reason for Exclusion
Primarily a test of cognitivebehavioral therapy.
Unmatched controls.
Limited matching of controls. Higher
risk and need offenders selected into
treatment group.
Not independent of larger study in
Latessa (1987).
Probation component is not a key part
of the program. Increased supervision
and drug testing are outcomes rather
than part of the process.
Primarily a test of a treatment program
not delivered by probation officers.
No crime outcomes.
No comparison group or crime
outcomes. Investigates how
supervision intensity differs by risk
level.
No crime outcomes.
No evaluation data reported. No
indication that an evaluation was
conducted.
No evaluation data or crime outcomes
reported.
Insufficient data to calculate effect
sizes: sample sizes not provided for
recidivism outcomes.
Pre-trial program examining
placement into treatment and services.

Study Reference
Otoyo (1983)
A study of the relationship of increased
supervisory contacts to recidivism.
Ed.D. Diss., Pepperdine Univ.
Petersilia (1989)
Probation and felony offenders.
Fed. Prob., 49, 4-9.
Petersilia & Turner (1990)
Los Angeles Electronic Supervision
(other programs, including Los Angeles nonEM, are eligible).
See reference in Bibliography.
Petersilia & Turner (1990)
Diverting prisoners to intensive probation:
results of an experiment in Oregon.
RAND Corp.
Petersilia & Turner (1993)
Evaluating Intensive Supervision
Probation/Parole: results of a national
experiment.
[Marion Co., OR & Milwaukee, WI only.
Other studies eligible.]
NIJ Research in Brief
Petersilia, Turner, & Deschenes (1992b)
Macon, GA program (others are eligible)
See reference in Bibliography.
Reichel & Sudbrack (1994)
Differences among eligibles: who gets an ISP
sentence?
Fed. Prob., 58, 51-58.
Rengifo & Scott-Hayward (2008)
Assessing the effectiveness of intermediate
sanctions: Multnomah County, Oregon.
Vera Inst. of Justice Report Summary.
Rhyne & Hamblin (2008)
What works with the DV offender? Services,
sanctions and supervision.
Multnomah Co. Dept of Community Justice,
Portland, OR.
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Reason for Exclusion
Not a test of probation supervision
intensity (looked at type of contact
rather than frequency).
No comparison group.
Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.
Electronic monitoring is the only
difference between treatment and
control programs.

Incarcerated controls.

Electronic monitoring is the only
difference between treatment and
control programs.
Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.
Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.

No comparison group.

Study Reference
Robertson (2000)
Comparison of community-based models for
youth offenders. Part 1: Program
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.
Soc. Sci. Res. Cen., MS State Univ./NIDA
Robertson & Blackburn (1984)
An assessment of treatment effectiveness by
case classification.
Fed. Prob., 48, 34-38.
Romero & Williams (1983)
Group psychotherapy and intensive probation
supervision with sex offenders.
Fed. Prob., 47, 36-41.
Rossman et al. (1999)
Confronting relapse and recidivism: case
management and aftercare services in the
OPTS program.
Urban Institute.
Rubin & Dodge (2009)
Probation in Maine: setting the baseline.
Univ. of Southern ME Muskie School of
Public Service/NIC
Sawyer (1975)
The effects of community probation unit
services versus conventional probation
services on recidivism by juvenile
probationers.
Ph.D. Diss., Brigham Young Univ.
Seng et al. (2000)
A comparison of evaluation findings on sex
offender probation projects in six Illinois
counties.
IL Criminal Justice Information Auth.
Serin, Vuong, & Briggs (2003)
Intensive supervision practices: a preliminary
examination.
Correctional Service of Canada.
Simon (2008)
Effectiveness of the Probation and Parole
Service Delivery Model (PPSDM) in reducing
recidivism.
M.A. Thesis, Univ. of Saskatchewan
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Reason for Exclusion

Unmatched controls.

Primarily a test of treatment
conditions in probation sentences.
Unmatched controls.
Primarily a test of group
psychotherapy.

Insufficient data to calculate effect
size.

Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.

Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.
No systematic change in intensity.
No regular probation comparison
group.
See also Stalans, Seng, & Yarnold
(2002).
Unmatched controls/control group
consists of ISP exclusions.

Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.

Study Reference
Smith (1984)
Alabama prison option: supervised intensive
restitution program.
Fed. Prob., 48, 32-35.
Solomon, Kachnowski, & Bhati (2005)
Does parole work? Analyzing the impact of
postprison supervision on rearrest outcomes.
Urban Institute.
Stalans, Seng, & Yarnold (2002)
Long-term impact evaluation of specialized
sex offender probation programs in Lake,
DuPage, & Winnebago Counties.
IL Criminal Justice Information Auth.
Stalans et al. (n.d.)
Process and initial impact evaluation of the
Cook County Adult Probation Department’s
sex offender program.
No publication details.
Taxman & Thanner (2006)
Risk, need, and responsivity (RNR): it all
depends.
Crime & Delinquency, 52, 28-51.
Texas Adult Probation Commission (1988)
Recidivism study on intensive supervision,
specialized caseloads, and restitution centers
for 1985-1987.

Reason for Exclusion
No comparison group.
No crime outcomes.
Control group did not receive regular
probation supervision (compares
parolees to prisoners released without
parole).

Unmatched controls.
See also Seng et al. (2000)

Not a test of probation supervision
intensity: experiment tests seamless
treatment delivery (sometimes via
probation, but not always).
Not an evaluation. Outcome
comparisons for different types of
disposals.
Limited information on experiment,
but does not appear to be a test of
probation supervision intensity.
No comparison group.
Not a test of probation supervision
intensity (evaluates a probation officer
training program).

Travis County (n.d.)
The probation experiment.
No publication details.

Trotter (1993 & 1995)
The supervision of offenders – what works?
Australian Criminol. Res. Council.
Trusty & Arrigona (2001)
Project Spotlight: first year implementation
overview and recommendations for
improvement.
TX Criminal Justice Policy Council.
No comparison group.
Trusty & Arrigona (2001)
Project Spotlight: program overview, early
implementation issues and outcome measures.
TX Criminal Justice Policy Council.
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Study Reference
Turner & Greene (1999)
The FARE probation experiment:
implementation and outcomes of day fines for
felony offenders in Maricopa County.
Justice Sys. J., 21, 1-21.
Turner & Jannetta (2007)
Implementation and early outcomes for the
San Diego High Risk Sex Offender (HRSO)
GPS pilot program
Cen. for Evidence-Based Corrections, UC
Irvine.
Turner, Petersilia, Deschenes (1992)
Evaluating Intensive Supervision
Probation/Parole (ISP) for drug offenders.
Crime & Delinquency, 38, 539-556.
Turner et al. (2002)
Evaluation of the South Oxnard Challenge
Project 1997-2001.
RAND Corporation.
Ulmer & van Asten (2004)
Restrictive Intermediate Punishments and
recidivism in Pennsylvania.
Fed. Sent. Rep., 16, 182-187.
Van Vleet et al. (2002)
Evaluation of Utah’s Early Intervention
Mandate: the juvenile sentencing guidelines
and intermediate sanctions.
National Institute of Justice.
Virginia Department of Corrections (1988)
Intensive Supervision Program (ISP) final
evaluation report: client characteristics and
supervision outcomes: a caseload comparison.
Vito (1986)
Felony probation and recidivism: replication
and response.
Fed. Prob., 50, 17-25.
Wagner & Baird (1993)
Evaluation of the Florida Community Control
Program.
National Institute of Justice.
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Reason for Exclusion
Not a test of probation supervision
intensity (tests fine payment condition
with no probation supervision).

Unmatched controls (subjects who
score highly on an instrument are
assigned to treatment).
Insufficient data to calculate effect
sizes.
See also Petersilia & Turner (1993).
Supervision for the treatment group
not always provided by probation
officers.
Unmatched controls.

Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.

Unmatched incarcerated or probation
violator controls.
Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.

Incarcerated controls.

Study Reference
Weatherburn & Trimboli (2008)
Community supervision and rehabilitation:
two studies of offenders on supervised bonds.
New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics
& Research: Crime & Justice Bulletin.
Wiebush (1993)
Juvenile intensive supervision: the impact on
felony offenders diverted from institutional
placement.
Crime & Delinquency, 39, 68-89.
Wilson, Denton, & Williams (1987)
Intensive Supervision Program evaluation:
year two.
Kentucky Corrections Cabinet.

Reason for Exclusion
Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.

Unmatched controls.
Sample may overlap with another
eligible study (Latessa & Vito, 1988).

No comparison group.
Wilson (1987)
Intensive supervision in Kentucky: program
procedures and evaluation.
National Institute of Justice.
Wilson, Naro, & Austin (2007)
Innovations in probation: assessing New York
City’s automated reporting system.
JFA Institute.
Wisconsin Dept of Health & Social Services
(1989)
Reducing criminal risk: an evaluation of the
high risk offender intensive supervision
project.
Wodahl (2007)
The efficacy of graduated sanctions in
reducing technical violations among
probationers and parolees: an evaluation of
the Wyoming Department of Corrections’
intensive supervision program.
Ph.D. Diss., University of NE at Omaha
Worrall et al. (2003)
Intensive supervision and monitoring projects.
Home Office Online Report 42/03.
Worrall et al. (2004)
An analysis of the relationship between
probation caseloads and property crime rates
in California counties.
J. Crim. Justice 32, 231-241.
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No comparison group.

Unmatched controls.

Not a test of probation supervision
intensity.
No comparison group.

No evaluation data reported.
No comparison group (macro-level
analysis of the relationship of
statewide crime rates to statewide
natural increases in caseload size).

Appendix E: Philadelphia APPD Low-Intensity Supervision Protocol



Office reporting: Scheduled office visit once every six months. Contact focused on
probation

officer

review

of

residence,

employment,

payments

on

fines/costs/restitution, and compliance with other conditions.


Telephone reporting: Scheduled telephone report every six months, occurring
approximately midway between office visits. Contact focused on confirmation of
details described above. Clients not restricted from initiating telephone contact.



Drug testing: Only administered if required by court order. Probation officer will
order a FIR evaluation after no more than three positive urine tests, and is free to refer
offender to drug treatment if the offender requests it.



Missed contacts: Arrest warrants issued if no case contact for six months. If the
offender surrenders positively, the warrant may be removed with no criminal
sanction.

(Adapted from Ahlman & Kurtz, 2008).
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Appendix F: Logistic, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial, and Two-Stage
Least Squares Regression Models Without Jail Time Controls
Prevalence of Recidivism (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up, Original Table 2.2)
Logistic Regression

Log likelihood = -787.658
Term
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (any charged offense)

Odds Ratio
1.03
.73
1.35
1.06
.98
.72
.57
.29
.79

Number of observations = 1,559
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 47.14
Pr > χ2 = .000
Pseudo R2 = .029
S.E.
z
p
.129
.20
.844
.109
-2.12
.034
.186
2.20
.028
.167
.34
.733
.006
-3.88
.000
.164
-1.43
.153
.138
-2.32
.020
.081
-4.41
.000
.138

-1.36

.174

Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 for goodness-of-fit (8 d.f., 10 groups) = 5.53, p ≤ .699

Prevalence of Recidivism (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up, Original Table 2.7)
Logistic Regression
Log likelihood = -287.943
Term
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged violent off.)

Odds Ratio
.86
.68
3.82
1.03
.97
.63
.41
.21
2.03

Number of observations = 1,559
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 37.48
Pr > χ2 = .000
Pseudo R2 = .061
S.E.
z
p
.205
-.63
.527
.193
-1.36
.173
1.323
3.87
.000
.305
.12
.905
.012
-2.89
.004
.253
-1.14
.254
.179
-2.04
.042
.113
-2.92
.004
.921

Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 for goodness-of-fit (8 d.f., 10 groups) = 9.63, p ≤ .292
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1.55

.121

Prevalence of Recidivism (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up, Original Table 2.13)
Logistic Regression
Log likelihood = -471.825
Term
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged drug off.)

Odds Ratio
.89
.98
2.08
1.22
.97
.62
.49
.29
.96

Number of observations = 1,559
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 34.79
Pr > χ2 = .000
Pseudo R2 = .036
S.E.
z
p
.157
-.65
.517
.207
-.08
.939
.437
3.48
.001
.270
.92
.359
.009
-3.85
.000
.187
-1.59
.113
.160
-2.19
.029
.111
-3.24
.001
.503

Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 for goodness-of-fit (8 d.f., 10 groups) = 14.46, p ≤ .071
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-.08

.937

Frequency of Recidivism (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up, Original Table 2.3)
Zero-Inflated Negative
Binomial Regression

Number of observations = 1,559
Nonzero observations = 335
Zero observations = 1,224
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 27.43
Pr > χ2 = .001

Inflation model = logit
Log likelihood= -1692.398
Full Model
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (any charged offense)
Inflated Model
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (any charged offense)
Constant
Ln(Alpha)
Alpha

Incidence
Rate Ratio
.93
1.17
1.98
1.13
.98
1.53
1.38
1.10

S.E.

z

p

.142
.220
.330
.203
.008
.425
.432
.391

-.44
.83
4.11
.68
-2.12
1.55
1.02
.27

.658
.408
.000
.495
.034
.122
.310
.789

1.24

.249

1.09

.277

b
-.060
.432
-.097
-.018
.023
.612
.858
1.554

S.E.
.154
.189
.176
.193
.008
.332
.356
.397

z
-.39
2.28
-.55
.09
2.91
1.84
2.41
3.91

p
.696
.022
.582
.925
.004
.065
.016
.000

.340

.195

1.59

.112

-1.080
.588
1.800

.561
.207
.373

-1.93
2.84

.054
.005

Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 4.03, p < .001
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Frequency of Recidivism (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up, Original Table 2.8)
Zero-Inflated Negative
Binomial Regression

Number of observations = 1,559
Nonzero observations = 77
Zero observations = 1,482
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 5.20
Pr > χ2 = .817

Inflation model = logit
Log likelihood = -509.488
Full Model
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged violent off.)
Inflated Model
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged violent off.)
Constant
Ln(Alpha)
Alpha

Incidence
Rate Ratio
.93
.95
1.05
1.03
.99
1.64
1.18
1.02

S.E.

z

p

.218
.288
.373
.326
.015
.725
.681
.642

-.32
-.18
.13
.09
-.75
1.12
.28
.04

.748
.858
.894
.928
.452
.263
.779
.969

.48

.263

-1.34

.181

b
.133
.396
-1.340
-.034
.034
.517
.918
1.533

S.E.
.243
.292
.351
.300
.013
.418
.461
.553

z
.55
1.36
-3.82
-.11
2.69
1.24
1.99
2.77

p
.584
.175
.000
.909
.007
.216
.047
.006

-1.198

.871

-1.38

.169

1.577
-.216
.806

.734
.283
.228

2.15
-.76

.032
.445

Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 3.95, p < .001.
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Frequency of Recidivism (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up, Original Table 2.14)
Zero-Inflated Negative
Binomial Regression

Number of observations = 1,559
Nonzero observations = 148
Zero observations = 1,411
Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 14.38
Pr > χ2 = .109

Inflation model = logit
Log likelihood = -737.786
Full Model
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged drug off.)
Inflated Model
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (charged drug off.)
Constant
Ln(Alpha)
Alpha

Incidence
Rate Ratio
.83
1.20
1.47
.86
.98
.96
.89
.59

S.E.

z

p

.134
.231
.323
.175
.008
.261
.276
.223

-1.18
.97
1.75
-.76
-1.97
-.16
-.36
-1.38

.237
.334
.080
.447
.049
.876
.717
.166

1.81

.902

1.19

.234

b
.049
.084
-.607
-.268
.030
.482
.699
1.064

S.E.
.190
.228
.235
.241
.010
.324
.354
.425

z
.26
.37
-2.58
-1.11
.307
1.49
1.98
2.51

p
.797
.712
.010
.266
.002
.137
.048
.012

.168

.544

.03

.757

.662
-.990
.372

.557
.403
.150

1.19
-2.46

.235
.014

Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 3.57, p < .001
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Instrumental Variables Model: Prevalence of Recidivism (All Offenses, 2-Year FollowUp, Original Table 2.5)

Instruments
Assigned LIS
Assigned LIS*West
Assigned LIS*Male
Assigned LIS*White
Assigned LIS*Age
Assigned LIS*Income20
Assigned LIS*Income30
Assigned LIS*Income40
Assigned LIS*Prior offending
Exogenous
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (any offense)
Constant

First Stage
Treatment Take-Up
Observations = 1,559
R2 = .655
Adjusted R2 = .651
b (S.E.)
.823 (.089)***
-.084 (.035)*
.015 (.032)
-.025 (.038)
-.000 (.001)
.034 (.058)
.087 (.061)
.041 (.067)
-.034 (.027)

Reduced Form (ITT)
Post-RA Any Off.
Observations = 1,559
R2 = .031
Adjusted R2 = .020
b (S.E.)
-.092 (.123)
.027 (.049)
-.009 (.044)
.036 (.052)
-.000 (.002)
.080 (.080)
.091 (.084)
.071 (.093)
.048 (.038)

.055 (.025)*
.004 (.023)
.007 (.027)
.001 (.001)
-.007 (.040)
-.013 (.042)
-.005 (.047)

-.066 (.035)
.052 (.032)
-.009 (.037)
-.004 (.001)**
-.094 (.055)
-.139 (.059)*
-.232 (.065)***

-.004 (.022)

-.055 (.031)

-.052 (.064)

.509 (.089)***

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

Second-Stage Instrumental
Variables Regression

Number of observations = 1,559
Wald χ2 (9 d.f.) = 46.13
Pr > χ2 = .000
Any New Charged Offense
R2 = .028
Term
b
S. E.
Z
p
Predicted Treatment Take-up
.006
.026
.22
.827
Constant
.459
.062
7.45
.000
Controlling for region, gender, race, age, SES and offending history.
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Instrumental Variables Model: Prevalence of Recidivism (Violent Offenses, 2-Year
Follow-Up, Original Table 2.11)

Instruments
Assigned LIS
Assigned LIS*West
Assigned LIS*Male
Assigned LIS*White
Assigned LIS*Age
Assigned LIS*Income20
Assigned LIS*Income30
Assigned LIS*Income40
Assigned LIS*Prior offending
Exogenous
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (violent offense)
Constant

First Stage
Treatment Take-Up
Observations = 1,559
R2 = .654
Adjusted R2 = .650
b (S.E.)
.818 (.089)***
-.083 (.035)*
.014 (.032)
-.022 (.038)
-.001 (.001)
.034 (.058)
.085 (.061)
.036 (.067)
-.011 (.100)

Reduced Form (ITT)
Post-RA Violent Off.
Observations = 1,559
R2 = .028
Adjusted R2 = .017
b (S.E.)
-.089 (.065)
.018 (.026)
.007 (.023)
.051 (.028)
-.000 (.001)
.065 (.042)
.058 (.045)
.031 (.049)
-.093 (.073)

.055 (.025)*
.004 (.023)
.007 (.027)
.001 (.001)
-.007 (.040)
-.014 (.042)
-.006 (.047)

-.027 (.018)
.045 (.017)**
-.025 (.020)
-.002 (.001)*
-.053 (.029)
-.070 (.031)*
-.079 (.034)*

-.055 (.083)

.111 (.061)

-.053 (.064)

.167 (.047)***

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

Second-Stage Instrumental
Variables Regression

Number of observations = 1,559
Wald χ2 (9 d.f.) = 35.44
Pr > χ2 = .000
New Charged Violent Off.
R2 = .023
Term
b
S. E
z
p
Predicted treatment take-up
-.008
.014
-.61
.541
Constant
.128
.033
3.91
.000
Controlling for region, gender, race, age, SES and offending history.
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Instrumental Variables Model: Prevalence of Recidivism (Drug Offenses, 2-Year FollowUp, Original Table 2.16)

Instruments
Assigned LIS
Assigned LIS*West
Assigned LIS*Male
Assigned LIS*White
Assigned LIS*Age
Assigned LIS*Income20
Assigned LIS*Income30
Assigned LIS*Income40
Assigned LIS*Prior offending
Exogenous
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year
pre-RA (drug offense)
Constant

First Stage
Treatment Take-Up
Observations = 1,559
R2 = .665
Adjusted R2 = .651
b (S.E.)
.812 (.089)***
-.086 (.035)*
.012 (.032)
-.023 (.038)
-.000 (.001)
.032 (.058)
.083 (.061)
.033 (.067)
.200 (.093)*

Reduced Form (ITT)
Post-RA Drug Off.
Observations = 1,559
R2 = .023
Adjusted R2 = .012
b (S.E.)
-.054 (.088)
.027 (.035)
.034 (.032)
.018 (.038)
.000 (.001)
.004 (.057)
-.010 (.060)
-.013 (.066)
.006 (.092)

.055 (.025)*
.004 (.023)
.007 (.027)
.001 (.001)
-.007 (.040)
-.013 (.042)
-.005 (.047)

-.016 (.025)
.039 (.023)
.009 (.027)
-.003 (.001)**
-.046 (.040)
-.060 (.042)
-.098 (.047)*

-.010 (.055)

.006 (.055)

-.052 (.064)

.254 (.064)***

Second-Stage Instrumental
Variables Regression

Number of observations = 1,559
Wald χ2 (9 d.f.) = 34.39
Pr > χ2 = .000
New Charged Drug Offense
R2 = .102
Term
b
S. E
z
p
Predicted treatment take-up
-.013
.018
-.71
.475
Constant
.230
.044
5.21
.000
Controlling for region, gender, race, age, SES and offending history.
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Appendix G: Conditional Distributions of Selected Model Covariates
and Outcome
Age at RA and Probability of a New Charge

Age

Charged
(%)

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

1 (50.0)
0 (0.0)
4 (23.5)
8 (42.1)
8 (33.3)
5 (20.8)
10 (23.3)
6 (19.4)
20 (35.7)
8 (20.0)
13 (28.3)
9 (25.7)
8 (21.1)

Not
Charged
(%)
1 (50.0)
2 (100.0)
13 (76.5)
11 (57.9)
16 (66.7)
19 (79.2)
33 (76.7)
25 (80.6)
36 (64.3)
32 (80.0)
33 (71.7)
26 (74.3)
30 (78.9)

32

9 (27.3)

24 (72.7)

33 (100)

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

10 (24.4)
8 (26.7)
7 (14.3)
8 (21.6)
10 (21.7)
9 (19.1)
13 (29.5)
12 (27.3)
9 (18.4)
10 (20.4)
6 (12.8)
5 (13.5)

31 (75.6)
22 (73.3)
42 (85.7)
29 (78.4)
36 (78.3)
38 (80.9)
31 (70.5)
32 (72.7)
40 (81.6)
39 (79.6)
41 (87.2)
32 (86.5)

41 (100)
30 (100)
49 (100)
37 (100)
46 (100)
47 (100)
44 (100)
44 (100)
49 (100)
49 (100)
47 (100)
37 (100)

45

13 (26.0)

37 (74.0)

50 (100)

Total (%)
2 (100)
2 (100)
17 (100)
19 (100)
24 (100)
24 (100)
43 (100)
31 (100)
56 (100)
40 (100)
46 (100)
35 (100)
38 (100)
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Not
Charged
Charged
(%)
(%)
46
14 (24.1) 44 (75.9)
47
13 (17.3) 62 (82.7)
48
9 (17.0) 44 (83.0)
49
7 (14.9) 40 (85.1)
50
16 (25.8) 46 (74.2)
51
6 (17.6) 28 (82.4)
52
11 (26.2) 31 (73.8)
53
4 (12.5) 28 (87.5)
54
6 (15.0) 34 (85.0)
55
6 (22.2) 21 (77.8)
56
3 (20.0) 12 (80.0)
57
2 (12.5) 14 (87.5)
58
3 (21.4) 11 (78.6)
15
59
0 (0.0)
(100.0)
60
0 (0.0) 7 (100.0)
61
0 (0.0) 7 (100.0)
62
0 (0.0) 5 (100.0)
63
0 (0.0) 7 (100.0)
64
0 (0.0) 3 (100.0)
65
1 (25.0) 3 (75.0)
66
2 (50.0) 2 (50.0)
67
0 (0.0) 5 (100.0)
68
1 (50.0) 1 (50.0)
69
0 (0.0) 2 (100.0)
70
1 (50.0) 1 (50.0)
71
1 (100.0) 0 (0.0)
335
1,224
Total
(21.5)
(78.5)
Age

Total
(%)
58 (100)
75 (100)
53 (100)
47 (100)
62 (100)
34 (100)
42 (100)
32 (100)
40 (100)
27 (100)
15 (100)
16 (100)
14 (100)
15 (100)
7 (100)
7 (100)
5 (100)
7 (100)
3 (100)
4 (100)
4 (100)
5 (100)
2 (100)
2 (100)
2 (100)
1 (100)
1,559
(100)

Post-RA Months in Jail and Probability of a New Charge
Months in jail
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Total

Charged
N (%)
210 (15.4)
4 (44.4)
2 (28.6)
1 (33.3)
5 (36.5)
1 (20.0)
4 (44.4)
12 (75.0)
7 (63.6)
7 (70.0)
14 (87.5)
12 (70.6)
56 (72.7)
335 (21.5)

Not Charged
N (%)
1,156 (84.6)
5 (55.6)
5 (71.4)
2 (66.7)
8 (61.5)
4 (80.0)
5 (55.6)
4 (25.0)
4 (36.4)
3 (30.0)
2 (12.5)
5 (29.4)
21 (27.3)
1,224 (78.5)
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Total
N (%)
1,366 (100)
9 (100)
7 (100)
3 (100)
13 (100)
5 (100)
9 (100)
16 (100)
11 (100)
10 (100)
16 (100)
17 (100)
77 (100)
1,559 (100)

Appendix H: Diagnostics for Proportional Hazards Models
Scaled Schoenfeld Residuals
All Charged Offenses
Covariate
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year pre-RA
(any charged offense)
In jail Oct 2007
In jail Nov 2007
In jail Dec 2007
In jail Jan 2008
In jail Feb 2008
In jail Mar 2008
In jail Apr 2008
In jail May 2008
In jail Jun 2008
In jail Jul 2008
In jail Aug 2008
In jail Sep 2008
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Rho
-.011
-.008
-.044
-.043
-.026
-.009
.025
.015

Time = time
d.f. = 1 for all covariates
χ2
p
.04
.836
.02
.880
.70
.401
.71
.400
.23
.632
.03
.874
.21
.646
.07
.789

.045

.38

.537

-.021
-.027
.105
-.119
-.010
-.019
.072
-.019
-.008
.081
-.050
.004

.15
.26
3.70
4.75
.03
.13
1.82
.12
.02
2.26
.89
.01

.701
.613
.054
.029
.861
.721
.177
.731
.878
.132
.345
.941

Scaled Schoenfeld Residuals
Charged Violent Offenses
Covariate
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year pre-RA
(charged violent offense)
In jail 1 year post-RA
Scaled Schoenfeld Residuals
Charged Drug Offenses
Covariate
Treatment group
West probation region
Male
White
Age at RA
Income $20,000-$29,999
Income $30,000-$39,999
Income $40,000 or more
Monthly offending rate 1 year pre-RA
(charged drug offense)
In jail Oct 2007
In jail Nov 2007
In jail Dec 2007
In jail Jan 2008
In jail Feb 2008
In jail Mar 2008
In jail Apr 2008
In jail May 2008
In jail Jun 2008
In jail Jul 2008
In jail Aug 2008
In jail Sep 2008
232

Rho
.051
.201
-.031
.196
-.063
-.054
-.051
-.219

Time = time
d.f. = 1 for all covariates
χ2
p
.21
.650
3.01
.083
.08
.782
3.46
.063
.33
.569
.23
.629
.17
.680
3.75
.053

.139

.81

.367

-.276

6.31

.012

Rho
-.032
.043
-.107
-.024
-.025
.032
.059
.133

Time = time
d.f. = 1 for all covariates
χ2
p
.17
.679
.30
.584
1.82
.177
.10
.756
.11
.739
.16
.687
.54
.464
2.64
.104

.076

.41

.522

-.100
-.026
.185
-.169
.019
-.020
.050
-.002
.057
.036
-.113
.004

1.48
.10
5.09
4.26
.06
.06
.38
.00
.48
.19
1.99
.00

.225
.747
.024
.039
.810
.800
.537
.981
.488
.666
.158
.957

Appendix J: Sensitivity, Specificity, and Predictive Value
Outcome
No Serious Offense
Serious Offense
Predicted Low Risk
Predicted Non-Low Risk

True Positive (TP)

False Positive (FP)

False Negative (FN)

True Negative (TN)

Sensitivity (Sn)

Specificity (Sp)

Positive Predictive Value
(PPV)
Negative Predictive Value
(NPV)

Sensitivity
The proportion of true positives (predicted/actual low-risk) identified by the model.

Sn =

# TP
# TP+# FN

Specificity

!
The proportion of true negatives (predicted/actual non-low risk) identified by the model.

Sp =

# TN
# TN+# FP

Positive predictive value

!
The proportion of predicted low-risk cases that are actually low risk (no serious offense).

PPV =

# TP
# TP+# FP

Negative predictive value
!
The proportion of predicted non-low risk cases that are actually non-low risk (commit
serious offense).

NPV =

# TN
# TN+# FN

!
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